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Friedrich Nietzsche witnessed the development of the modern state first-hand, and 
perceptively identified many of its major features. His analysis of modern politics was 
initially marked by a qualified sympathy, or at least thoughtful acquiescence. 
Nevertheless, in later writings Nietzsche became a virulent critic of the modern world, 
sketching out a radically anti-modern political counter-project. Nietzsche’s political 
thought is therefore relevant to both those who want to better understand the foundations 
and leading characteristics of modern politics, and to those who want to explore 
influential criticisms of it. At the same time, it presents a substantial interpretive 
dilemma, since it is not clear how these two poles of Nietzsche’s thought can be squared. 
Indeed, most readers have tended to approach them in isolation from one another, either 
focusing on the radical project of Nietzsche’s late writings, or looking to his “middle 
period” as a welcome-but-discrete alternative. In this dissertation I argue that these two 
poles of Nietzsche’s thought are more closely linked than most readers have realized. 
Drawing on the extensive autobiographical self-assessments that Nietzsche published 
during his last two productive years, I show that he shows that he helps readers to see 
how a critical dialogue between the more moderate and the more radical aspects of his 
thought can be established – and, moreover, that Nietzsche himself subtly engaged in just 
 v 
 
such a dialogue throughout his career. The result is a picture of Nietzsche’s thought that 
is more nuanced and self-conscious in both its criticism and its endorsement of modern 
politics than has been generally appreciated. Moreover, using Nietzsche’s 
autobiographical self-accounts to negotiate the tensions in his writings sheds light on the 
precise motivation lying behind his political ambitions, and thereby also helps to sketch 
out the lines of defense that are required against the sort of anti-modern politics that 
Nietzsche pioneered. 
 vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Abbreviations and Citations…………………………………………….……vii	  
Chapter 1  "And So I Tell Myself My Life":                                                               
An Introduction to Nietzsche's Challenge………………………………………1 
Chapter 2 "A Dithryamb on Solitude":                                                                       
The Puzzle of Thus Spoke Zarathustra………………………………………...27 
Chapter 3 "Tethered Heart, Free Spirit":                                                                    
The Wanderer, His Shadow, and the Monument to a Crisis…………………..56 
Chapter 4 "What Is It To Us That Mr. Nietzshe Has Got Well Again?"            






List of Abbreviations and Citations 
References to Nietzsche’s works are made using the abbreviations and editions listed 
below. The translations have sometimes been modified with reference to the Digitale 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe, ed. Paolo d’Iorio (based on the KGW, listed 
below), available at nietzschesource.org. 
 N.B.: All italics in quotations from Nietzsche are original to his text; words that 
have been underlined represent my own emphasis. 
 
A = The Antichrist. In Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. 
London: Penguin Books, 1990. 
 
AOM = Assorted Opinions and Maxims. In Human, All too Human. Trans. R.J. 
Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
BGE = Beyond Good and Evil. In Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality. 
Trans. Adrian del Caro. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014. 
 
BT = The Birth of Tragedy. In The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings. Trans. Ronald 
Speirs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
 
CW = The Case of Wagner. In Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. 
New York: Modern Library. 
 
D = Daybreak. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
EH = Ecce Homo. Trans. Duncan Large. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
GM = On the Genealogy of Morality. In Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of 
Morality. Trans. Adrian del Caro. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014. 
 
GS = The Gay Science. Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff & Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
HAH = Human, All Too Human. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986.  
 
KGW = Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke. Ed. Giorgio Colli & Mazzino Montinari. 
Berlin: Walter de Grutyer, 1967-. 
 
SE = Schopenhauer as Educator. In Untimely Meditations. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
 viii 
TSZ = Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. Graham Parkes. Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 
2005. 
 
TI = Twilight of the Idols. Trans. Duncan Large. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995. 
 
WS = The Wanderer and His Shadow. In Human, All too Human. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. 




“AND SO I TELL MYSELF MY LIFE”:  
NIETZSCHE’S CHALLENGE 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s indictment of the modern world is well known. He charges 
it with being the vehicle of the “last man”: the last men do not know love or longing, but 
instead know “happiness”, meaning momentary material comfort; seeking comfort of this 
sort, they do not find any glory in sacrifice and struggle, but neither do they revel in 
grand exaltations – they avoid all sorts of exertion; accordingly, they shrink from the 
demands of both ruling and of being ruled – they distract themselves instead with 
“work”; they seek pleasure, but even more, they seek health; they know a little about 
everything, but are deeply concerned with nothing; consequently, they quibble and 
quarrel, but they do not fight ferocious battles; they are careful, they are cautious, “and 
they blink”. As Martin Heidegger has explained, Nietzsche uses this image of blinking to 
indicate that the last men are incapable of despising themselves, and thus lack any 
incentive for overcoming themselves. There is no prospect that they will transform 
themselves into something more than what they are – they can only degenerate. That is 
why they are the “last men”1.  
                                                
1 cf. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, 57-75. The description of the last men is given by 
Nietzsche’s character Zarathustra: TSZ Preface 5. For kindred reflections made by Nietzsche 
directly, see BGE 201-203. 
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 As these remarks suggest, no one has diagnosed the predicament of the modern 
world so starkly as Nietzsche and, as a consequence, no one has spoken of transforming it 
so radically. This is widely acknowledged2. It is less familiar, but still recognized from 
time-to-time, that Nietzsche was not always so hostile to modernity. In writings from the 
middle period of his career, Nietzsche approached modern politics far more 
sympathetically, and even offered cogent arguments in its defense3. Nietzsche is therefore 
a most fitting late-modern thinker in at least this respect: he presents us with both a stout 
defense of the modern world, and an incendiary attack on it. 
Nevertheless, although scholarly commentaries on the late Nietzsche are legion, 
and studies of the middle Nietzsche are increasingly common, few have taken the 
opportunity to approach his corpus as one of seriously competing alternatives. It is not 
that readers are generally unaware of the opposing poles of Nietzsche’s thought, but that 
they tend to focus on one stage of his career to the exclusion of the other: sometimes the 
later writings are taken as the definitive (if objectionable) expression of his thought4, 
while others turn to the middle works as a welcome, but discrete, alternative5. 
                                                
2 The best overview of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the modern world is Pangle, “The Roots of 
Contemporary Nihilism and Its Political Consequences According to Nietzsche” (reprinted with 
some helpful additional discussion of the last man as “Nihilism and Modern Democracy in the 
Thought of Nietzsche”). 
3 The first study of Nietzsche’s thought, by his former acquaintance Lou Salome, taxed him for 
failing to adhere to his own arguments in this respect.  
4 For instance, Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism acknowledges that 
the “middle” works present a stark alternative to the general thesis of his study, but maintains that 
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This approach – viewing Nietzsche’s corpus as divided into discrete units, rather 
than as a more integrated whole – misapprehends the texts, and it also severely 
diminishes the challenge presented by Nietzsche’s thought6. Let me begin by saying a bit 
more about the second point. If Nietzsche’s “middle” writings were not an aberration in 
his career, but in fact share close, logical connections to his later writings, then 
Nietzsche’s criticism of the modern world must gain all the more force for having first 
confronted, and fully taken into account, a more nuanced appreciation of it. And that 
possibility certainly presents a more thorough-going challenge than if Nietzsche is read as 
a straightforward enemy of modernity. At the same time, viewing Nietzsche’s corpus as 
an integrated whole puts an equally important challenge to Nietzsche himself: to what 
extent can his late position be justified in light of the more positive features of the 
                                                                                                                                            
those writings amount to an aberration on Nietzsche’s part – more of a curiosity than something 
to be squared with later works.  
5 E.g., Abbey, Nietzsche’s Middle Period; Franco, Nietzsche’s Enlightenment; Garrard, 
“Nietzsche for and Against the Enlightenment”. It should be noted that Franco goes much further 
than these other authors (or most scholars in general) in drawing out continuities between 
writings from the various stages of Nietzsche’s career. His book is therefore especially insightful, 
and I engage it in more detail in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, I believe that Franco understates the 
extent to which the later writings engage themes that are raised earlier, and extend their general 
project.  
6 Karl Lowith follows the conventional division of Nietzsche’s writings into three major periods, 
but then links them together by suggesting that Nietzsche’s thought is meant to “cycle” through 
these three stages, so that they all ultimately cohere into one “system” (Nietzsche’s Philosophy of 
the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, 23-26). I agree that Nietzsche’s thought has a sort of cyclical 
character, but not in the same manner identified by Lowith. 
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modern world that he had recognized earlier on? What features of his thought were 
modified or abandoned in the transition from his more modern to his more radical 
writings? And in view of that transition can we see more clearly what distinctively 
modern commitments would have to be upheld, what logic must be accepted, in order to 
mount a sustained and coherent defense of the modern world?  
A further challenge to Nietzsche must also be issued: why should the possibility 
of the “last man” (or even his existence) be regarded as such a decisive objection to our 
world anyway – and especially for a man like Nietzsche himself? After all, it is by no 
means obvious that a philosopher could justifiably oppose a world of last men. Such a 
world might offend his sense of nobility – but that would not quite be a reason to oppose 
it, so much as a moral qualm about it. And, to be sure, some of Nietzsche’s writings do a 
great deal to try to revivify nobility as an essential aspect of morality for the modern 
world. But, by the same token, Nietzsche also issues the sternest warnings against 
nihilism – which includes the all-too-modern proclivity to embrace moral enthusiasms 
that one knows lack rational justification. Any conscientious reader of Nietzsche must 
therefore wrestle with both of these demands, in order to see how they can be reconciled 
– if they can be reconciled. Do Nietzsche’s later, more radical, writings really give us any 
good reason to abandon the sober resignation in the face of modern politics that we find 
in the middle period? Nietzsche himself invites this question, because although the 
political orientation of his books shifts over time, there are still many connections 
between the works – recurring characters and tropes, persistent themes, theoretical claims 
with associated doctrines, etc. And in Nietzsche’s final, autobiographical writings he 
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encourages us to “connect the dots” between many of these features of his seemingly 
disparate writings. Creating a dialogue between his works in this way shows that 
Nietzsche’s assessment of the modern world enables one to approach his corpus as a 
more consistent, and thus more challenging, body of work than has generally been 
recognized.  
As this last remark suggests, I take Nietzsche’s own self-assessments to be largely 
authoritative for the purpose of establishing the contours of his project. At the least, it 
must be acknowledged that Nietzsche put an exceptional amount of effort into trying to 
help readers understand the connections between his books. For instance, in the midst of 
his “late” writings he returned to the thought of his “middle period” by reissuing the 
books from it with new prefaces, commenting extensively on the process that produced 
him, and explaining how he came to view that process in retrospect. Moreover, at the 
very end of his productive life Nietzsche authored a sort of autobiography, Ecce Homo, 
composed of four chapters, the third and longest of which (“Why I Write Such Good 
Books”), is divided into a series of sub-chapters that treat each of his earlier works 
individually, and explains his personal development through the evolution of his oeuvre. 
And it should be added that in none of his retrospective self-assessments does Nietzsche 
invoke the now-common distinction between “middle” and “late” works in his oeuvre. 
He certainly does classify his first two books as somewhat immature and embarrassing 
efforts. But after that he speaks of his publications in terms of a common project: “my 
task”, as he sometimes refers to it. 
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When Nietzsche speaks of his books, and his whole authorial project, in terms of 
“my task” (often italicizing the first of those two words), he implies a point that is 
essential for understanding his corpus: any evolution in his writings is coeval with and 
reflective of the evolution of his life as a whole.  
Nietzsche indicates this very point in a short, lyrical paragraph that opens Ecce 
Homo (standing alone between its forward and first chapter), which notes that he has just 
successfully completed his most recent series of writings, and, in view of that fact, 
concludes: “How could I not be grateful to my whole life? And so I tell myself my 
life…”. As this suggests, Nietzsche views his accomplishments an author as not just one 
portion of his life, but as the product and culmination of “my whole life”, which is why 
that achievement compels him to take stock of his whole life, in the form of reexamining 
all of his books one-by-one, showing how they contributed to his full development as a 
human being. Nietzsche’s political philosophy is part-and-parcel of that process: it is an 
essential element of Nietzsche’s whole life, his “task”, to confront political questions and 
compel others to face them as well, through the power of his writings. As a consequence, 
Nietzsche’s writing and publishing of his books amounts to a political project in and of 
itself.  
This last remark might sound peculiar, but it can be partially explained by 
considering Nietzsche’s position in the history of modern political thought. Modern 
political thought as a whole is characterized by the aim of showing that its theoretical 
principles can be actively legislated into political practice. Thus, Machiavelli wrote a 
handbook for princes; Locke and Rousseau advised the authors of constitutions; Kant and 
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Hegel explained how to modify existing political structures to make them more 
legitimate; Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill authored quasi-philosophic pamphlets to 
guide mass political movements. This project of remaking the world on the basis of 
theoretical insight was, in one form or another, the project of the Enlightenment7. 
Nietzsche, with his notorious talk of philosophers as “commanders and legislators” and 
the “masters of the earth” might seem to radicalize this whole philosophic tendency of 
seeking to remake the world in its image (indeed, Heidegger indicts Nietzsche on 
precisely this count).  
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that even if Nietzsche did intend to 
radicalize the modern project in such a fashion, he pursued that goal in a manner very 
different from that of his illustrious predecessors. Unlike Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes 
and Locke, he was not personally acquainted with any individuals close to political 
power, whom he could hope to influence through his treatises. Unlike Rousseau, he was 
not a quasi-celebrity whose writings would naturally command the attention of the 
authorities of his time. Unlike Kant and Hegel, he did not hold a distinguished 
professorial position from which he could shape the thought of the opinion makers of 
several generations. Unlike Marx, he had no mass movement to try and commandeer, and 
unlike Mill, he held no political office. (Not to mention that, unlike the ancient thinkers, 
Nietzsche founded no school or sect.) During his lifetime, then, Nietzsche did not exert 
anything close to the political influence of his modern predecessors simply because he 
had no influence to exert. To be sure, he may have crafted his writings with a view to 
                                                
7 For an overview, see Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of the Mind.  
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cultivating some such influence. But this only underlines the fact that for virtually his 
entire productive lifetime Nietzsche had no outlet for his ambitions apart from his books. 
Early in his adulthood he had skirted the bounds of influence thanks to his prodigious 
ascension as a professor of philology, and his entry into the inner circle of Richard 
Wagner, the reigning titan of German culture at the time. But shortly after his career 
began Nietzsche deliberately burned his bridges to both of those potential sources of 
influence. Public interest in his thought began to develop around the last year of his 
productive life, but at that time he had no means of capitalizing on it apart from pouring 
himself even further into his books. (Nietzsche was exceptionally productive during that 
year, partly in response to his awareness of the emerging interest in his work.) Thus, to 
the extent that Nietzsche had a political project it must be characterized as an authorial 
project in a unique way. And Nietzsche confirmed and underlined this fact by writing so 
many commentaries on his own work, in order to help readers recognize and understand 
his authorial project.  
Of course Nietzsche is not the only political philosopher to avail himself of a few 
autobiographical remarks. In terms of sheer volume Rousseau devoted even more pages 
to himself. But the content of those pages helps to show what is so unique about 
Nietzsche: Rousseau wrote about his many travels and his dramatic adventures, his 
friendships and his love affairs, his moments of shame and of success, his notorious 
reputation, his daily habits. Rousseau’s books form just one part, and usually not the 
primary part, of that picture. For Nietzsche, by contrast, the story of his life virtually is 
the story of his books, and vice versa: his books are the catalyst for his break with his 
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youthful loyalties; they are what he devotes himself to when he is isolated and ill; they 
became his only vehicle for giving voice to his mature insights; getting them written and 
published becomes his primary activity, and foremost preoccupation. As William 
Schaberg remarks, for most of Nietzsche’s adult life,  
[H]e focused the majority of his energy on just one thing: his writings. They were 
the lifeblood of his existence and any biography that minimizes the importance of 
the books to Nietzsche’s life does a grave disservice to our understanding of the 
man who produced them.8  
Nietzsche’s project of not only writing his books, but also writing extensive 
commentaries about them, was his manner of helping readers recognize the fact that 
Schaberg highlights, but which has not always been duly appreciated. 
 Here, however, I would like to extend the point somewhat further. Nietzsche’s 
self-commentaries are indispensible not only because they help us to recognize the 
centrality of his books for his life, and vice versa. They are also essential for 
understanding his political thought. To be sure, the commentaries are not directly 
political at all: they are primarily commentaries on the impetus behind each work, and an 
assessment of the purpose that each work served in the broad context of his life and 
thought. But we are now in a position to recognize why this second point carries some 
political significance: since Nietzsche’s whole political project was an authorial project, 
understanding the latter helps to make sense of the former. But that is not the main point 
                                                
8 Schaberg, The Nietzsche Canon, 189 
 10 
that I want to make. The more important point concerns the motivation behind his 
different books, which is a political question in the deepest sense. Let me elaborate.  
 Nietzsche, following an ancient tradition in the history of political philosophy, 
links the question of political regime types to an analysis of the soul, or human 
psychology; accordingly, his analysis of modern politics is largely derived from an 
assessment of the qualities of soul that it fosters. As a result, the difference between 
Nietzsche’s quiescent approach to modern politics in his middle writings versus his 
vigorous opposition to it in later writings needs to be considered mainly as a 
psychological difference: as we shall see in detail, the sort of psychology to which 
Nietzsche was most attracted at a given time is closely connected to the political 
preference which he articulates in each book. Nietzsche’s self-commentaries therefore 
give essential insight into his understanding of politics, because they tell us about what 
motivated him to write a particular book, what state of mind it was meant to capture, in 
other words, what the distinct psychology of the book is. Connecting those insights to the 
concrete political program recommended in a given work thereby reveals the core of 
Nietzsche’s understanding of politics: his psychology of regime types, so to speak. 
Since we are not accustomed to this way of thinking about politics today, let me 
begin by saying a few words to help elaborate what it is, and to explain why it matters. 
 
The Political Challenge 
To analyze politics primarily in terms of its effect on the psyche or the soul is, as 
already noted, to follow in the footsteps of ancient political philosophy, where that 
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approach is most prominent9. Nevertheless, this mode of analysis is no less essential to 
understanding the politics of the Enlightenment, and thereby also Nietzsche’s response to 
it – since, when Nietzsche reacts to modern politics, he is reacting above all not to, say, 
its separation of powers or its system of representation, but to how it conditions the soul.  
In referring to “the politics of the Enlightenment” I have in mind roughly what is 
nowadays called “classical liberalism”. Living today within a broadly classical liberal 
framework, we tend to think of it in terms of the somewhat general and abstract concept 
of “individual rights”, but there is arguably a more concrete psychological profile both 
presupposed and promoted by classical liberalism. 
A good illustration of this point can be found in the recent work of Steven Pinker. 
What Pinker sets out to explain is the progressive decline of violence over the course of 
human history, which has dramatically accelerated during the last several centuries. 
Pinker’s explanation of this phenomenon turns out to be something of a history of 
thumos, the crucial component of Platonic political psychology, which amounts, roughly 
speaking, to an individual’s spirited sense of independence and self-sufficiency, and 
consequent insistence on asserting and enforcing the sense of the rightness and the 
primacy of one’s self, and what that self cares for, over all obstacles10. Although Pinker 
never frames what is at issue in quite such terms, his entire history amounts to an 
                                                
9 cf. Plato, Laws 650b; Gorgias 464a-465b; Republic Books VIII-IX 
10 Plato, Republic 375a-b, 439d-441c, 548c, 581a-c Laws, 731a-b, 863b, 866d-867c; cf. 
Aristotle, Politics VII.7 
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exploration of the ways in which politics can counteract thumos, along with an 
explanation of why the Enlightenment accomplished this most successfully.  
Pinker identifies two factors from the course of human history that have acted as 
crucial preconditions for the decline of violence: on the one hand, the development of 
state power; on the other hand, the cultivation of individual self-control. These two 
factors are linked, since state power initially develops in order to supplant the authority of 
individuals or tribal groups to punish transgressions against themselves (as in nonstate 
societies)11. As for self-control, it received a crucial boost in the late medieval period, 
when the development of technologically sophisticated weaponry rendered obsolete the 
old culture of heroic knights operating in quasi-autonomy from any centralized power, 
and the new social model became the more restrained and deferential codes of behavior 
expected at royal courts (“courtesy”)12. In both cases, then, individuals’ instincts – their 
natural sense of self-assertion, their desire to express their impulses and punish those who 
impinge on them – are counteracted by politics. But these changes alone do not explain 
the reduction of violence that Pinker is trying to explain (in fact, the growth of state 
power can make the situation worse, not better13). It proves to be the Enlightenment that 
made the decisive contribution in that respect, by counteracting thumos most thoroughly. 
                                                
11 Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature, 40-56 
12 Ibid, 64-75 
13 Ibid, 57-58 
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Pinker’s book therefore amounts to an elaborate defense of the classical liberal politics 
associated with the Enlightenment14.  
The historic genius of the Enlightenment, on Pinker’s account, was not that it 
brought about a change in basic human nature, but that it was responsible for political 
changes that brought psychological adjustments along with them15. I cannot reproduce 
Pinker’s whole account here, but a few examples will suffice to show how, on his 
argument, classical liberalism consistently works to strengthen my capacity for self-
control over my impulse to self-assertion. For instance, the promotion of free markets 
fosters empathy and cooperation by encouraging me to see myself as engaged in a 
positive-sum partnership or mutually beneficial competition with others, whom I must 
therefore learn to work with over the long-term, rather than seeking to eliminate others in 
order to maximize my own immediate position. At the same time, free markets foster 
transparency and a range of stakeholders in national economies, both of which constrain 
the personal ambitions of political leaders16. Relatedly, the weakening of national 
boundaries forces me to question my gut loyalties to those who happen to be closest to 
me, and encourages me to think of humanity at a high level of abstraction from myself, 
accustoming me to shifting back and forth between my own perspective and that of others 
as a kind of impartial spectator between them17. Furthermore, the elevated social status of 
                                                
14 Ibid, 133, 180, 662-664 
15 Ibid, xxiii, 612 
16 Ibid, 75-77, 287-288, 663-664 
17 Ibid, 165-168, 175-183, 289-292, 647-657, 662, 666-669 
 14 
women not only helps to balance out male inclinations, it also modifies them, as men are 
induced to modify their behavior in response to the increased female presence18. Law 
enforcement becomes a matter of providing incentives and disincentives for appropriate 
behavior, instead of indulging a sense of retribution, i.e., it privileges utilitarian 
calculation over moralistic impulses, with dramatic declines in cruelty and mass killings 
as a result19. In more recent times, the whole notion of rights has begun to acquire a 
broader scope as individuals become more conscious of the ways in which their words or 
actions can cause offense to others, and so modify their social interactions in a process 
analogous to the complex web of behavioral codes and taboos that developed in order to 
display “courtesy” during the late middle ages20. As all of these examples show, what is 
most crucial about classical liberalism for Pinker is the way in which it fosters various 
aspects of self-control, suppressing or restraining individual impulse in favor of a greater 
sociability. 
I have already noted that we tend to think of classical liberalism in terms of 
individual rights more than individual self-restraint. But these two points are not at odds; 
in fact, they are closely connected. After all, a society composed of individual rights 
holders must also be one of individuals who consciously respect the rights of others, and 
to that end restrain the exercise of their own when the two might otherwise conflict. This 
point comes out in most strikingly in Pinker’s treatment of justice. For Pinker, to invoke 
                                                
18 Ibid, 105-106, 525-528, 684-688 
19 Ibid, 145-148, 339-342, 529-540 
20 Ibid, 381, 392-394, 475 
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and seek to enforce our sense of righteousness will always create more problems than it 
solves, because it will always be in competition with other such claims, creating a cycle 
of grievances and thus a cycle of righteously-minded violence21. It is crucial to appreciate 
that Pinker does not here deny that some such claims could well be warranted: for 
instance, in many of the examples that he supplies from the aftermath of repressive and 
violent civil conflicts, it seems unquestionable that grievous wrongs have been committed 
by some of the parties involved. Nevertheless, Pinker maintains that seeking to act on and 
enforce this sense of righteousness will be counter-productive over the long term. 
Engaging in this kind of cost-benefit analysis is the work of reason, and so Pinker 
concludes that a more Enlightened, intelligent society will be less moralistic, but also 
more pacific. But what allows for all of this to happen – what makes classical liberalism 
possible – is not just a declaration of individual rights, which government promises to 
respect on my behalf: it is also a kind of psychological trick, where I am somehow 
persuaded to restrain my individual impulses or inclinations enough to make such a 
society possible. And the Enlightenment accomplished this not only by devising 
sophisticated theories of rights, but even more by establishing political institutions and 
practices that counter-acted thumos, fostering more moderate, calculating psychological 
traits in its place. 
Still, Pinker’s approach to the problem of justice cannot help but bring out the fact 
that the kind of society he favors naturally opens itself up to a certain kind of objection. A 
statement made during the recent Indian election campaign by a representative of the 
                                                
21 Ibid, 543-546 622-624, 636-637 
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leading Hindu nationalist party can illustrate the point at issue: “This election is the 
election of honor and revenge… A man can sleep hungry but not humiliated. This is the 
time to take revenge by voting for Modi”22. This pithy statement neatly encapsulates the 
perfect antithesis of a certain liberal logic, which, as Pinker brings out, maintains that it is 
in fact far better to sleep humiliated than hungry, at least over the long-term, because 
hunger can be satiated in a way that the desire for honor cannot be. But, as the quotation 
also makes clear, in order to make that calculation you have to be willing to sacrifice one 
desire (a sense of righteousness or pride) in favor of another (a taste for material 
comfort). To this extent, the whole Enlightenment political project is a bet about what 
desires are truly primary or most deeply satisfying for human beings. 
Does this mean that politics comes down to a matter of mere assertion or 
idiosyncratic taste – for honor or for security, for peace or for war? Pinker himself 
sometimes seems uncertain about how to arbitrate between such competing claims, at one 
point demurring that “no logical argument inherently favors peace over honor and 
glory”23. On the other hand, Thomas Hobbes – whose powerful arguments favoring 
comity-over-glory Pinker cites at appreciative length – did in fact propose that campaigns 
to obtain honor, and avoid humiliation, were objectively self-defeating, and therefore 
ought to be abandoned24. And Hobbes did not fail to act on that logic when civil conflict 
                                                
22 “Incendiary Words in Campaigns Draw Ban on Rallies for Two Politicians”, New York Times, 
April 11, 2014. 
23 Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature, 686-687 
24 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 11 (paragraphs 1-4) and Chapter 13 
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broke out in his country and he responded by becoming “the first of all that fled”, as he 
once proudly put it25. Nevertheless, Hobbes’s argument has a difficulty, which is that it 
operates mainly on the assumption that although we are easily confused about how to 
satisfy our desires, what they are can be resolved with confidence, and generally agreed 
upon. Thus, Hobbes’s logical reasoning about politics comes after he gives an analysis of 
the human mind and what it allows us to know about our passions26. Hobbes’s politics, in 
other words, have his psychology as their foundational premise, and therefore rely on his 
having gotten that psychology right. 
And perhaps Hobbes did get it right, in the main. To be sure, contemporary 
science allows us to identify ways in which Hobbes overstated the pacific or security-
seeking character of human psychology27, but then Pinker presents too great a weight of 
evidence to doubt that Hobbes did indeed identify crucial, enduring facts about human 
life, and helped to guide humankind to live more peacefully in accordance with those 
facts.  
At least, it is this serious possibility that forms the background for Nietzsche’s 
assessment of modern politics. For it was the emergent reality of modern politics that 
forced Nietzsche to reckon with the possibility of a world whose primary concern and 
primary characteristic would be mere material security – a world where thumos had been, 
                                                
25 Hobbes, English Works, Volume 4, 414 
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapters 1-6 
27 See, e.g., Peter Hatemi and Rose McDermott, “A Neurobiological Approach to Foreign Policy 
Analysis” 
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if not eliminated, then at least tamed and severely conditioned. Nietzsche, of course, 
ultimately rejected that world as forcefully as possible. But his rejection of it was not 
itself purely thumotic, so to speak. Rather, he rejected it on the same basis that Hobbes 
had tried to construct it: on the basis of an analysis of human psychology. Moreover, 
Nietzsche claimed to find that it is above all the psychology of philosophy, i.e., the 
human capacity for rationality, which invalidates Hobbesian psychology. That is, 
Nietzsche held that it is above all our experience as reasoning, rational creatures which 
casts doubt on the claim that our primary desire is for peace and security. And so when 
Nietzsche sets out illustrate that point through his account of himself and his own rational 
activity, he strikes at the very basis of modern politics. 
Still, even and especially on his own account, the story of Nietzsche’s life is not 
perfectly straightforward or univocal: it contains competing elements that point in 
different directions. Whether Nietzsche’s account of himself is of sufficient coherence to 
effectively challenge a contrary political psychology, such as that of Hobbes, is therefore 
a question that must remain open until at least the conclusion of this study. In the 
meantime, however, a crucial aim of the study will be to argue that Nietzsche’s account 
of himself shows his career to have been at least more coherent and consistent than most 






The Interpretative Challenge 
Nietzsche’s most influential exegete, Martin Heidegger, once began a course on 
Aristotle by issuing the following instruction to his students (who, incidentally, included 
a hefty proportion of the 20th-century’s most notable students of the history of 
philosophy):  
Regarding the personality of a philosopher, our only interest is that he was born at 
a certain time, that he worked, and that he died. The character of the philosopher, 
and issues of that sort, will not be addressed here28. 
Aristotle’s terse manner of writing along with absence of reliable biographical records 
lends itself to such an approach. but Nietzsche would seem to be another matter. 
Nietzsche, after all, declared that “in the philosopher, there is absolutely nothing that is 
impersonal” (BGE 6), and his polemical remarks on predecessors from Socrates to 
Spinoza attest to that conviction. Nevertheless, a decade after his course on Aristotle 
Heidegger began a course on Nietzsche by dismissing the extensive secondary literature 
on his subject with an echo of his earlier injunction:  
Whoever does not have the courage and perseverance of thought required to 
become involved in Nietzsche’s own writings need not read anything about him 
either29. 
Curiously, however, if we apply this principle rigorously to the interpretation of 
Nietzsche himself, we will inevitably be led into an appreciation of the ways in which 
                                                
28 Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, 4 
29 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art, 10-11 
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“the personality of a philosopher” shaped his thought, because Nietzsche tells us so much 
about exactly this matter. That fact is not evident from Heidegger’s interpretation of him, 
but that is because Heidegger focused his attention mainly on Nietzsche’s unpublished 
notes. Nietzsche’s published works, however, at least present the possibility of a highly 
“self-contained” reading of his thought, because Nietzsche tells us so much about 
himself: we do not need to refer much to secondary sources if Nietzsche’s carefully-
designed account of himself proves to be illuminating. In what follows I therefore aim to 
follow Heidegger’s principle more than his practice. 
 Let me begin with a simple example. As I have already noted, it is commonplace 
to speak of Nietzsche’s career in terms of “early”, “middle”, and “late” (or “mature”) 
phases. And this classification makes some sense. But although Nietzsche does, in fact, 
provide a number of schemes by which to divide up his thought, this early/middle/late 
schema is not among them. In this study I therefore stick as much as possible to 
Nietzsche’s own manner of demarcating his writings from one another. The clues that 
Nietzsche offers in this respect are so numerous that I will only be able to go through 
them in the necessary detail in subsequent chapters. For now, however, I can offer a 
system of classifying Nietzsche’s writings which he never explicitly suggests, but which 
is consistent with the detailed interpretation of his remarks that I will provide. Roughly 
speaking, then, Nietzsche’s books can be divided up as follows:  
(1) The Birth of Tragedy and Untimely Meditations. These are youthful efforts 
reflecting youthful loyalties and theoretical commitments that Nietzsche 
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definitively broke with subsequently. As a result, I will largely overlook them, 
as they have relatively minimal bearing on Nietzsche’s mature project.  
(2) Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, The Gay Science, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. These are the works through which Nietzsche gradually 
discovers and articulates all of his mature insights. As such, they 
progressively develop and lay out the whole of his mature thought. 
(3) Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morality, Twilight of the Idols. 
These books reproduce and summarize the insights gained in the previous 
series of writings. They represent no major discoveries on Nietzsche’s part, 
but present his thought in a diverse set of rhetorical guises in order to help 
draw attention to his work, and lure new readers into studying it more 
carefully. 
(4) The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche contra Wagner, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo. 
These are the works of “self-knowledge” in which Nietzsche shows the reader 
the obstacles that he had to overcome in order to reach his major insights. To 
that end, they lead the reader through how to engage in a confrontation with 
the challenges of cultural authority, religion, and one’s own nature.   
This is not the only relevant system of classification for understanding Nietzsche’s 
thought, but I believe that it is defensible, and it should help readers who are accustomed 
to more common divisions understand the distinctive way in which I navigate his corpus. 
(It should be noted that in my schema Nietzsche’s books are arranged chronologically, 
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but, in contrast to the standard chronological approach to his corpus, this is not done 
merely in order to highlight the progressive evolution of his thought. I do stress that 
evolution in my first two categories, but in the second two I draw distinctions on the basis 
of rhetorical intention, rather than a shift in substantive outlook.) 
 That being said, there is a massive dilemma that is not addressed by my 
classification system, and which any attempt to take Nietzsche’s self-assessments 
seriously must confront. That dilemma is simple. Nietzsche persistently emphasizes a 
single key point: “Among my writings my Zarathustra stands alone” (EH Forward 4). 
Indeed, Nietzsche’s testimonies to that work in Ecce Homo are so extensive and 
extravagant that one would have to quote a few pages worth just to represent their full 
enthusiasm. But he highlights the importance of the work elsewhere as well. For instance, 
in Twilight of the Idols – which Nietzsche conceived of as a kind of introductory 
overview to his whole philosophy30 – the chapter on “How the ‘Real World’ Finally 
Became a Fable” concludes “pinnacle of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSRA” (i.e., 
Nietzsche’s whole history of the world culminates with Zarathustra!); and the book 
concludes with a paragraph excerpted from Zarathustra (“The Hammer Speaks”). In fact, 
                                                
30 He describes it as “my philosophy in a nutshell” in a Letter to George Brandes of October 20, 
1888. Brandes was the first public figure to take an interest in Nietzsche work, and had requested 
some biographical materials from Nietzsche in preparation for a series of lectures on his thought. 
Thus, Nietzsche seems to be commending Twilight to Brandes as appropriate introduction to his 
oeuvre. Nietzsche writes in a similar vein in Ecce Homo, when he comments that “anyone who 
wants to get a quick idea of how topsy-turvy everything was before I came along should make a 
start with this work” (EH TI 1). 
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every single book that Nietzsche wrote after Thus Spoke Zarathustra refers back to it in 
an assortment of glowing terms31. Moreover, The Gay Science, which Nietzsche wrote 
before Zarathustra, actually concludes by introducing its successor work32. In light of all 
this, Thus Spoke Zarathustra might appear to be like a sun around which Nietzsche’s 
other books merely orbit33. 
 A number of scholars have sought to downplay Nietzsche’s emphasis on Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, but that option is not open to any reader who proposes to take his 
self-assessments seriously. Those who follow Nietzsche’s counsel have therefore tended 
to take Zarathustra as Nietzsche’s crowning achievement, and the most definitive 
statement of his position34. But here I would like to put forward an alternative. 
                                                
31 BGE concludes with an “Aftersong” whose final flourish introduces “Zarathustra… the guest 
of all guests!”. The forward to CW stresses that Nietzsche required “the eye of Zarathustra” to 
help him overcome Wagner. The forward to A says that the work “belongs to the very few… 
Possibly they are the same readers who understand my Zarathustra” (cf. 53-54).  Nietzsche 
makes a similar remark near the end of the preface to GM, and the second essay culminates with 
an exhortation to Zarathustra whose importance to the whole argument of the essay has been 
explicated by Paul Loeb (The Death of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 208-240).  
32 Nietzsche also included allusions to Zarathustra in the new material that he composed for the 
second edition of The Gay Science, after he had finished writing Zarathustra (see aphorism 381 
and the song “Sils-Maria”). 
33 A letter to Franz Overbeck of April 7 1884 supports this thought when it remarks: “Reading 
through Daybreak and The Gay Science I have found that there is hardly a line in them that 
cannot serve as introduction, preparation, and commentary for the aforesaid Zarathustra”. 
34 Most notably Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche’s Teaching and Paul Loeb, The Death of 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. Both Lampert and Loeb have many valuable insights into Zarathustra, 
and I very much agree with both of them that Nietzsche’s later autobiographical remarks on the 
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Zarathustra is so important to Nietzsche, I will argue, less because of any solution that it 
promotes than because of a series of problems that it presents.  
The situation can be thought of in these terms: Plato is sometimes said to have 
written a series of aporetic dialogues that is, dialogues that culminate in quandaries 
without any obvious solution, and which therefore direct the reader to consider other 
dialogues in which those problems are addressed more fully. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I 
would suggest, functions as something like Nietzsche’s aporetic dialogue. It presents the 
most radically ambitious project that Nietzsche can imagine, based to a considerable 
degree on his own genuine insights, but also indicates why such a project – that is, such a 
deployment of Nietzsche’s own thought – may be deeply frustrating, and thereby prods 
the reader to consider alternatives to it. 
 In Chapter 2 of this study I therefore provide an overview of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, outlining both the character of the project to transform the modern world 
which Nietzsche has his Zarathustra undertake, and highlighting the difficulties which 
that project proves to face. The difficulties that I have in mind are drawn out especially 
by contrasting Zarathustra to one of Nietzsche’s other major character types, the “free 
spirits”: these characters are only alluded to briefly in the work, but they are very 
prominent in many of Nietzsche’s other writings, and their perspective contrasts sharply 
                                                                                                                                            
work must be taken seriously, but I also think that they each misconstrue those remarks in 
different ways. Thus, in Chapter 2 I argue that Lampert mistakes Zarathustra’s “philanthropic” 
project (i.e., a political project to transform and benefit the lives of all humankind) for 
Nietzsche’s own. And in Chapter 4 I note some of my difficulties with Loeb’s interpretation of 
the eternal recurrence (Zarathustra’s central doctrine).  
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with Zarathustra. In particular, the free spirits pose a strong challenge to any 
Zarathustrian ambitions for world-transformation.  
In order to draw out the nature of that challenge, I turn in Chapter 3 to the book in 
which Nietzsche first introduced the free spirits, Human All Too Human. This also 
happens to the book in which Nietzsche was friendliest to modern politics, and these two 
points are related, since the free spirits’ skepticism about political ambition makes them 
far more easy to reconcile with the project of the Enlightenment (even if they never 
embrace it themselves). At the same time, I argue that even in the process of introducing 
this important perspective into his corpus, Nietzsche outlined some of its limitations, and 
indicated why he might be moved towards a more ambitious outlook himself – and thus 
towards Zarathustra, and away from modern politics. 
 In other words, I argue that two basic, competing, perspectives dominate 
Nietzsche’s lifework: Zarathustra, with his project of radical world-transformation; the 
free spirits, who live at a skeptical distance from all grand political projects, and therefore 
might at least be reconciled to our world. Chapters 2 and 3 therefore focus on examining 
the exact nature of Zarathustra and the free spirits, outlining what they represent to 
Nietzsche by drawing out their basic characteristics, and considering the limitations of 
each as indicated by Nietzsche. Chapter 2 focuses on Thus Spoke Zarathustra (or, rather, 
its first three books, which is the form in which Nietzsche initially published it), prefaced 
by a statement on some interpretive challenges which are specific to that book. Chapter 3 
treats The Wanderer and His Shadow (an “installment” in the three-part-series of Human, 
All Too Human), which I hold to be Nietzsche’s most revealing statement of the free 
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spirited perspective. In order to help make that case, I begin the chapter with a detailed 
analysis of the unique place of Human, All Too Human in Nietzsche’s broader corpus.  
 Chapters 2 and 3 are therefore both relatively narrow and self-contained, 
presenting the two alternatives that dominate Nietzsche’s thought. In Chapter 4, however, 
I provide an overview of a much broader swath of Nietzsche’s corpus, looking at how his 
late autobiographical self-assessments explain and negotiate between the alternatives of 
Zarathustra and the free spirits, and showing how these relate to his other publications. 
The goal of this chapter is to explain why Nietzsche was unable to hold to the détente 
with the modern world that he established in Human, All Too Human, and why he was 
moved instead to the project of attempting to overcome it through Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. But since Nietzsche consistently accorded pride of place amongst his 
writings to Zarathustra, I begin with it as the most appropriate introduction to the many 





















“A DITHRYAMB ON SOLITUDE”:  
THE PUZZLE OF THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 
 It is a commonplace-approaching-a-truism to observe that Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra is an extremely unusual book: strange at best, and bewildering at worst. 
Zarathustra’s peculiarity is in the first place a matter of its style, which is both 
relentlessly exhortative and resolutely un-didactic: it is by turns lyrical and allusive, 
figurative and imagistic, oratorical and oracular. Consequently, on the level of substance, 
although the work also presents what are by far Nietzsche’s most explicit and extended 
treatments of his two famous “doctrines” – the will to power and the eternal recurrence of 
the same – it contains hardly any direct argument about either35. Nevertheless, the book 
also conveys a sense of grave seriousness, as it wrestles with questions concerning the 
meaning of human existence and the direction of human history; in certain places it 
seems akin to a revolutionary political tract. For all of these reasons, Zarathustra is often 
characterized as “poetic” or “prophetic”36 – descriptions that serve to highlight those 
                                                
35 Both doctrines are also more-or-less introduced in this work. The eternal recurrence was 
presented without being named at the conclusion to the first edition of The Gay Science, where it 
was also presented as ingress to Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The will to power is prefigured in 
earlier works, but not articulated as such.  
36 The most forceful reading of the work along these lines is Stanley Rosen, The Mask of 
Enlightenment, e.g., xvi, 14, 162-163. Brief but incisive readings of Zarathustra in a similar vein 
are given by Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Drama of Zarathustra”; Michael Allen Gillespie, 
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qualities which distinguish it from any ordinary philosophic treatise, while also stressing 
how difficult it remains to categorize the work at all. A convincing categorization of 
Zarathustra (as philosophy? poetry? prophesy? a political manifesto?) would only be 
possible on the basis of an ultimate interpretation of it. Thus, the first and the final 
question provoked by Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the same: exactly what sort of book is 
this?  
 The overtly puzzling character of Thus Spoke Zarathustra was in fact highlighted 
by the very first commentator on the work – namely, its author, in a letter to his publisher 
of February 13, 1883. There Nietzsche described the work as: “a ‘poem’, or a fifth 
‘gospel’, or something else for which there is no name yet”. Subsequently several 
scholars have cited this letter as evidence that Nietzsche quite literally set out to compose 
a fifth Gospel, and have described Zarathustra as such – omitting and not acknowledging 
the scare quotes in which Nietzsche enclosed the term37. And yet disregarding those scare 
quotes may mislead the reader about the whole purpose of Zarathustra: after all, 
Nietzsche’s extensive manipulation of punctuation devices is well-known from his 
published works, where he frequently uses scare quotes to call attention to some 
questionable aspect of his explicit statements38. In that light, Nietzsche’s use of scare 
                                                                                                                                            
“‘Slouching Towards Bethlehem to be Born’: On the Nature and Meaning of Nietzsche’s 
Superman”. Also see n39 and n40, below. 
37 E.g., Erich Heller, The Importance of Nietzsche, 70; T.K. Seung, Nietzsche’s Epic of the Soul, 
xxvi; Julian Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, 366. 
38 The most glaring example involving scare quotes is in Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 188. 
Some other instances are noted by Maudemarie Clark & David Dundrick, The Soul of Nietzsche’s 
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quotes when describing Zarathustra as a “fifth ‘gospel’” could suggest that the grave and 
prophetic impression which the work fosters at first glance conceals a more playful and 
satiric intention. 
 This last suggestion is corroborated by a letter which Nietzsche wrote to his friend 
Malwida von Meysenburg on April 20, 1883. In this letter Nietzsche deploys scare quotes 
to describe Zarathustra in almost exactly the same fashion which he had used with his 
publisher two months earlier: “I have challenged all religions and written a new ‘holy 
book’!” Moreover, with the letter’s very next sentence Nietzsche indicates that such 
declarations may be at least as self-conscious as they are self-aggrandizing: “[I]n all 
seriousness, it is as serious as any other book, even though it accepts laughter into 
religion”. And yet precisely this statement confounds as much as it clarifies: is Nietzsche 
saying that the book is, seriously, “as serious” as the Bible or the Koran (and in a similar 
manner, with a similar goal in mind)? Or is he saying that he does not ultimately take the 
book’s pretensions to “seriousness” all that seriously?  
When Nietzsche delivered a retrospective assessment of Zarathustra in the 
autobiographical Ecce Homo his approach to the earlier work would be no less elusive. In 
particular, Ecce Homo publically raises the possibility that Nietzsche had earlier broached 
in private: namely, that Zarathustra might be read as a quasi-religious or prophetic text. 
To be sure, at first Nietzsche raises this possibility only to decry it. Thus, the foreword to 
                                                                                                                                            
Beyond Good and Evil, 44; Paul Franco, Nietzsche’s Enlightenment, 214-215; Robert B. Pippin, 
Nietzsche, Psychology and First Philosophy, 7n5; Richard Schacht, Making Sense of Nietzsche: 
Reflections Timely and Untimely, 47-48. 
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Ecce Homo remarks on Zarathustra as follows: “[H]ere speaks no ‘prophet’, none of 
those gruesome hybrids of sickness and will to power called founders of religions”; “no 
faith is being demanded here”; Zarathustra says “precisely the opposite of what some 
‘sage’, ‘saint’, ‘world-redeemer’, or other decadent would say…”. Moreover, near the 
beginning of the concluding chapter to Ecce Homo (“Why I Am a Destiny”) Nietzsche 
effectively drives home the same point by insisting: “[T]here is nothing in me of a 
founder of religions”; “I have a terrible fear of being declared holy one day”; “I don’t 
want to be a saint, and would rather be a buffoon”.  But this insistence is very different 
from what is suggested in the chapter of Ecce Homo devoted to Zarathustra, where 
Nietzsche goes further than any other philosopher in attributing to one of his books an 
inspired and revelatory status; in the third section of the chapter he even gives a detailed 
description of his own experience of revelation. To be sure, Nietzsche’s very different 
statements in his forward and conclusion might be meant to function as a set of scare 
quotes placed around that discussion, alerting the reader to its questionable or ironic 
status. At the same time, however, it compels the reader to wonder: can these two 
presentations be squared with one another? And wouldn’t that entail Zarathustra 
somehow being both the promulgation of a new religion and the negation of it?39  
                                                
39 Robert Pippin explores this possibility, observing that “Zarathustra seems to be some sort of 
prophet, calling people, modern European Christian people especially, to account for their 
failings and encouraging them to pursue a new way of life” (“Introduction”, ix). (And, as Pippin 
also notes, it is of course highly relevant that Zarathustra’s namesake is the Persian prophet 
Zoraster.) But then, noting incongruous features of the work which warrant comparison to the 
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In sum: any reader of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is bound to be puzzled about the 
status of the work. It provides the reader with Nietzsche’s most substantial statement of 
his famous philosophic doctrines, yet it does so in a manner which seems to aspire 
beyond philosophy to something like prophesy, and it evidently does so in the service of 
a project of political founding. 
Moreover, as we have just seen, there is no doubt that Nietzsche’s own statements 
regarding Zarathustra encourage us to consider seriously (though still cautiously) the 
possibility that the work is indeed an experiment with the establishment of a new 
religious-and-political order – a call to decisively reject the old, Christian teachings in 
favor of Zarathustra’s own40. And, up to a point, that undoubtedly is the purpose of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. Nonetheless, at the same time Nietzsche indicates that we ought to be 
on the lookout for indications of what he would admit is problematic about that project – 
and about any such project.  
Insofar, then, as Thus Spoke Zarathustra amounts to the sort of Nietzschean auto-
critique that I have just suggested – the promulgation of something like a new religion 
and consequent proposal for a refounding of the political order, along with a depiction of 
                                                                                                                                            
intermingling of seriousness-and-satire exemplified by Don Quixote, Pippin adds that Zarathustra 
“could be both a prophetic book and a kind of send-up of a prophetic book” (xii).  
40 “[F]or Nietzsche, in common with Machiavelli (Discourses on Livy, II.5), the highest politics 
consists in the founding of new religions. In fact, one might speculate that Nietzsche’s whole aim 
in writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra was to prove that a single human being can sit down and write 
a religion. What Moses and St. Paul did can be done again.” Ronald Beiner, Civil Religion: A 
Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy, 2n3. 
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the fundamental difficulties which that entire project necessarily entails – the work 
provides an essential inlet to problems which lie at the heart of Nietzsche’s thought, and 
especially his own project as an author. And in order to show that the work does have this 
character, my treatment of it will focus especially on its presentation of the doctrine of 
which Nietzsche would thereafter continuously present himself as an adherent and an 
advocate: the eternal recurrence41.  
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra the eternal recurrence is explicitly presented as a 
doctrine that could alter the whole course of human existence. In particular, there are 
suggestions in the work that the doctrine can be understood as a “cosmological” teaching 
(i.e., as parallel to scientific and metaphysical claims about the nature of the universe and 
human existence within it), and, relatedly, also as a tremendously philanthropic teaching 
(that is, one which will benefit the lives of the vast majority of human beings). In other 
words, Zarathustra suggests that the eternal recurrence can be understood in terms of 
both a religious and a political teaching. Moreover, it suggests that Zarathustra himself 
was inclined to understand it as such – and thus to understand himself as a kind of 
prophetic lawgiver on the model of Zoraster, Moses or Saint Paul.  
In what follows, we shall see how that works in more detail. We shall also see, 
though, that Nietzsche shows this cosmological-and-philanthropic understanding to be 
                                                
41 See Twilight of the Idols, “What I Owe to the Ancients”, section 5; Ecce Homo, “Birth of 
Tragedy”, section 3 and “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, section 1; Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 
56 (note that this aphorism appears in a chapter titled “Das religiöse Wesen”: “The Religious 
Essence” or “The Religious Being”). 
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inherently problematic – so much so that the reader might be led to wonder whether 
Nietzsche ultimately accepted it at all, or at least wonder whether he did not intend to 
suggest the need for a different iteration of the whole teaching. Thus, when we turn from 
Zarathustra to Nietzsche’s later reflections on the work in Chapter 4, we will see that this 
was ultimately exactly what he provided for himself: a modified understanding of the 
eternal recurrence that was more natural than cosmological, and more personal than 
philanthropic. But the solutions suggested in Nietzsche’s autobiographical writings can 
only be fully appreciated once we have seen the full dimension of the problems that are 
brought to light through Zarathustra. On this reading, Zarathustra occupies a central 
status in Nietzsche’s oeuvre because of the key problems that it presents, rather than any 
definitive solutions that it promulgates.  
My task in the pages that follow is therefore limited in an important way. It is not 
meant to provide anything like a comprehensive commentary on Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
Rather, it is designed to highlight a set of crucial dilemmas that Nietzsche calls to the 
reader’s attention throughout the work: namely, the complex set of psychological 
motivations that must inform any ambitious theological or political project (for Nietzsche 
the two are necessarily linked, as will become evident). By showing us the struggles or 
limitations that Zarathustra faces in his attempt to carry out such a project, Nietzsche 
forces us to consider what sort of psychological conditions a healthy or successful 
undertaking would have to fulfill, or whether the whole project ought to be abandoned 
altogether.  
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A final note: summarizing Thus Spoke Zarathustra might seem like a quixotic 
task given what a labyrinth the work is, but the task can be simplified by making use of 
an inlet which Nietzsche provides via the following summary statement in Ecce Homo: 
“My whole Zarathustra is a dithyramb on solitude” (“Why I am So Wise”, section 8). 
The summary of Zarathustra which follows has been designed to unpack the meaning of 
that summary statement. In particular, it highlights the contrast between Zarathustra and 
one of the work’s other characters, the “free spirits”, with respect to solitude – a contrast 
that proves to be especially revealing of the problematic character of Zarathustra’s whole 
political project.  
 
Zarathustra’s Task 
 Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a fictional work whose action consists of a series of 
attempts by its title character to teach human beings the meaning of their existence, and 
whose own understanding of that meaning evolves in the process (even leading him to 
question whether any single, definitive meaning exists). Zarathustra’s attempts at 
instruction are framed by his repeated retreats to and descents from a solitary existence 
on a mountain where his understanding develops in ways that are initially only alluded to 
rather than depicted or detailed. The novel therefore amounts to a commentary on the 
relationship between wisdom and solitude, or between philosophy and human society 
more generally. The critical light which the novel sheds on this subject is only indirect, 
however: it emerges gradually through Zarathustra’s development over the course of the 
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narrative, as well as in the contrasts which Nietzsche enables us to draw between 
Zarathustra and other characters introduced within the novel, as we shall now see.  
The relationship between wisdom and solitude is a prominent theme from the very 
beginning of the work, when Zarathustra first descends from his mountain, asking of the 
sun whose overflowing illumination has sustained him in his solitude for ten years: 
“What would your happiness be, were it not for those for whom you shine?” Having 
ripened to the point of overflow himself with the benefit of the sun’s sustenance, 
Zarathustra has become “overburdened with my wisdom”, and his own happiness now 
depends on bestowing the fruit of that wisdom onto recipients who may benefit from it. 
Having grown tired of his solitude in this way, “Zarathustra wants to become human 
again”. “Thus”, Nietzsche concludes, “began Zarathustra’s going under”.  
Nevertheless, even as Zarathustra returns to society he remains singular for 
reasons that are laid out with special clarity in the speech “On the Famous Wise Men”. 
These “famous wise”, Zarathustra observes, have sought after truth only to the extent of 
finding it in objects of popular reverence, and so in “the people” themselves. Where the 
“famous wise” have justified popular understanding, Zarathustra seeks to transform it – 
and so where the famous wise have found that God spoke to them through the people, 
Zarathustra will bring a teaching on divinity to the people from his solitude. In the 
immediate context, however, these famous wise are not contrasted directly with 
Zarathustra, but instead with the “free spirits”. The free spirits are distinguished by the 
intransigence of their “will to truth”, an intransigence which has broken their “revering 
hearts”, rendering them as solitaries to dwell in “deserts”, “redeemed from Gods and 
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adorations”. From the depth of their deserts these “non-worshippers” will on occasion not 
be able to resist “squinting thirstily at the islands rich in springs, where living beings 
repose beneath dark trees”, but their contempt for the idols that inevitably arise amongst 
such beings will only serve to confirm them in their “godless” isolation.  
There is no doubt that Zarathustra views the free spirits as superior to the famous 
wise, and understands the free spirits’ critical activity as providing a welcome corrective 
to the degradation of wisdom brought on by the popularized philosophy of the famous 
wise. Nevertheless, Zarathustra also clearly does not share in the free spirits’ taste for a 
radically solitary existence, cut off from the cares and needs of broader humanity 
community. Zarathustra indicates this most clearly by associating their spirit with that of 
the lion – a spirit which, in an earlier speech (“On the Three Metamorphoses”), he had 
identified as emerging in the “loneliest desert”, where it is driven to debunk all 
established idols, thereby clearing the ground for their replacement; but the lion spirit 
itself will remain incapable of furnishing that replacement. In this manner, Zarathustra 
suggests that a radically solitary existence is also a radically incomplete one. 
In other words, the activity of the free spirits is negative, destructive, or “no-
saying”; but the work of Zarathustra is affirmative, creative, or “yes-saying” (see 
especially his speech “On the Gift-Giving Virtue”). Zarathustra therefore aims to stand 
somewhere between the famous wise and the free spirits: neither pandering to the people 
nor rejecting them, but transforming them instead. This distinction is reflected in the fact 
that, while Zarathustra joins the free spirits in rejecting the servile sociability of the 
famous wise, he is also less wedded to his solitude than they are. More subtly, it also 
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means that Zarathustra is in a way less intransigently committed to the truth42. Precisely 
how and why Zarathustra straddles the divide between sociability and solitude, and what 
the implications of that posture are for the character of his wisdom, will be our over-
arching question in following his narrative journey.  
At the outset of his journey, Zarathustra sets out to transform humanity by 
teaching them a new goal around which to orient their collective existence: the 
“superman” (Übermensch). However, as the novel proceeds Zarathustra learns that the 
highest and most distinctive achievement of the superman must consist in his ability to 
will the “eternal recurrence of the same”: the notion that every moment of one’s 
individual life and every aspect of human existence will repeat itself an infinite number 
of times. In order to understand the significance of this doctrine for Zarathustra and his 
larger project, we need to examine how it emerges out of his reflections on another 
doctrine: the will to power. 
 
The Will to Power and Zarathustrian Politics 
The will to power is discussed directly in three chapters of the book. The densest 
of these is the second, in the chapter “On Self-Overcoming”, which also elucidates the 
difference between Zarathustra and the free spirits. Here Zarathustra reflects on the “will 
to truth” of which those spirits were so proud. The will-to-truth, Zarathustra explains, has 
been a misnomer through which even the very wisest heretofore have misled both 
themselves and others about their activity. For at the root of all life is only will-to-power: 
                                                
42 On this point, consider further Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 230. 
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that is, a will to constant self-overcoming, not directed towards any given end, and so 
eventually bound to oppose even that which it creates. A will-to-truth may be an 
admirable spur to this process – inspiring the critical examination and subsequent 
supersession of a spent creation – but it is neither the deepest motive nor the ultimate goal 
of the process.   
Here it is crucial to note that Zarathustra’s whole speech “On Self-Overcoming” 
is addressed directly to “the wisest”, and that there is no other speech which is the 
exclusive preserve of such a rarefied audience. In this context Zarathustra is therefore 
able to admit (and to emphasize) that most agents of the will to power have 
misunderstood it: “peoples” (Völker), for instance, express their will-to-power by 
establishing codes of good and evil, without realizing that these are transitory, rather than 
final ends towards which all human life ought to be directed. And even the wisest human 
beings have made it seem (including to their own consciences) as if they have only 
“discovered” truths that stand apart from and above their own activity – rather than being 
creatively interpreted by it. Against these misunderstandings of the will to power 
Zarathustra insists that there can be no code of human life so definitive or any insight into 
it so fathomable that it will be able to avoid inviting and ultimately even demanding its 
own overcoming43.  
                                                
43 Zarathustra reports the claim of a personified Life: “And even you who understand are only a 
path and footstep of my will; verily, my will to power walks even on the feet of your will to 
truth!” This is also the meaning of the “suspicion” which Nietzsche says would be kindled among 
philosophers by his suggestion that “even gods philosophize” in the penultimate aphorism of 
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Zarathustra addresses this claim to the wisest in order to receive the surest 
confirmation of it: for he is certain that if the wisest examine their own hearts they will 
recognize that only Zarathustra’s elaboration of the will to power suffices to explain their 
activity44. 
Zarathustra’s trust in the self-reflective testimony of “the wisest” as the key 
witness in his case for the will to power is striking for two reasons. In the first place, it is 
not clear that Zarathustra has yet understood his own heart at this half-way point in the 
novel’s narrative. Moreover, the novel itself is by no means addressed only to “the 
wisest” (quite the contrary: it is subtitled “A Book for All and for None”). Thus, it cannot 
be psychological reflection alone (on the part of Zarathustra or any reader of his speech) 
                                                                                                                                            
Beyond Good and Evil: in other words, the sort of architectonic knowledge which philosophers 
traditionally claimed for themselves is not available, because the world is so ineluctably 
mysterious that even a God would be compelled to philosophize (desire wisdom) about it. And if 
no philosophy can be conclusive or authoritative, then philosophers cannot claim that any “truth” 
which they arrive at is definitive of their activity, or even a sufficient motive for engaging in it (at 
least once it is generally known that the traditional objects of philosophic aspiration are 
unattainable). But, Nietzsche wants to add: philosophy can still retain something like its 
traditionally exalted status if the process of engaging in it (“creativity”) is given a greater primacy 
than its products (“truth”) – and if this rank-order reflects the order of all life as a process of 
perpetual self-overcoming.  
44 By telling the wisest that he possesses the solution to “the riddle of your hearts”, Zarathustra  
implies that there has never been a satisfactory explanation of philosophic activity to date, and 
that the wisest themselves have been most aware of and troubled by this fact (cf. Beyond Good 
and Evil, aphorisms 190 and 191; there is, to be sure, an important distinction between 
Nietzsche’s assessment of Socrates as opposed to Plato on this crucial point. I consider the 
implications of this difference in Chapter 3).  
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which might incline one towards accepting the interpretation of all life as perpetual self-
overcoming or ceaseless creativity. Rather, Nietzsche has also constructed the novel’s 
broader narrative to help establish the plausibility of Zarathustra’s thesis by showing how 
the will to power comes to express itself in different forms as a consequence of its 
historical and political development.  
Indeed, the historical evolution of will to power is the explicit theme of the first 
speech which refers to the doctrine, “On the Thousand Goals and One”. In this speech the 
codes of good and evil which define a given “people” (Volk) or civilization (Zarathustra 
alludes to the Persians, Greeks, Jews and Romans in this context) are said to be “the 
voice of their will to power”, i.e., a means through which the people collectively 
challenged and over-came itself, mastering ever-more-demanding tasks for the sake of 
some greater goal or ideal. The people’s understanding of their will to power may have 
therefore been somewhat confused (insofar as it understood itself as directed toward a 
determinate end), but Zarathustra is emphatic that it was through this collective creative 
process that the will to power was first given expression: “verily, the individual itself is 
just the most recent creation”. The individual “I” therefore emerged at first only as the 
bad conscience and “going-under” of a people: as calculating, self-seeking, “loveless”.  
In these last respects the “I” that first comes to self-consciousness as the bad 
conscience of a people might well call to mind the solitary, broken-hearted free spirits 
who were ever at odds with the people. The “I” in question is certainly of a very different 
spirit from Zarathustra, as is most obvious from the fact that the former is “loveless”, 
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whereas Zarathustra is practically defined by his great love45. And it is Zarathustra’s great 
capacity for love which imbues him with a desire to benefit not only himself, but also his 
fellow-man. But if this self-conscious “I” is both something less than Zarathustra and an 
enemy of the will to power as it expresses itself in the initial collective human 
consciousness, it is hardly at odds with the will to power altogether. To the contrary, 
insofar as it reveals fundamental flaws in a people’s self-understanding (insofar as it 
reveals the inherently transitory character of their code of good and evil), it may serve as 
an inducement to even more powerful self-overcoming and renewed creation, which is to 
say that it may act as a bridge precisely towards a Zarathustrian type. Accordingly, this 
more negative and transitional spirit may not only be the cause of a people’s decay – it 
may also serve an essential function once that decay sets in (as it inevitably must, since 
on Zarathustra’s account no people’s code of life can be so definitive as to indefinitely 
ward off external-or-internal challenge). 
This last thought is suggested especially by Zarathustra’s most sustained 
reflection on the contemporary political situation, in his speech “On the New Idol” – that 
is, the modern state, which does not create a “people” by challenging them to collective 
tasks, but instead promises them individual security and the satisfaction of their disparate 
                                                
45 See, above all, “Prologue” 4. Love is not only a pervasive and primary theme of Zarathustra’s 
reflections throughout the work, it practically frames his own journey over the course of it. Thus, 
in the second section of the Prologue, when Zarathustra was asked why he was descending from 
his mountain back to human society, he answered at once: “I love mankind” (in contrast to his 
interlocutor, who lives alone in the woods because of his inability to love human beings). And, at 
the conclusion of the third book, Zarathustra sings a song of his love for eternity. 
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desires46. In that regard the state foreshadows the dystopic future of the “last man” which 
Zarathustra had warned against in the prologue to the work: a world of materialistic, 
hedonistic, atomized individuals who express only sanguine self-satisfaction, utterly 
devoid of the capacity for self-overcoming which Zarathustra insists is coeval with the 
will to power. It is likely with such a potential future in mind that Zarathustra warns “the 
vanquishers of the old God” not to serve the new idol, the state. To that end, Zarathustra 
impresses on them the contemptible pettiness of the state and its citizens’ way of life – a 
sense of contempt which is necessary fuel for the fire of self-overcoming discouraged by 
the state47. In this fashion Zarathustra exhorts worthy individuals to remain on the 
margins of modern politics – “where the state ceases, only there does the human being 
begin who is not superfluous”. But, as Zarathustra immediately makes clear, this 
ultimately means to open a pathway in the direction of a new goal: the superman. 
The will to power thus travels a circuitous route: it begins as the collective 
expression of a people’s self-overcoming; but this collective expression is inevitably 
undermined by the critical awareness of individuals who overcome the mass 
consciousness to expose the limitations of its codes of good and evil and the flaws of its 
old idols; yet this process is, in turn, properly only a transition to the introduction of a 
                                                
46 “Annihilators are they who set up snares for the many and call them a state: they hang a sword 
and a hundred desires over them all”. 
47 Zarathustra acknowledges a contest for power within the state, but directed merely towards 
material acquisition or control over the state’s levers of power – objects of aspiration which 
would be patently unworthy of “great souls”. 
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supremely creative individual whose highest expression of the will to power culminates 
in the reconstitution of a new people, directed towards a new goal.  
Or at least this is undoubtedly Zarathustra’s experience of it. This is shown most 
clearly in the speech “On Redemption”, which contains his final discussion of the will to 
power. Here he is told that for the people to fully accept his teaching, he must show that it 
will benefit even the crippled among them. But then Zarathustra confides to his disciples: 
to him, all human beings are decisively crippled because they represent some incomplete 
or distorted expression of their fullest potential – “I walk among human beings as among 
fragments of the future; that future which I envisage”. On this basis Zarathustra questions 
whether he could even bear to be human if in striving to better himself he did not also 
better the whole of humanity: 
“[T]his is all my composing and striving, that I compose into one and bring 
together what is fragment and riddle and cruel chance. And how could I bear to be 
human if the human being were not also a composer-poet and riddle-guesser and 
the redeemer of chance! To redeem that which has passed away and to re-create 
all ‘It was’ into a ‘Thus I willed it!’ – that alone should I call redemption”. 
Zarathustra thus reveals that his will is that of a supreme philanthropist.  
 But Zarathustra’s articulation of his will implies an intractable obstacle which it 
faces in the “chance” (or “accident”: Zufall) to which it is subject. For Zarathustra might 
will the creation of a great future, but he cannot un-will the conditions under which his 
own will was created. And this means that in any attempt at redeeming crippled or 
fragmentary human beings, he also willy-nilly relies on them: his super-human future 
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will never be able to transform its all-too-human past, and so the former remains to some 
extent dependent on and even defined by the latter48.  
 Thus Zarathustra observes: “willing liberates”, but at the same time “the will itself 
is still a prisoner”, since it can only ever be “an angry spectator of all that is past”. The 
failure to accept this fact (“the will’s ill-will towards time”) has been responsible for 
turning the will into an instrument of revenge, rather than of liberation: the will’s 
conditioning has been felt as a “punishment”, and this was in turn interpreted as 
somehow deserved, as “justice”49. Creative will may lie at the heart of life, but in order 
for this insight not to be understood negatively (in order for it to celebrate life rather than 
condemn it) the will must unconditionally embrace its own, unchosen conditioning:  
“Has the will yet become its own redeemer and joy-bringer? Has it unlearned the 
spirit of revenge and all gnashing of teeth? And who has taught it reconciliation 
with time, something higher than any reconciliation? Something higher than any 
                                                
48 There is an important distinction to be drawn between the concern which Zarathustra faces 
here and that which had preoccupied him in the series of speeches and songs on wisdom which 
culminated in the speech “On Self-Overcoming”. There Zarathustra’s concern had been with the 
future of his creation, and whether he could reconcile himself to its ephemeral status in Life’s 
never-ending succession of wills. Here (and for the remainder of the work) he wrestles with the 
past which his creative act can never completely break free of. I think this means that in the first 
case he is more preoccupied by a problem which the insight into will to power poses for a 
philosopher; in the second case, by the problem which it poses for a philanthropist-political 
founder. Of course these two perspectives are closely related for Nietzsche, and one central 
puzzle of Zarathustra is to determine precisely how they fit together (or fail to fit). 
49 Nietzsche gives a fuller treatment of this phenomenon in On the Genealogy of Morality. 
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reconciliation the will that is will to power must will – yet how shall this happen? 
Who has yet taught it to will backwards and want back as well?” 
And here (after this, the work’s final reference to the will to power) Nietzsche says that 
Zarathustra fell silent and began to look terrified. Zarathustra’s terror at his unspoken 
thought is the subject of the remainder of the work, where it becomes clear that the 
solution to the problem that he has just identified must be to “will backwards” by willing 
the eternal recurrence (the notion that every moment of his individual life and every 
aspect of human existence will repeat itself an infinite number of times). 
 Many readers have been perplexed by just how terrifying Zarathustra proves to 
find the thought of eternal recurrence, and especially by his proclaimed “nausea” over the 
recurrence of various lower or painful forms of human life (the fragments or the crippled, 
the “small man” if not quite the “last man”, etc.). What I would like to suggest now is 
that Zarathustra’s terror (or nausea) at this prospect is only fully intelligible in light of his 
experience of the will to power. For, as we have just seen, the eternal recurrence is a 
consequence of the teaching on will to power: if a will to self-overcoming lies at the heart 
of life, then that will is bound to be frustrated unless it can (not only accept but also) will 
the conditions in which it perforce emerges. But Zarathustra’s will to power is also of a 
specific kind: it is philanthropic and political – it wants to improve humankind by 
establishing a new political order and ideal for their collective benefit. (This last point 
will become even more apparent in what follows.) Zarathustra’s great “nausea” over the 
recurrence of the lower forms of human life is therefore correlative to his sense of great 
responsibility for them – a responsibility which he could not entirely avoid so long as his 
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will was determined to express itself in the philanthropic-political terms that we have 
identified. 
 But is this the most defensible or desirable task which Zarathustra could set for 
himself? This seems to be exactly the question that Zarathustra is forced to ask through 
his struggle with the eternal recurrence doctrine. And that struggle compels him, not 
necessarily to change his course of action, but certainly to modify the motive which he 
attributes to it – and this fact throws his entire philanthropic-political project into a new 
light. In this way, Nietzsche shows us how the eternal recurrence not only emerges out of 
reflection on the will to power, it also reflects back onto it. And to that end, Zarathustra’s 
notorious “nausea” over the “small man” proves to be not histrionic or self-indulgent, but 
actually amounts to a dawning self-awareness about the true nature of his task. 
 
The Eternal Recurrence and Zarathustra’s Health of Soul 
In Zarathustra’s third and final book its protagonist wrestles with the doctrine of 
eternal recurrence, which teaches that what he seeks most to transcend (the contemptible 
“last man” which contemporary life is headed towards) will recur just as surely as the 
goal which he is working to bring into being (an age dominated by “super-men”). The 
doctrine thereby forces Zarathustra to question his entire activity as a teacher of human 
beings, since it implies that the end which he initially believed that his instruction was 
advancing is not actually an end at all, but only a means to the repetition of the whole 
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process: “All is the same, nothing is worthwhile, knowing chokes”50. Confronted with 
this difficulty, Zarathustra is unable to affirm the doctrine and so eventually retreats from 
society back to his mountaintop, where he remains for the novel’s final eight chapters. 
Here Nietzsche lets us see Zarathustra in his solitude for the first time, where we witness 
how he comes both to affirm the eternal recurrence and to accept his task as a teacher of 
it.  
Zarathustra’s return to his mountain is titled “The Return Home”. But although 
Zarathustra himself refers to solitude as his home, it appears to be a rather different 
existence from the deserts in which the disenchanted free spirits secure their distance 
from all objects of reverence. For what Zarathustra experiences in his solitude proves to 
be a renewed openness toward and insight into the nature of all things, even 
comprehending the world associated with traditional ‘metaphysicians’: “Here the words 
and word-shrines of Being spring open for me; here all being wants to become word, here 
all becoming wants to learn from me how to speak”. Zarathustra’s retreat to solitude thus 
appears to entail not so much an escape from the world as the adoption of a different, 
architectonic perspective on it – a perspective which, far from devaluing human things, 
revalues them, giving them a new weight and so a renewed potential for reverence.  
That a humanitarian concern occupies Zarathustra even in his solitude is made 
explicit in the next speech (“On the Three Evils”), where a dream presents Zarathustra 
with a picture of the world as sufficiently knowable to be known as “a humanely good 
                                                
50 These are the words with which Zarathustra explains (in “The Convalescent” 2) what had 
repulsed him when he first encountered the doctrine (in “On the Vision and the Riddle” 2). 
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thing”; consequently, when the day comes he sets out to revalue natural qualities which 
human beings had devalued heretofore, in order to show that even these can “imitate” 
(participate in) the humanly good vision of which he had dreamed51. In passages like this 
(and the previous one), it is difficult not to think that we are meant to see Zarathustra as 
the recipient of a “revelatory” or supernatural experience52. 
Zarathustra’s prophetic-legislative activity culminates (after he summons the will 
to carry it out: “On the Spirit of Gravity”) with the longest speech in the work: “On Old 
and New Tablets”, where, as the title suggests, Zarathustra conceives of his mission as a 
kind of modern Moses, announcing a new code for the conduct of all human life and 
calling on his “brothers” to steel themselves for the defeat of the “last man” and transition 
to the super-man. Thus, he proclaims at the outset of this speech: “I want to return to 
human beings once more”. In his solitude, then, Zarathustra achieves the vision necessary 
                                                
51 Note that elsewhere Nietzsche stresses (and by no means always dismissively) that “it was in 
dreams that the magnificent figures of the gods first appeared before the souls of men” (The Birth 
of Tragedy, section 1; cf. Human, All Too Human, aphorisms 5, 12-13; Daybreak, aphorism 5; 
Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 193). The political consequences of such claims were a matter 
of considerable concern to the pioneering early modern political thought of Hobbes (Leviathan, 
Chapter 2 [paragraphs 5-9], Chapter 27 [paragraph 20], Chapter 32 [paragraph 6]) and Spinoza 
(Theologico-Political Treatise, Preface). With the specter of religious war looming, Hobbes and 
Spinoza sought to undermine the claims of “false prophets” which proliferated in their time by 
debunking dreams and visions as a legitimate source of prophecy in order to secure sovereign 
political authority. Nietzsche’s contrary elevation of the unconscious goes hand-in-hand with a 
renewed potential for revolutionary and competitive political activity. 
52 Cf. “On Reading and Writing”, end: “Now I am light, now I am flying, now I see myself 
beneath myself, now a God dances through me!” 
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to act, not merely as a teacher of human beings, but as something even more: their 
founder.  
But precisely as Nietzsche shows us Zarathustra having reached this apex of 
visionary activity and calling on “brothers” to help him bring his vision into being, we 
must be all the more struck that, next…..nothing happens. Zarathustra does not descend 
from his mountain; he does not even have any “brothers” to address. He remains a 
solitary. We might say that Zarathustra stands before us as a philosopher-king lacking 
only a compulsion to rule (cf. Plato, Republic 520a-d). To be sure, the problem that drove 
Zarathustra back into his solitude – his inability to affirm the eternal recurrence – still 
remains, and is indeed the subject of the very next chapter (“The Convalescent”), which 
will help to clarify why, precisely in light of his prophetic vision, Zarathustra finds it so 
difficult to return to human beings. 
The chapter begins with Zarathustra collapsing unconscious after a renewed 
struggle with the eternal recurrence doctrine, only to be gradually resuscitated by the 
chatter of his animals – not their specific words, so much as their general sounds 
(“babbling”). “Words and tones”, Zarathustra reflects, present the world as like a garden 
at his disposal because they provide “seeming-bridges between what is eternally 
separated”. But as pleasing and restorative as Zarathustra admits to finding this, he also 
asserts that such bridges do not actually exist: “For me – how could there be an outside-
me? There is no outside me! But with all tones we forget that; how lovely it is that we 
forget!” Such forgetting naturally appears lovely to human beings because it furnishes 
them with “names and tones” which in turn allow them to “refresh themselves with 
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things”: Zarathustra is presumably referring to the process of naming-through-words, 
which is to say, creative/legislative activity by means of which “our love dances on 
colorful rainbows” (i.e., expresses itself over the illusory bridges binding communities 
together). More generally, then, through this whole statement Zarathustra speaks from his 
recently-adopted perspective as a founder: that is, a determinedly singular perspective, 
but one that is pleased by the appearance of human community which is facilitated 
through sound (“words”, “tones”, “names”) and which thus makes the creative 
(evaluative) activity of the individual founder possible.  
The animals reply to Zarathustra by speaking to him of the eternal recurrence – 
that is, from within the perspective created by a teaching which they had heard him speak 
of earlier (“for those who think as we do all things are already dancing”). However, 
where Zarathustra had spoken of a relatively moderate and thus for him also pleasing 
diminishment of “individuality” through the apprehension of various sounds, the animals 
now present a much more radical challenge to his singular perspective. This is the 
consequence of a difficulty which we noted in an earlier discussion of the eternal 
recurrence: namely, that the doctrine renders the would-be founder’s attempt at decisively 
redirecting human activity into nothing more than one stage in the turning of a never-
ending circle. As the animals remind Zarathustra: “Everything breaks, everything is 
joined anew; eternally is built the same house of Being”. And with that realization, the 
would-be founder’s sense of distinctness from what he rebelled against evaporates: 
“Naked I once saw them both, the greatest and the smallest human being: all-too-similar 
to each other, even the greatest!” Thus, the same teaching which comforts its would-be 
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disciples and beneficiaries convulses its progenitor53. Zarathustra therefore rebuffs his 
animals and the vulgarized version of his insight which they regurgitate54. For the 
animals, then, the eternal recurrence teaching represents a solution55, whereas for 
Zarathustra it represents a problem, not so much because of any difficulty with the 
doctrine per se as because of the difficulties which the doctrine creates specifically for 
the one who would teach it.  
With this last observation we can understand why even as Zarathustra acquired 
the vision of the founder, he did not descend to an actual founding – and how that 
intermediate perspective remains distinct from both the free spirits (whose solitude leaves 
them “redeemed from all adorations” and thus cut off from all society) and the famous 
wise (whose concern with society compels them to serve it).  
What the exchange over eternal recurrence with the animals helps us to see, then, 
is that if Zarathustra is ever to assume the role of a teacher of the doctrine and descend 
                                                
53 The animals not only address Zarathustra as “the teacher of eternal recurrence”, they also 
envision him willing to die as a “herald” on its/their behalf – but a death which, as they indicate 
in the context, would be (like their own deaths) compensated for by the eternal recurrence itself 
(i.e., by the belief that death is not permanent). In a notebook from 1883 Nietzsche commented on 
the eternal recurrence: “Its immediate effect will be to replace the belief in immortality”. 
Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. Giorgio Colli & 
Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), Volume 12, 398. 
54 “You buffoons and barrel-organs”, Zarathustra addresses them, and asks: “Have you simply 
made a hurdy-gurdy song of it all?” 
55 “Thus – ends Zarathustra’s going under!” they imagine him saying upon having accepted his 
task as teacher. 
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from his mountain once more, it will have to be with the awareness that his teaching will 
inevitably be misunderstood and popularized in a manner which would spark the critical-
destructive ire of a free spirit and that this task could therefore only be taken on if it was 
somehow nevertheless aimed primarily at satisfying Zarathustra’s own deepest desires. 
Only if this last condition was satisfied and kept constantly in mind would Zarathustra be 
able to go down from his mountain once more and still escape the charge of having 
become just the latest iteration of a famous wise man serving the many who do not share 
in his wisdom. 
And so Zarathustra ignores even his animals, feigning sleep so that they leave him 
to lie in a solitude apart even from them. And yet…..even in his most solitary solitude 
Zarathustra proves to be not wholly alone. To be sure, he no longer dreams of the world 
below him, with its demands or potential. He lies, instead, in dialogue with his soul56. 
The care of his soul now appears to be Zarathustra’s most intimate concern, as he speaks 
to it of the gifts that he has bestowed on it, eventually appearing to his soul as the sun had 
appeared to him in the prologue to the whole work – as the source of overflowing 
brilliance which had nourished its development. But this means that Zarathustra’s soul 
now stands to him as he once stood to the sun: as overfull and in need of stretching itself 
out beyond itself. “O my soul”, Zarathustra admonishes: 
“I have given you all, and all my hands have become empty for you – and now? 
Now you say to me, smiling and heavy of heart: ‘Which of us should be thankful? 
                                                
56 Cf. Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 289, and then also consider aphorisms 160 and 296. 
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– should not the giver be thankful that the taker has taken? Is bestowing not a 
need?’” 
Zarathustra seems to concede his soul’s question, for he responds by according to it a task 
through which it may unburden its surplus of riches: “You must sing, O my soul!”, and 
he indicates that the subject of those songs should be Dionysus, “your great redeemer” 
and the god with whom Nietzsche identified the eternal recurrence57. “Better yet”, 
Zarathustra adds by way of conclusion (since the last command could by itself be taken 
as a final gift to his soul), “sing to me, O my soul! And let me give thanks!” And with 
that Thus Spoke Zarathustra ends in songs through which Zarathustra is finally able to 
embrace his life and the eternity in which he lives it. 
 If we return from this poetic and ecstatic conclusion to the practical dilemma that 
had led to it (the problem of the founder or teacher), in what respect can we say that the 
former resolves the impasse faced by the latter? If we consider this question in light of 
the entire narrative of Zarathustra, it seems to me that Nietzsche’s suggestion must be 
this: Zarathustra’s solitude is never wholly solitary, because apart from whatever 
conflicted concern he may have for other human beings, even his self-concern cannot 
remain entirely self-contained. For even when Zarathustra abandons his concern for 
others as inexorably frustrating, the needs of his own soul to which he ministers 
                                                
57 Zarathustra refers to Dionysus here only as “the nameless one”, but he alludes to anecdotes 
with which Dionysus was associated in Greek mythology. Nietzsche makes the connection 
between Dionysus and the eternal recurrence explicit in Ecce Homo (“The Birth of Tragedy”, 
section 3; “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, section 6). 
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ultimately entail a need for that soul’s expression, and he can satisfy that need only by 
bestowing his soul with an object and subject for its effusion. To that extent, one can see 
how Zarathustra might justify to himself assuming the task of teaching others. That being 
said, we do not see Zarathustra descend from his mountain at the end of the book; he 
remains, for the time being, alone with his soul, the latter evidently content with their 
new duet.  
Nonetheless, we cannot conclude Thus Spoke Zarathustra without observing that 
with it we are clearly witnessing Nietzsche’s own descent in the form of a book through 
which he endeavors to instruct others (no matter how obliquely). And we cannot forget 
that Nietzsche concluded one of his final works with these words: “I, the last disciple of 
the philosopher Dionysus – I, the teacher of the eternal recurrence…” (Twilight of the 
Idols, “What I Owe to the Ancients”, section 5). 
 We might conclude, then, by wondering how those thorough-going solitaries, the 
free spirits, would respond to Zarathustra and Nietzsche’s predicament. Would they be 
persuaded that the needs of their souls should compel them to give up their posture of 
critical isolation in favor of a creative engagement with the world? Or wouldn’t they be 
justified in holding to the same assessment of their situation suggested by the early 
speech “On the Famous Wise Men”: that is, admitting the attractions which an alternative 
existence would promise while also anticipating its inevitable costs (such as the popular 
vulgarization and misappropriation of their authentic individual insight)? At the least, 
they could justifiably note that Zarathustra never suggests that those costs can be entirely 
avoided. And consequently, wouldn’t the free spirits conclude by rededicating themselves 
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to their “godless” existence once more, even and especially as this entailed accepting a 
different cost suggested by the evolution of Zarathustra’s self-understanding – namely, 
the deliberate denial or suppression of some aspect of their souls?58  
 
Coda 
 Taken on its own, Thus Spoke Zarathustra does not answer such questions. But 
by raising them it directs us to consider the works that Nietzsche published immediately 
before and after Zarathustra, in which the free spirit’s are Nietzsche’s primary characters, 
and with whom he often directly identifies himself. In other words: Zarathustra sets the 
stage for a contest between Zarathustra and the free spirits, but the contest is not carried 
out in the work itself. Nevertheless, readers can draw out the contrast, and judge it for 
themselves, by considering Zarathustra in light of Nietzsche’s writings on the free spirit, 
along with his late autobiographical writings on both. That will be our task in the chapters 
that follow. I will begin, however, with the free spirits, and try to explain why their 





                                                
58 “Tethered Heart, Free Spirit.–If one tethers one’s heart firmly and imprisons it, one can give 
one’s spirit many liberties: I have said that once before. But one does not believe me, unless one 
already knows it…..” (Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 87; cf. pp. 95-97, below). 
 56 
CHAPTER 3 
“TETHERED HEART, FREE SPIRIT”: 
THE WANDERER, HIS SHADOW, AND THE MONUMENT TO A CRISIS 
In Chapter 1 I suggested that Thus Spoke Zarathustra can be viewed as the 
culmination in a series of works of discovery on Nietzsche’s part. In particular, 
Zarathustra lays out most fully and emphatically the central doctrines which would to 
some extent define Nietzsche’s career: the will to power and the eternal recurrence. But a 
nuance can now be added to that characterization: Zarathustra is the one work in which 
Nietzsche does the most to help readers discover these doctrines. Subsequent works tend 
to allude to them in suggestive snippets, whereas in Zarathustra the title character’s 
entire journey amounts to a process of discovering and wrestling with these teachings.  
Nevertheless, the will to power and the eternal recurrence are not wholly original 
to Thus Spoke Zarathustra: they are at least intimated in earlier works (as we shall see in 
Chapter 3), and Nietzsche had explored both notions in his notebooks before entrusting 
them to Zarathustra. What is therefore most striking about their appearance in 
Zarathustra must then be the fact that both teachings present its protagonist with a 
profound dilemma: having been led from his insight into the will to power to a 
recognition of the necessity of the eternal recurrence, Zarathustra nevertheless struggles 
to affirm the world in those terms. And the reader is thereby entitled to question whether 
there is not something fundamentally mistaken about Zarathustra’s whole orientation 
towards the world, especially his desire to lead it through a process of political 
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transformation – a thought which is strengthened by the fleeting presence in the work of 
the free spirits, whose political orientation is very different from Zarathustra’s own. 
This fact can be seen most clearly in Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free 
Spirits, which introduced these characters into Nietzsche’s corpus, specifically in order to 
signal the newfound independence of mind that he had acquired with that work (freie 
geist can mean either “free spirit” or “free mind”). That outlook develops progressively 
through Human, All Too Human and the series of writings that follow it (commonly 
designated Nietzsche’s “middle period), but it begins from a practical concern that 
continues to be of interest in the contemporary world: namely, the extent to which 
science can provide a sufficient basis for grounding and guiding social and political life59. 
Human’s sympathetic exploration of that possibility constitutes a sharp break with 
Nietzsche’s earlier writings, and that turn is accompanied by a newfound sympathy for 
liberal democracy, which also sharply distinguishes Nietzsche’s orientation in this period 
from that of Zarathustra. The theoretical outlook of the free spirits is then linked to a 
political posture in a way that can be directly contrasted with the orientation of 
Zarathustra. Let me elaborate on this point a bit further by way of introduction. 
 The notion that science could sustain culture was the subject of extensive 
criticism in Nietzsche’s early works, which were characterized by a faith in Wagnerian 
                                                
59 This is the over-arching thesis of the best and most recent study of the middle period, Paul 
Franco, Nietzsche’s Enlightenment. Franco has provided the most insightful account of 
Nietzsche’s animating concerns during this period, but I read the development of Nietzsche’s 
thoughts about them differently. In particular, I emphasize writings from the middle period that 
Franco overlooks, and understand the relationship between those writings somewhat differently.   
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opera as the herald of a rejuvenated, neo-classical German civilization. And in the works 
that follow the middle period Nietzsche seems to style himself as the herald of a radically 
new cultural transformation, with his Zarathustra as the prophetic icon of a “superhuman” 
future, centered on the quasi-religious affirmation of the eternal recurrence. Human, All 
Too Human does not exhibit such preoccupations. Accordingly, whereas later works 
excoriate modern politics for cultivating an ethos of hedonistic, materialistic 
egalitarianism that Nietzsche portrays as virtually sub-human (sometimes speaking of the 
citizens of modern states as the “last men” or the “herd”), in Human Nietzsche cautiously 
reconciles himself to the modern world60.  
 To be sure, Nietzsche never shows any great enthusiasm for democratic 
government, but Human nevertheless accepts it as not only inevitable, but also as placing 
a salutary break on tyrannical individual ambition and arbitrary government power (WS 
275, 281, 289, 292). In some places Nietzsche even sounds like he could have been at 
home among the great liberal moderates of the mid-20th century who steered a course 
between the extremes of communism and fascism (e.g., Raymond Aron, Isaiah Berlin, or 
Judith Shklar); he seems to roughly foreshadow their concerns when he insists on an 
‘anti-utopian’ posture in politics, and advocates ‘limited government’ as a result (HAH 
235, 472). Still, Nietzsche’s political moderation never culminates in any sort of “public 
philosophy”, and never even launches a strong defense of any political order. Instead, 
Nietzsche clearly expects the most gifted individuals (the “free spirits” to whom his work 
                                                
60 For a detailed account, see Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic 
Radicalism, Chapter 8. 
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is addressed) to live peacefully on the margins of politics, soberly skeptical of it rather 
than desiring its transformation (HAH 291, 438, 464). For that reason, at times Nietzsche 
can sound like a proto-libertarian, admonishing socialists’ attempts to resuscitate state 
power, and turning to a vision of ‘open borders’ through global trade as an alternative 
(HAH 473-475). 
 The moderate, libertarian political thrust of Nietzsche’s middle period is 
accompanied by an intellectual orientation that scholars commonly characterize as 
“positivist” (in fact, the whole “middle period” is sometimes also referred to as 
Nietzsche’s “positivist period”)61. What this means is that, whereas Nietzsche’s early 
works looked to art or metaphysics as a solution to philosophic problems, here Nietzsche 
attempts to explain the world using no explanatory tools beyond those provided by 
human reason (HAH 29). For Nietzsche, this project does not require disproving the 
existence of a metaphysical realm beyond human reason (a realm that, in earlier writings, 
he believed could be accessed through great art). Rather, it requires establishing the limits 
set to human beings’ capacity for knowledge – the “all too human” character of our 
rational faculties (HAH 9, 16-17). And if our capacity for knowledge is in fact limited to 
the all-too-human, then there is no point in pursuing a grand cultural project to vault 
ourselves beyond it to the “Dionysian” essence of things. In this way, establishing the 
limits of human knowledge helps to establish and justify a limited government.   
                                                
61 A standard statement of this view is Maudemarie Clark, “On Knowledge, Truth, and Value”; 
cf. Ruth Abbey, Nietzsche’s Middle Period, 87; Julian Young, Friedrich Nietzsche, 242-245 
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 If appreciating the limits of human knowledge does indeed serve to limit our 
political ambitions, then at least one major strand of Nietzsche’s thought could be 
enlisted in support of a liberal democratic government such as our own. The difficulty for 
the contemporary reader, however, is that Nietzsche did not ultimately hold to this line of 
argument. Moreover, he did not only turn against it in his later writings. As I will argue in 
what follows, even in Human… itself Nietzsche suggests that philosophy’s ambitions 
cannot easily rest with the less ambitious, quietist posture sketched above. In particular, 
The Wanderer and His Shadow (the final installment of Human…62) shows why 
Nietzsche began to abandon that posture even as the “middle period” progressed.  
 At this point a qualification should be made. When I suggest that Nietzsche’s 
“middle period” was less of a straightforwardly “positivist period” than many scholars 
have taken it for, I do not mean to imply that Nietzsche was in fact some sort of anti-
rationalist all along63. It is more accurate to say that from early on in the middle period 
                                                
62 As I discuss in detail below, Human, All Too Human is made up of three components parts 
(HAH, AOM, WS), which share a complex relationship, and were eventually published by 
Nietzsche in a single volume with an all-encompassing title. In what follows, I will consistently 
refer to each component individually. 
63 Michael Gillespie holds that Nietzsche’s positivist turn during the middle period has generally 
been overstated, and that Nietzsche never wavered from his goal (first set out in The Birth of 
Tragedy) of revivifying the “Dionysian”, even as he turned against a “metaphysical interpretation 
of the Dionysian” in the middle works (Nihilism Before Nietzsche, p. 215-216). I very much agree 
with Gillespie that Nietzsche’s positivist turn needs to be viewed in instrumental terms (i.e., as a 
strategy for clearing the debris left behind by decaying metaphysical philosophies) rather than as 
an uncritical embrace of the positivist “paradigm” (as supposed by Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A 
Philosophical Biography, p. 243). But I do not follow Gillespie in finding that Nietzsche’s 
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Nietzsche adopted quite a modest view of what his new positivist outlook could achieve: 
it could only produce a few rational individuals, not a rational society. Indeed, we might 
say that precisely during his most clearly rationalist period Nietzsche’s rationalism was 
defined by its distance from and resistance to socio-political life.  
 The opposition between rationality and society that Nietzsche has in mind can be 
broadly stated along the following lines: in The Wanderer and His Shadow, Nietzsche 
identifies traditional metaphysics as an outgrowth of social needs or demands, so that to 
securely forsake the former one must also abandon the latter. In other words, social needs 
somehow lead to metaphysical claims, including theological claims; to embrace society 
in any form is therefore to take a treacherous step down a dangerous road. We might even 
say that for Nietzsche society-metaphysics-religion are planets operating in a single orbit. 
And what changes in Nietzsche’s writings (early to middle to late) is not how he aligns 
this constellation, but how he suggests orienting oneself towards it. The Wanderer and 
His Shadow constitutes Nietzsche’s most determined effort to resist the pull of that 
horizon. It is therefore especially revealing about what might make such resistance 
difficult, and eventually untenable – as it seems to have become for Nietzsche himself in 
later works.  
 That being said, in order to recognize what is most distinctive about The 
Wanderer and His Shadow, we have to appreciate what is singular about the work within 
                                                                                                                                            
“positivistic tools” aimed at recovering Dionysus all along. So far as I can tell, the Dionysian 
genuinely recedes in the Human… trilogy (though it certainly makes a gradual reemergence in the 
later writings of the middle period).   
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the context of Nietzsche’s entire corpus. And since the work is closely bound up with 
Human, All Too Human, this means that we must approach The Wanderer through the 
larger project of Human.  
 
The Monument to a Crisis: Nietzsche’s All-Too-Human Trilogy 
 Human, All Too Human is widely recognized as the first entry in the “free spirit 
trilogy” that comprises Nietzsche’s “middle period”64. Nietzsche’s own statements 
authorize this classification in two ways. In the first place, on the back cover of the first 
edition of The Gay Science he announced: “This book marks the conclusion of a series of 
writings by Friedrich Nietzsche whose common goal is to erect a new image and ideal of 
the free spirit”. He then listed that “series of writings” as follows: The Gay Science itself 
(in its initial form, comprising only four books), its predecessor Daybreak, and the three 
publications before that. These last three were Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free 
Spirits (published in 1878), Assorted Opinions and Maxims (1879), and The Wanderer 
and his Shadow (1880). Although these three were originally written and published 
separately Nietzsche evidently thought of them as forming a single unit, since he 
republished HAH in 1888, with AOM and WS included under the same cover as the 
work’s second volume (with each of the two volumes outfitted with an autobiographical 
                                                
64 E.g., Franco,  Nietzsche’s Enlightenment: The Free Spirit Trilogy of the Middle Period. But 
Franco is certainly not alone in referring to this series of writings as  “trilogy”: e.g., R.J. 
Hollingdale, Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy p. 169; Keith Ansell Pearson, 
“Introduction” to A Companion to Nietzsche (ed. Ansell Pearson), p. 11. The more general 
conceptual division of the writings along these lines dates all the way back to Lou Salome. 
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preface discussing its composition). Moreover, in Ecce Homo he devoted a single chapter 
of “Why I Write Such Good Books” to “Human, All Too Human, with Two 
Continuations”. Thus, although Nietzsche initially wrote and published HAH, AOM and 
WS separately, by the end of the middle period he seems to have concluded that (a) these 
three works belonged together as a single unit and that (b) they also belonged to a broader 
series of writings devoted to the free spirits. To that extent, Nietzsche authorizes us to 
speak of Human, All Too Human as his first entry in a “free spirit trilogy”. 
 It should be added that Human, All Too Human, Assorted Opinions and Maxims 
and The Wanderer and His Shadow were not only brought together by Nietzsche 
retrospectively. Close connections between the three existed from the time of their 
composition. Most notably, the three writings are designed to follow a nearly identical 
thematic structure. Although only the first volume of Human… was divided up into 
discrete chapters, the aphorisms in the next two works treat substantially the same 
subjects in the same order: for instance, a sequence of aphorisms on women, followed by 
a sequence on modern politics65. HAH, AOM and WS can therefore plausibly be 
characterized as variations on a theme (or a set of themes). In keeping with this fact, in 
both published and epistolary remarks Nietzsche’s often refers to AOM and WS as 
“continuations”, “supplements”, or “appendices” to the first installment of HAH66.  
                                                
65 This correspondence is noted by Werner Dannhauser, Nietzsche’s View of Socrates, 164-166 
and Paul Franco, Nietzsche’s Enlightenment, 15.  
66 The first edition of AOM was even announced as a “supplement” to HAH on its title page. 
Moreover, Nietzsche initially wanted the pagination and aphorism numbering of AOM to pick up 
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 If, then, the three installments of Human, All Too Human constitute variations on 
a theme, then just how distinct are these variations? Scholarship on HAH seems to answer 
“not very distinct at all”, insofar as AOM and WS have attracted very little attention from 
scholars67. This reading is, however, partly a consequence of the larger tendency to divide 
Nietzsche’s work into three distinct periods (early/middle/late), and then define the 
middle period in terms of a trilogy of three works (HAH, D, GS). Attributing this 
structure to Nietzsche’s career leaves little room for reading AOM and WS as much more 
than “supplements” or “appendices” to the landmark of HAH68. But this is not the only 
way to view these three works, even if we follow Nietzsche’s own judgments of them. In 
what follows I want to propose that Human, All Too Human can be viewed as a trilogy of 
                                                                                                                                            
exactly where HAH had left off (this plan was scuttled by his publisher, who insisted that a book 
which begin with “aphorism 639” on “page 379” would be off-putting for potential readers).  
67 Ruth Abbey, Nietzsche’s Middle Period, p. xii echoes Michael Tanner, Nietzsche, p. 26, in 
judging Nietzsche’s most overlooked work to be Daybreak. I doubt that this judgment would hold 
if Daybreak was considered relative to AOM or WS (taken independently of the first volume of 
HAH). To some extent, Abbey herself exhibits this tendency, because although she professes to 
observe a distinction between the three installments of HAH (xii), she never makes clear how she 
understands those distinctions.  
68 This approach to Nietzsche’s corpus is best illustrated by Paul Franco’s Nietzsche’s 
Enlightenment, which is comprised of three chapters dealing with each work of the “middle 
period” in turn, book-ended by chapters which place them relation to his later and earlier works. 
Thus, although Franco generally exhibits a great sensitivity to the way in which Nietzsche’s 
various works exhibit his evolving self-understanding, he also manages to dismiss AOM and WS 
in a single footnote referring to Nietzsche’s own descriptions of these works as “supplements” or 
“appendices” to HAH (233-234n8). I think that this approach downplays the dramatic changes in 
Nietzsche’s life during this period, and the extent to which those changes impacted his thought. 
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its own, embodying a crucial series of developments in Nietzsche’s self-understanding. 
And Nietzsche’s autobiographical self-assessments support this approach at least as much 
as they support the “free spirit trilogy” reading.  
 In order to grasp the way in which the All Too Human trilogy represents an 
evolving process of self-discovery on Nietzsche’s part, it is helpful to begin from a 
programmatic statement that he makes about the work in Ecce Homo. There he 
introduces it as “the monument to a crisis” (EH HAH 1). That crisis had been brought on 
by his break with Wagner, whom Nietzsche had valorized in earlier publications as 
ushering in a new cultural golden age. That mistake had been tied up with a basic 
philosophic error. Nietzsche’s early works were not only a tribute to Wagner, they were 
also shaped by Schopenhauer, the philosopher whom both Wagner and the young 
Nietzsche idolized. Schopenhauer had argued that music enabled human beings to see 
beyond the given corporeal world, and pierce through to the transcendent spiritual heart 
of things (the noumena behind the phenomena, in the Kantian language that Nietzsche 
occasionally employs during this period) (see BT 16). Music, the young Nietzsche had 
learned from Schopenhauer, was the path to metaphysics, and he believed that Wagnerian 
opera had the potential to realize that insight in the modern world (as it had been realized 
in the Dionysian festivals of the ancient world). Nietzsche would spend the rest of his 
career repudiating those early beliefs. 
Human, All Too Human was written just as Nietzsche had begun to turn 
decisively away from Wagner’s influence, and, as Paul Franco has shown, the work can 
be most coherently read as Nietzsche’s attempt at thinking through the problem of 
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‘culture’, after having abandoned any hope in Wagner as its solution69. Thus, when 
Nietzsche refers to the “crisis” of Human…, that crisis does not end with the break from 
Wagner (it also encompasses Nietzsche’s subsequent struggle to find new bearings once 
he had come unmoored from the master of Bayreuth). But the crisis does begin with that 
break, and Nietzsche’s turn to the “free spirits” as a the key to navigating a world in 
which Wagner’s star had ceased to provide him with a guiding light. A few words 
therefore need to be said about the nature of that initial break.  
 Nietzsche had composed Human, All Too Human knowing that it would alienate 
him from Wagner. He did not, however, initially take any great delight in this fact, as the 
bombastic style of his later published remarks on Wagner might lead one to believe. 
Nietzsche’s publisher welcomed the conflict between the young author and the renowned 
composer as a chance to increase the book’s sales, but Nietzsche himself wanted to 
publish it under a pseudonym. When his publisher refused, Nietzsche toned down some 
of the language in the work, so that it would not appear to indict Wagner so directly. In 
other words, Nietzsche deliberately provoked his break with Wagner via Human…, but 
he did so with a mixture of knowingness and reluctance70. He seems to have been 
compelled to the break by his intellectual probity, while remaining unsure of how to 
handle its consequences for himself as a human being.  
                                                
69 See Franco, Nietzsche’s Enlightenment. Brief-yet-incisive remarks on this aspect of the work 
are also made by Laurence Lampert, The Enduring Importance of Leo Strauss, 257-259. 
70 See Schaberg, The Nietzsche Canon, 58-59 
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 Nietzsche’s uneasy and reluctant or bashful approach to the publication of 
Human, All Too Human is significant, because although the work stands as the 
monument to his break with Wagner, and was also the catalyst for that break, he did not 
initially embrace that aspect of the work. To the contrary, he shied away from its full 
implications somewhat. Yet this was no longer the case by the time he wrote The 
Wanderer and His Shadow, if only because by then he had been forced to live the 
consequences of the break with Wagner. Now, this fact could simply mean that by 1880 
Nietzsche was finally in a position to state more bluntly what he had been thinking for 
several years. But if the experience of publishing Human had forced Nietzsche to 
confront more squarely the practical consequences of his new theoretical commitments, 
then we could reasonably expect The Wanderer to reflect important developments in 
Nietzsche’s understanding. And, indeed, The Wanderer proves to be distinguished from 
its two predecessors partly by the concern it expresses for more practical questions of 
everyday living. In later autobiographical commentaries Nietzsche would confirm that 
the work was the product of his reflection on the personal isolation created by the quarrel 
with Wagner, a sense of isolation that was compounded by ill-health that brought him 
close to death (see Chapter 4, below). 
 In sum: the history of Human, All Too Human gives us reason to think that 
Nietzsche’s thought evolved over the course of his writing and publishing its three 
installments. But what changed during that time would seem to be mainly Nietzsche’s 
orientation towards a core set of insights – his growing recognition and acceptance of 
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their practical consequences. Meanwhile, the basic arguments, and the corresponding 
change in orientation from his first two books, remains the same.  
 This point can be drawn out as follows. When Nietzsche published the first 
installment of Human, All Too Human he indicated by its subtitle (A Book for Free 
Spirits) that with this work he had begun to speak to, and to some degree speak as, a 
wholly new philosophical type, one that existed in deliberate and wholesale opposition to 
his entire earlier metaphysical, Romantic Wagnerian incarnation. But Nietzsche also 
learned about the nature of “free spiritedness” through the experience of writing the 
books, and living with their consequences. As a result, Human, All Too Human is not 
only the monument to Nietzsche’s break with Wagner; the trilogy as a whole also 
amounts to an evolving critical examination of the consequences of that break, whose 
limitations (as indicated by The Wanderer) lead Nietzsche to embark on a new course 
beginning with his next work (Daybreak).  
 As this last point suggests, the three installments of Human… belong together, not 
because the second two merely repeat the first, but because the three together represent 
something singular in Nietzsche’s corpus, something distinct from both their 
predecessors and their successors. The distinction between The Birth of Tragedy and 
Untimely Meditations, on the one hand, and Human, All Too Human on the other is clear 
enough. Nietzsche repeatedly disowned the early works as products of his early, 
misguided infatuation with Wagner and Schopenhauer, and scholars have universally 
recognized that distinction. Nevertheless, scholars have made much less of the fact that 
Nietzsche also demarcates the Human trilogy from its two successor volumes when he 
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suggests that the last two entries in the “middle period” actually belong to a series of 
“yes-saying” works: Daybreak, The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (see EH D 2, 
GS 1, BGE 1).  
 When Nietzsche refers to one of his writings as “yes-saying”, he seems to mean 
that it is what he also sometimes calls “affirmative”: positive and constructive, presenting 
an ideal to be embraced, and a goal to be pursued. A full elaboration of this notion of 
“yes-saying” works would require looking at what they each might have in common, a 
task that will be undertaken in our next chapter. For present purposes, however, we 
should note that in Ecce Homo Nietzsche also contrasts his series of “yes-saying” works 
with a series “no-saying” works that begin immediately after Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
with Beyond Good and Evil. And Nietzsche indicates that the “no-saying” perspective is 
characterized by stepping away from the radically new insights of its predecessors, and 
instead launching a “critique of modernity”, i.e., a critical assessment of all that is closest 
to the contemporary reader, in order to prepare such a reader for discovering and 
embracing the insights of the “yes-saying” works (EH BGE 2).  
What is most striking about Nietzsche’s characterization of the “no-saying” works 
beginning with Beyond Good and Evil is how much it parallels his task in Human, All 
Too Human. On Nietzsche’s own account Human… is a destructive work, dedicated to 
debunking the idols that formerly dominated Nietzsche’s thought, and continue to 
transfix much of the popular philosophic imagination (EH HAH 1). This critical or 
destructive thrust of the two works is reflected by the fact that Human, All Too Human 
introduces the free spirits into Nietzsche’s corpus, and Beyond Good and Evil effectively 
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reintroduces them. In fact, the free spirits are more prominent in these two works than in 
any of Nietzsche’s other writings: the subtitle of the former dedicates the work to them; 
the second chapter of the latter is named after them. Moreover, in the same year that 
Nietzsche published BGE he also reissued HAH, and equipped it with a preface 
describing the development of a free spirited outlook with a clarity found in none of his 
other writings. In fact, Nietzsche had originally planned Beyond Good and Evil as a 
“second edition” of Human, All Too Human, and traces of the connection can be still 
found in structure of the two works71. In all of these ways, Nietzsche calls attention to the 
free spirited outlook that characterizes these two works to a degree that is unique in his 
corpus.  
Of course, the free spirits had not disappeared in the interregnum between HAH 
and BGE: but, as we saw in Chapter 2, their single brief appearance in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra serves to emphasize that their critical, “anti-social” disposition made them 
                                                
71 Both are divided into nine major chapters, and whereas the third chapter of the first work is 
titled “Das religiöse Leben”, the third chapter of the second is “Das religiöse Wesen”. The other 
chapters are not always perfectly parallel, but similarities exist. Most notably, the title of the first 
chapter of BGE (“On the Prejudices of the Philosophers”) could serve as an alternate title for the 
first chapter of HAH, and Paul Franco notes that the opening aphorisms of the respective chapters 
pose virtually identical objections to philosophy’s traditional “faith in opposite values” 
(Nietzsche’s Enlightenment, 17). The last three chapters of the two works run more roughly 
parallel: the subject of the seventh chapter of HAH (“Woman and Child”) is treated in the last 
eight aphorisms of the seventh chapter of BGE; the eighth chapters of each work deal with 
modern politics; the subject of the ninth chapter of HAH (“Man Alone with Himself”) is taken up 
by the second half of the ninth chapter of BGE. Moreover, the second edition of HAH was 
outfitted with a Preface and a closing song, features that mirror BGE. 
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ill-suited to Zarathustra’s project, the most “affirmative” that Nietzsche ever wrote. There 
seems, then, to be a connection between the free spirits and the critical cast of mind 
characteristic of Nietzsche’s “no-saying” side, although this connection requires further 
clarification (since the free spirits also overlap with two of the “yes-saying” works).  
Based on the preceding, we can conclude the following: if Daybreak and The Gay 
Science are grouped together with Thus Spoke Zarathustra as “yes-saying” (i.e., positive 
and constructive) works, then Human, All Too Human stands in a category of its own. It 
is the means through which Nietzsche separated himself from the loyalties of his youthful 
writings, but also as a stage preceding the emergence of his most affirmative works. 
Moreover, this means that Human, All Too Human is the only non-“affirmative” work 
that Nietzsche composed in his first decade as an author (i.e., from The Birth of Tragedy 
through Thus Spoke Zarathustra: but whereas the early works affirmed false idols, the 
later works celebrate worthy ideals). The three installments of the Human, All Too 
Human trilogy therefore belong together because they are the only works that Nietzsche 
published before 1882 which were not constructive or creative. 
Appreciating the distinct status of Human, All Too Human is crucial not only for 
understanding Nietzsche’s project during his first decade as an author. It also has 
implications for how one understands the project of his final years. We have already seen 
that after Zarathustra, Nietzsche returned to the free spirits and to “no-saying” (albeit in a 
somewhat new light, since the free spirits were by then clearly represented as transitional, 
i.e., presented in light of an ideal established by “yes-saying” works). But in his last years 
Nietzsche also indicated that he planned to return to a second series of “yes-saying” 
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works, with an opus on The Will to Power. Indeed, according to one influential reading of 
Nietzsche, his corpus as it stands is essentially incomplete, because he was never able to 
return to his most affirmative, world-transformative project72. On the other hand, it can be 
argued that Nietzsche effectively completed his project with the works of 1888, and that 
we are missing nothing essential about his thought despite the fact that he was never able 
to write another series of “affirmative” works73. It is impossible to say what Nietzsche’s 
final intentions were with certainty. Nevertheless, if we want to understand why 
Nietzsche might have been driven to transition from a series of “no-saying” to “yes-
saying” works near the end of his productive life, then we ought to consider carefully the 
one document that we have of what led him to make just such a transition earlier in his 
career.  
If this last suggestion is sound, then The Wanderer and His Shadow assumes a 
much greater significance than it is usually granted. The approach to Nietzsche’s 
development that I have laid out somewhat downplays the conventional emphasis on 
drawing distinctions between the early, middle, and late Nietzsche (in which case 
Human, All Too Human represents a decisive break, with The Wanderer and His Shadow 
                                                
72 This is the thesis of the most famous, and most important, interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
thought, by Martin Heidegger. Heidegger presents an extreme version of this thesis, but it has 
been maintained more recently by Laurence Lampert (see his Nietzsche’s Teaching, 6n6, 86).  
73 In an important forthcoming study of The Antichrist and Ecce Homo, Heinrich Meier will 
argue that Nietzsche’s project is substantially completed by the last works that he left to posterity. 
I explore this possibility sympathetically in Chapter 4, although I do not know the extent to which 
my argument is supported by Meier’s. 
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amounting to a straightforward and derivative continuation of that trajectory, which 
continues uninterrupted for two more volumes). Instead, I highlight the differences 
between Nietzsche’s yes-versus-no-saying books, with Human… characterized as his first 
“no-saying” work, and The Wanderer standing as Nietzsche’s most thorough and critical 
reflection on that negative orientation, and thereby also implicitly helping to explain the 
“yes-saying” turn that followed it. Taken as a whole, then, the Human, All Too Human 
trilogy acts as a hinge point in two directions: it is neither the youthful Nietzsche 
(worshipping the false idols erected by others), nor the mature Nietzsche (establishing his 
own, worthy ideals), but the stage in between.  
Explaining Nietzsche’s transition towards and then away from the “no-saying” of 
the Human… trilogy not only helps us to understand the movement of his later thought, 
however. It also is essential to understanding the political development that we noted at 
the outset of this chapter. For by now it should be clear that the relative lack of ambition, 
and consequent acquiescence in modern politics, that we find in Human… is bound up 
with the “no-saying” posture of this work74. Nietzsche is here primarily concerned with 
identifying and debunking the remnants of old idols in the new world; he is not 
                                                
74 This is not to say that it is necessarily linked to that posture: after all, Nietzsche’s later “no-
saying” works evince extreme hostility towards modern politics, but that is because they are “no-
saying” in a different sense, i.e., are written against the background of his “yes-saying” works, 
and are even intended to prepare the reader for those works. Thus, the “no-saying” works of both 
periods are primarily critiques of modern life, but since Human… is not attached to any 
alternative to the modern world, it is at least not outwardly hostile towards it. As this indicates, in 
a sense Human, All Too Human is Nietzsche’s most thoroughly “no-saying” work, even if he 
never quite referred to it in those terms. 
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attempting to transform it. If anything, he is attempting to remove himself, and perhaps a 
few kindred free spirits, from the political world as far as possible. This appears most 
clearly in The Wanderer and His Shadow.  
The remainder of this chapter therefore seeks to establish the following: first, 
what distinct aspect of philosophy did Nietzsche discover in The Wanderer and His 
Shadow; second, how did he recommend that would-be free spirits discover and pursue 
those distinct qualities for themselves – and, in particular, how do the classical models of 
philosophy that Nietzsche commends in the work suggest that the free spirit should carry 
out that task; finally, how do those classical exemplars illustrate some of the challenges 
which a free spirit could expect to face in that project, and how might acknowledging 
those challenges finally lead him back to a more productive (less purely critical or 
destructive) engagement with the broader society of which he remains a part. In other 
words: how might the “no-saying” of The Wanderer lead to the “yes-saying” of 
Daybreak? 
Let us not get ahead of ourselves, however. We need to begin from the simple 
matter that dominates the whole All Too Human trilogy: namely, what are the constituent 
elements of the free spirited perspective that Nietzsche adopts in these works, and which 
enabled him to free himself of his dependence on Wagner and the other agents of 
dominant opinion in his time? And, by extension, how might sympathetic readers learn 





The Wanderer’s Encounter with Nietzsche “As A Shadow” 
 Human, All Too Human is, as its subtitle says, A Book for Free Spirits. Nietzsche 
had never mentioned the free spirits before writing the book, but they were to become the 
most enduring characters in his corpus. He described them with reasonable clarity from 
the outset: 
“He is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on the basis of his 
origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant 
views of the age, would have been expected of him. He is the exception.”  
(HAH 225) 
In other words: the free spirit is, roughly speaking, “one-of-a-kind”, not one-of-society. 
This is not to say, however, that Nietzsche is exhorting would-be free spirits to “relax”, 
“let go”, or any other sort of self-indulgence75. To the contrary, throughout his career 
Nietzsche stresses that free spiritedness constitutes an achievement, which is to say, an 
overcoming of obstacles that demands at least as much discipline (and even self-denial) 
as would be required of any great athlete or skilled dancer. Indeed, in an important 
respect the whole over-arching theme of the Human, All Too Human trilogy is just how 
                                                
75 In fact, the association of the term “free spirit” with such unNietzschean sentiments is one 
argument for translating freier Geist as “free minds”.  Nevertheless, I adopt “free spirit” partly 
because a great deal of what is at issue for these characters ultimately concerns what we would 
generally think of as closer to their “spirit” or “soul”, in its relation to qualities of mind. Indeed, 
my own interpretation emphasizes that relationship more strongly than most, so the translation 
“free spirit” helps to bring out that dimension of the problem. 
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difficult it is for a would-be free spirit to truly separate themselves from the spirit of their 
age.  
 The first installment of the All Too Human trilogy introduced the difficulty. From 
its opening aphorisms onward, it advanced “historical philosophy” as a means of 
uncovering the extent to which modern objects of admiration had been infected by the 
residue of discreditable ideals inherited from metaphysical philosophy and theology 
(HAH 1-2). Thus, the Wagnerian opera that had once seemed to Nietzsche as an avenue 
to the metaphysical mysteries of philosophy and religion now appears as a crude and 
hollow form of mass-intoxication, the decayed vestige of bygone Christian grandeur, 
targeted at mass audiences without any sensitivity to true subtlety and refinement (HAH 
150, 215, 217; AOM 171; WS 149, 156, 165, 170)76. Against these decadent trends, the 
primary task of philosophy throughout the Human… trilogy is to inspire an appreciation 
of seemingly ordinary or prosaic “unpretentious truths” that have been too easily 
overlooked or despised for too long (HAH 3; cf. 6, 609, AOM 25; WS 16). 
                                                
76 Compare Charles Taylor’s comments on how art can provide a “middle realm…between 
religious commitment and materialism”: “Something similar can perhaps be said of music. I am 
thinking of the way in which publically performed music, in concert hall and opera house, 
becomes an especially serious and important activity in nineteenth century bourgeois Europe and 
America. People begin to listen to concerts with an almost religious intensity. The analogy is not 
out of place. The performance has taken on something of a rite, and has kept it to this day. There 
is a sense that something great is being said in this music. This too has helped create a kind of 
middle space, neither explicitly believing, but not atheistic either, a kind of undefined spirituality” 
(A Secular Age, 360). For a sharp overview of Nietzsche’s criticism of modern art, see Franco, 
Nietzsche’s Enlightenment, 41-43. 
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 Nietzsche’s turn away from Wagner was, then, from its very beginning a turn 
towards the all-too-human. Yet this is true in a new and more rigorous way of The 
Wanderer and His Shadow. The book makes the all-too-human thematic to a degree that 
surpasses its two predecessors. In particular, it clarifies the difficulty of consistently 
appreciating the all-too-human by explaining that the problem at issue is not just 
historical (the obstacle of an accumulated tradition which the diligent scholar must 
constantly be on guard against accepting uncritically), but also psychological – internal to 
the free spirit himself rather than created by the society in which he happens to live. It 
further suggests that Nietzsche himself may not have fully appreciated this last difficulty 
until he wrote the work. 
 The unique difficulty that Nietzsche wrestles with in The Wanderer and His 
Shadow is indicated in the first place by its title, which refers us to the two characters 
who appear in short dialogues presented at its opening and closing77. These two 
characters are not identified until the closing dialogue, which indicates that the wanderer 
                                                
77 The importance of the title can be seen visually by comparing the title pages of the first 
editions of AOM and WS. The top half of the former has Human, All Too Human written in a 
large typeface, dominating the page, with A Book for Free Spirits on the next line in smaller type, 
followed by Nietzsche’s own name close to the center of the page. Below all of this one reads (in 
a smaller but distinct typeface) “Appendix [Anhang]: Assorted Opinions and Maxims”. No such 
apparatus emphasizing the connection to any predecessor volume is found on the last installment 
of the trilogy. There, one finds an uncluttered title page, dominated by the words “Wanderer and 
His Shadow” in large print. In other words: the title page of Assorted Opinions and Maxims draws 
the reader’s attention to Human, All Too Human; the title page of The Wanderer and His Shadow 
draws the reader’s attention to the wanderer and his shadow. 
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is the author of the book, Nietzsche himself, in conversation with his shadow. This rather 
bashful self-presentation is in striking contrast to Nietzsche’s other works, which are 
more likely to begin with very assertive pronouncements from the self-described “Mr. 
Nietzsche” (GS Preface 2). Not to mention that the other characters who Nietzsche 
introduces throughout his writings are typically defined no less strongly than himself 
(e.g., Zarathustra, Wagner, the free spirits, the last men). So although we eventually learn 
that the wanderer is Nietzsche, the fact that for most of this book he exists as an 
anonymous and nondescript wanderer suggests that this is a very different Nietzsche than 
the one that most of his readers think they know.  
 But the singularity of The Wanderer and His Shadow goes further than this, 
because the exchange between its title characters indicates that with this work Nietzsche 
is (re)discovered by both the reader and by Nietzsche himself. The work’s opening 
dialogue reveals that just as the wanderer stands to readers as a semi-anonymous figure 
very different from the Nietzsche whom they think they know, so the shadow stands to 
the wanderer himself: a part of the wanderer which he usually neglects about himself, and 
who is rather different from how he typically understands himself. Accordingly, the 
dialogue between the two at the outset of the book reveals that although the wanderer’s 
shadow is ever-present, the two hardly ever speak. This is so much the case that the 
wanderer initially does not recognize the shadow’s voice as his own; that is to say, he 
does not initially understand that the shadow’s existence is a part of his own. 
Nevertheless, despite the wanderer’s initial surprise at encountering the shadow, the two 
proceed to affirm that they do not exist in opposition to one another; in fact, they 
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presuppose one another. And the wanderer concludes their first exchange by declaring 
that their conversation will be a quest to find what they can agree on.  
Now, if Nietzsche (the wanderer) had heretofore failed to recognize the shadow’s 
omnipresence in his existence, then he can hardly have appreciated and absorbed all that 
he shared with his shadow before writing the book. And, in turn, the book must amount 
to a kind of summary of what Nietzsche learned from the encounter with his shadow: that 
is to say, from the year of his life when he “lived through the summer like a shadow at St. 
Moritz and the following winter, the least sunny of my life, as a shadow in Naumburg” 
(EH “Wise” 1). Nietzsche made this last remark almost a decade later, alerting readers to 
the biographical context of The Wanderer and His Shadow. In particular, he reminded 
readers that he composed The Wanderer in the same year that he resigned his 
professorship and began to live as a quasi-nomad, all while experiencing battles with his 
health that put him close to death. And this late remark serves to make more emphatic 
what is indicated by the earlier dialogues between the wanderer and his shadow: what 
Nietzsche learned from his “shadow”, and “as a shadow”, is something new, something 
that the break with Wagner alone could not have taught him. The Wanderer and His 
Shadow must therefore somehow stand apart from its All Too Human predecessors, even 
as it completes the trilogy to which all three belong. 
In sum: although the content of The Wanderer and His Shadow mirrors the 
thematic organization of its two predecessors, its content must represent something new 
for both Nietzsche and the reader (or at least shine a new light on older concerns), since 
neither has had the opportunity to recognize the shadow’s significance until now. The 
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book’s singular task is to correct that misunderstanding, by exploring what the wanderer 
and his shadow share in common, and thereby also suggesting what the reader might also 
share with both. To that end, the work directs our attention towards elementary-and-
indispensable-but-often-overlooked aspects of human existence, shared by the most 
diverse sorts of human beings (not only philosophers or free spirits).  
 
The Wanderer’s Turn to “The Closest Things” 
The most important product of Nietzsche’s encounter with his shadow, and its 
distinctive contribution to the rest of his thought, is his new recognition and appreciation 
of features of the everyday, prosaic world that he partakes of and relies on no less than 
any other human being around him. This point is made clearest by the book’s closing 
dialogue, which the shadow opens by observing:  
“Of all the things you have said [i.e., of all the things that Nietzsche has written in 
the book’s three hundred and fifty aphorisms] nothing has pleased me more than 
the promise you have made: you want again to become a good neighbor to the 
things closest to you. This will benefit us poor shadows too.”  
This closing reference to “the closest things” [nächsten Dinge] is crucial for two reasons. 
First of all, it reflects and underlines the break with metaphysical philosophy which is the 
primary task of the All Too Human trilogy: that is, a break with “First and Last Things” 
(as the title of the first chapter of HAH had referred to metaphysics), and a turn towards 
what is quite literally closest to the philosopher in his everyday life. In other words, the 
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shadow’s statement indicates that Nietzsche is here embracing a new conception of 
philosophy, because the object of the philosopher’s inquiry has changed78. 
 When Nietzsche speaks of “the closest things”, he is not only pointing to his 
philosophical shift away from the early, Wagnerian works (in which he had been 
transfixed by the “first and last things” of metaphysics). He is also pointing to a 
movement beyond the first volume of Human, All Too Human (which had instantiated the 
movement away from Wagner). After all, Nietzsche makes no mention of “the closest 
things” up until The Wanderer and His Shadow, and they clearly constitute part of what 
he has learned from the shadow. This does not in any way diminish their significance, 
however. Quite the contrary. Although the notion only appears at the end of the All Too 
Human trilogy, it reappears in the preface that Nietzsche added to the first volume of its 
republication in 1886. And there Nietzsche makes explicit what is only implied by the 
development of the original trilogy: namely, that an appreciation of “the closest things” 
belongs to a specific, late stage of the free spirit’s development.  
In that first preface to the 1886 reprint Nietzsche describes how the notion of a 
free spirit first formed in his mind, and then explains how a would-be free spirit would in 
fact form himself: beginning with a radical break from his youthful loyalties, persevering 
through the consequent isolation from his contemporaries, maturing into a rigorous 
                                                
78 Adrian del Caro asserts: “There is every reason to believe that  Nietzsche regarded his 
discovery and advocacy of the closest things as one of his principal philosophical teachings” 
(Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth, 220). This is not reflected in most scholarship on 
Nietzsche, but my argument in what follows provides some support for his judgment.  
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regimen of self-discipline, which in turn enables him to maintain a cool distance from all 
ordinary concerns, until… 
It again grows warmer around him… It seems to him as if his eyes are only now 
open to what is close at hand. He is astonished and sits silent: where had he been? 
These close and closest things: how changed they seem! What bloom they have 
acquired!79 
This cursory glance at the preface suffices to make one point clear: the free spirit evolves, 
and, to the extent that Nietzsche is here describing his own evolution in the period of the 
Human trilogy, he is highlighting the fact that he only gradually arrived at the 
appreciation of “the closest things” that we find in The Wanderer. Moreover, this 
reference helps us to see that the turn to “the closest things” is not an isolated curiosity in 
Nietzsche’s oeuvre: it is in some measure the climax of the free spirited perspective, and 
so a point that Nietzsche was compelled to spotlight when he revisited the free spirits in 
1886. In order to see how the turn towards “the closest things” completes the all-too-
human turn away from metaphysics, we can glance over The Wanderer’s opening series 
of aphorisms, which makes that question thematic.  
There are clear parallels between The Wanderer’s opening aphorisms and the 
parallel sequences in its predecessor volumes. Nietzsche opens each work by presenting 
                                                
79 The preceding paragraph is based on sections 2-4 of the preface, with the quotation being 
drawn from section 4. I discuss the preface in more detail in Chapter 4, below. All subsequent 
citations in this chapter are to aphorism numbers of The Wanderer and His Shadow, except where 
noted. 
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philosophy as a relentlessly negative or deflationary force, showing the limits set to 
human life. The target of this presentation is the traditional notion that the subject of 
philosophy is something called “metaphysics”, and that, moreover, it responds to some 
“metaphysical need” that human beings have – a desire to know “first and last things” 
beyond the human sensory world (16; cf. HAH 2, 26-27, 110, 131, 153). Philosophy in 
this sense is typically viewed as either laying the groundwork for a properly religious 
teaching (as Nietzsche understood Plato to have done), or acting as a latter-day substitute 
for a decaying religion (as Nietzsche had encountered it in Schopenhauer).  
The Wanderer and His Shadow (like its two immediate predecessors) hammers 
away that as religious belief continues to decline, its aspirations and exalted status must 
not be projected back onto philosophy. In particular, Nietzsche emphasizes that 
philosophy is not to be thought of as a means for justifying or satisfying many of the 
most pervasive human longings, but instead shows why those longings are unjustifiable 
and insatiable: not showing man to be “the goal and purpose of the existence of the whole 
universe” but instead showing how little of it he can even know (1, 2, 14, 16). The 
delusions which have lent philosophy (and, through it, human self-understanding more 
generally) a grandiose-but-unwarranted sense of self-importance are attributed to 
demands growing out of social and political life, which manipulate and distort 
individuals’ natural understanding for their own, larger ends (5-6, 9-13). Once such 
pretensions are abandoned, what we are left with in place of the mysteries of the universe 
is the needs and nature of our individual selves (2, 5-6). But these are not primarily to be 
found through the academic, philological task of historical research laid out in Human, 
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All Too Human. Rather, the proper subject of philosophy as Nietzsche now conceives it is 
“the closest things”: for instance, “eating, housing, clothing, social intercourse” are now 
proposed as “the object of constant impartial and general reflection and reform” (5-6).  
The sorts of quotidian concerns at issue here had never been prominent in 
Nietzsche’s thought until this point, but they would never disappear from his corpus. 
They are given especially careful attention in his very last work, Ecce Homo, where his 
autobiographical reflections are constantly bound up with observations on drink, diet, 
climate, and other apparently mundane matters80. And it these sorts of concerns in which 
Nietzsche’s turn to the All Too Human culminates, and which mark out the distinctive 
presentation of philosophy in The Wanderer and His Shadow. 
But isn’t this a rather peculiar understanding of philosophy? Granted that The 
Wanderer and His Shadow suggests replacing philosophy’s traditional “metaphysical” 
speculations with reflection on “the closest things” of day-to-day life, why should 
philosophy thus reconceived occupy any elevated status? Wouldn’t it amount to a sort of 
high-minded self-help program, with a philosopher distinguished from his fellow-men 
primarily by his outstanding mastery of the tasks of everyday life, in the manner of a 
Mary Poppins or Reginald Jeeves?81  
This last question is important, and will be addressed directly in due course. First, 
however, it should be noted that this thought can actually be pushed in an even more 
radical direction: why, it might well be asked, should a philosophy directed towards 
                                                
80 See, e.g., EH “Clever” 1-2. I discuss some of these issues in more detail in Chapter 4, below. 
81 This is roughly how it seems to be taken by Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion, 68-69 
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ordinary life even retain a status distinct from that life? Doesn’t Nietzsche’s suggestion 
point in the direction of Rousseau’s encomiums to the “good citizens”, “honest men”, and 
“simple souls” who live perfectly satisfying lives before (and only before!) encountering 
philosophy? In fact, there are places in The Wanderer and His Shadow where Nietzsche 
seems to envision a tranquil retreat away from society via immersion in an uncorrupted 
natural environment in a manner that sounds almost prototypically “Rousseauian” (192, 
196, 200, 295, 338). The possible connection between Nietzsche’s presentation of 
philosophy in The Wanderer and the thought of Rousseau runs still deeper than this, 
however. We can see that connection more clearly if we briefly remind ourselves of what 
may be Rousseau’s most significant contribution to modern thought. 
In the first part of his Discourse on Inequality Rousseau famously argued that 
what is most distinctively human – above all the human capacity for reason – has only 
evolved within social-political life as an accident of history, rather representing the 
fulfillment of human beings’ primeval nature. On this view, human beings’ rational 
faculties might be appropriately deployed as an instrument to clear away depredations 
introduced into human nature through various historical vicissitudes, and especially in 
order to free oneself of the psychological ills brought on by living in society. But reason 
is not an intrinsically good, or even a necessary, feature of human happiness; it as most 
contingently (and thus temporarily) so. If this is the case, then on the Rousseauian 
argument one is best advised to use one’s reason to retreat from society (whether 
mentally, physically, or both) – and then, having retreated from society, to retreat as well 
from reason, a tool that is been rendered superfluous outside of the unfortunate historical 
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context in which it just so happened to emerge82. In other words, when reason is seen as 
purely a product of history, it seems to point us away from society, but also away from 
philosophy as an end of human activity. 
Nietzsche’s All Too Human trilogy might well seem to exemplify this 
Rousseauian understanding of philosophy. As we have seen, the trilogy begins by 
introducing historical philosophy as a tool to dismember the constricting tentacles of an 
inherited tradition; but by The Wanderer and His Shadow those critical historical 
researches are accompanied by an inward turn towards “the closest things”, i.e., what is 
most individual about us, our elemental needs that are most resistant to social 
manipulation; and this ultimately includes a picture of withdrawal from society and 
immersion in nature, with the pleasures that it naturally supplies. Viewed in these terms, 
Nietzsche represents the culmination of a line of thought instantiated by Rousseau. 
In what follows, however, I want to argue that The Wanderer and His Shadow 
does not in fact play out the broad Rousseauian tendency sketched out above. “History” 
remains a problem in The Wanderer, and it was in the first volume of Human, All Too 
Human. But it is not the primary problem, and this is shown by the fact that the turn to 
“the closest things” does not represent a solution for Nietzsche, but rather a new and 
more intractable challenge. Nor does that turn serve to remove one from society in any 
                                                
82 It should be acknowledged that the full breadth of Rousseau’s writings – and even a number of 
qualifications in the Discourse on Inequality itself – make it difficult to conclude that he 
ultimately held to such a limited view of the role which reason could play in a fulfilling life. 
Nevertheless, the general thrust of the Discourse limits the utility of reason along the lines 
indicated. 
 87 
straightforward sense; the models of life that Nietzsche commends in The Wanderer bear 
little resemblance to either Rousseau’s Emile or his Solitary Walker. In fact, the models 
that Nietzsche holds up are classical: Socrates and Epicurus. Both appear in Nietzsche’s 
initial discussion of “the closest things”, and reappear throughout the book. But it is not a 
conventional Socratic or Epicurean exemplar that Nietzsche advocates here. Both are 
presented in terms somewhat at odds with their traditional representation, and thereby 
illuminate the nature of Nietzsche’s deviation from the philosophic tradition. At the same 
time, because Socrates and Epicurus remain exemplars of philosophy, Nietzsche’s 
endorsement of a reconceived understanding of each clarifies what it is which in his view 
remains to distinguish philosophy once its traditional ambitions have been abandoned.  
 
The Wanderer’s Socratic Forbearer 
Nietzsche’s sympathetic interest in Epicurus is well-known, and expressed 
consistently over the full course of his career (e.g., AOM 408; D 72; A 58). Nietzsche’s 
interest in Socrates is even better known, but it is known primarily for Nietzsche’s sharp, 
and sometimes vituperative, criticism of Socrates83. The Wanderer and His Shadow 
presents what is, in many ways, almost a mirror-image of Nietzsche’s better known 
position on the ancient Athenian. Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy, had 
advanced the thesis that Socrates was to blame for setting in motion the destruction of 
                                                
83 In TI the first few aphorisms of the chapter on “The Problem of Socrates” describe Socrates as, 
variously, “ugly”, “stunted”, “rabble”, a “decadent”, a “monster”, a “criminal”, a “buffoon”, who 
contained “all the bad vices and desires”, and continues onward in this vein.  
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classical Greek civilization. The Wanderer and His Shadow presents a surprising 
variation of this theme: Socrates is once again presented as an opponent of Greek 
civilization – only now in a manner that redounds very much to his credit, inspiring 
Nietzsche’s praise rather than blame.  
Nietzsche’s praise of Socrates, along with his commendation of Epicurus, both 
initially occur in The Wanderer’s first discussion of “the closest things”, and are used to 
exemplify the proper orientation towards those things. The immediate context is 
Nietzsche’s decrying social authorities (“priests”, “teachers”, “idealists of every 
description”) who “hammer even into children that what matters is”, not “the 
requirements of the individual”, but instead, “the salvation of the soul, the service of the 
state, the advancement of science, or the accumulation of reputation and possessions, all 
as the means of doing service to mankind as a whole”. In response, Nietzsche insists that 
all such claims (whether derived from politics, religion, or science) are illegitimate, 
because they distract our attention from those things closest to us, which ought to matter 
most. The Wanderer’s interest in “the closest things” thereby counsels, to a degree that its 
predecessor volumes had not, that a free spirits refrain from involvement in any larger 
social project, any greater good that does not serve his individual good.  
At the same time, Nietzsche stresses, the various mechanisms of society have 
been constructed to confuse us about what in fact serves our individual interests, rather 
than some larger interest: 
“Already in ancient Greece Socrates was defending himself with all his might 
against this arrogant neglect of the human for the benefit of the human race, and 
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loved to indicate the true compass and content of all reflection and concern with 
an expression of Homer’s: it comprises, he said, nothing other than ‘that which I 
encounter of good and ill in my own house’.”84 (6) 
With this remark, The Wanderer introduces Socrates in a sharp light: as a representative 
of the individual and individual interests against the larger community’s attempt to 
sacrifice those interests to a larger communal project, especially by confusing the 
individual about what his interests actually are. As this already indicates (and as will be 
elaborated subsequently), the point of the turn to “the closest things” does not amount to 
any kind of etiquette guide, a recipe for success in society (in the manner that it might 
have been understood and advocated by Benjamin Franklin, for instance). It is, rather, 
intended as a severe reminder of the fact that we must struggle to keep those things that 
are naturally closest to us constantly at the focus of our concerns, if our individual 
interests are to retain primacy throughout our lives, and not be swamped by the interests 
and demands of the larger communities in which we find ourselves. This depiction of 
Socrates – as representing one pole in a larger struggle between the individual and the 
                                                
84 Nietzsche is referring to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, II.21, which 
reports that Socrates was the first to focus on philosophy on the concerns of ordinary life, and 
privileged moral over natural philosophy. The Homeric quotation which Socrates was said to 
favor is from The Odyssey, IV.392. The notion that Socrates was responsible for redirecting 
philosophy towards “the human things” was a commonplace in the ancient world (see Cicero, 
Tusculan Disputations, V.10-11). It finds some support in Plato (Phaedo 96a-99d), and even 
more in Xenophon. (Memorabilia I.1.11-16). 
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community – is taken up in an equally sharp, and even more specific, manner in 
Nietzsche’s next reference to him.  
 Aphorisms seventy-two through eighty-six of The Wanderer and His Shadow 
comprise a sub-section dealing with religion85. The first and last aphorisms in this 
sequence also happen to be devoted to Socrates. In a way, this should not be surprising. 
After all, the Socrates depicted in Platonic dialogues such as the Phaedo and Republic is 
famous for promulgating theological or quasi-theological teachings that Nietzsche 
himself famously blamed for spawning Christianity (BGE Preface). On the other hand, 
we have just noted that The Wanderer’s presentation of Socrates is unique in Nietzsche’s 
corpus, and so his religious significance in the book differs from what one might 
otherwise expect. Here Nietzsche uses Socrates to bookend a discussion of religion 
primarily in order to suggest that Socrates was not, and could not have been, the founder 
of any dogma, and was in fact a consistent critic of popular belief. Moreover, through 
these two aphorisms Nietzsche proposes that Socrates furnishes a model of how such 
criticism ought to be undertaken. Insofar as this constitutes Nietzsche’s model of the 
proper orientation towards “the closest things”, then, it will quickly become evident how 
much this model differs from Rousseau’s Emile or Solitary Walker. Socrates’ appeal to 
Nietzsche – and Socrates’ manner of securing his individual interests in the face of 
                                                
85 Corresponding to HAH Chapter 3 and AOM 92-98 
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communal projects – lies not in his peaceful retreat from society, but in his combative 
contest with it86. 
 Nietzsche illustrates the Socratic spirit through an interpretation of Socrates’ 
famous “divine mission”. The divine mission is mentioned in Plato’s Apology of 
Socrates, where Socrates defends himself against the charge of impiety by insisting that 
the dialectical interrogations to which he habitually subjected his fellow Athenians were 
part of a quest to determine whether the Delphic oracle had been correct to claim that he 
was the wisest man alive. On this basis, Socrates characterizes his dialectical cross-
examinations as part of a “divine mission”. Nietzsche, however, suggests that this story 
hardly proves that Socrates was especially devoted to the Greek god. On Nietzsche’s 
view, the divine mission is much better understood as Socrates’ manner of 
accommodating himself to popular devoutness87.  
 For Nietzsche, then, Socrates’ “divine mission” was the means through which he 
“put the god to the test in a hundred ways”, i.e., critically scrutinized it claims rather than 
accepting or rejecting them outright. Nietzsche concludes by calling this “one of the 
subtlest compromises between piety and freedom of spirit ever devised”, and thereby 
                                                
86 Nietzsche never wavered in judging this “agonistic” aspect of Socrates as indispensible to his 
appeal (cf. TI “Problem” 8) even if in later works he emphasized its corrupting effect on Athenian 
youths. I discuss the change in Nietzsche’s evaluative assessment of Socrates (as opposed to his 
“factual” assessment) below. 
87 Nietzsche is not alone in concluding that Socrates’ skeptical response to the Delphic oracle is a 
testament to his heterodoxy, and even disbelief, rather than proof of his piety: e.g., Michael 
Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 81-83; David Leibowitz, The Ironic Defense of Socrates, 60-
102. 
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suggests that Socrates in fact is the model of a certain sort of free spirit – a temperate or 
prudential free spirit who maintains an intellectual and spiritual independence from 
society without necessarily launching a direct attack against it. In fact, the indirect mode 
of critique might help to preserve the free spirit’s independence, by keeping him at a 
secure distance from society even as he scrutinizes it.  
This notion of Socrates as a model of free spiritedness is made explicit by 
Nietzsche’s final reference to him, in aphorism eighty-six at the end of the sub-section on 
religion, which remarks:  
“If all goes well, the time will come when one will take up the Memorabilia of 
Socrates rather than the Bible as a guide to morals and reason… The pathways of 
the most various philosophical modes of life lead back to him.” 
The sense in which Nietzsche’s All Too Human trilogy leads back to Socrates would then 
seem to be this: Nietzsche’s primary task in The Wanderer is no longer merely 
identifying and correcting the problem of a historical tradition (as it had largely been in 
the first volume of the trilogy). His primary task is now recovering and reaffirming the 
inherent disjunction between individual and communal interests, which Socrates’ whole 
career attests to (at least as Nietzsche’s reading of the Delphic Oracle story suggests). In 
this way, Nietzsche proposes, Socrates’ example can still serve to inspire free spirits 
today, showing them a way to benefit from society while remaining along the edges of it, 
engaging in critical contests with a few other individuals within it, without undermining 
the structures that sustain it. 
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The Wanderer’s Tethered Heart 
 Let us now take a step back and reconsider Nietzsche’s exhortation of philosophy 
to “the closest things” in light of the full Socratic model of free spiritedness which 
Nietzsche has presented as exemplifying the proper concern for those things in the face of 
broader communal efforts at derailing our pursuit of them. On Nietzsche’s account, the 
Socratic example has two major implications for how we ought to pursue the things 
closest to us. First, it entails a far more active critical scrutiny of popular opinion than any 
conventional schoolmarms’ self-help program would allow. By the same token, this 
Socratic model cannot amount to the sort of peaceful retreat from society and blissful 
emergence in nature associated with Rousseau: the way of life that Nietzsche 
recommends here is far too engaged with society, even engaged in a critical contest with 
or quest within it. If Nietzsche’s task in The Wanderer had been to simply clear the debris 
of an accumulated historical tradition, then the life of the rustic Emile or the isolated 
Solitary Walker might have remained open to him. But Nietzsche’s Socratic turn suggests 
that he expects the free spirits to remain critically engaged with society.  
But why is that Nietzsche, through his discussion of Socrates, places so much 
emphasis on remaining engaged in society, even if at a critical distance? Why shouldn’t 
they withdraw from it altogether, once they have debunked its leading authorities and 
venerated traditions? My suggestion here will be that Nietzsche’s discussion of Socrates 
only gives a partial portrait of the free spirit. In another piece of that picture Nietzsche 
emphasizes that the division between individual and communal interests results not only 
from social engineering and propaganda, but also from a division in the free spirit’s 
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individual soul. In particular, Nietzsche’s treatment of Epicurus – the philosophic 
exemplar who is introduced in the seventh aphorism, immediately after the first 
discussion of Socrates and of the closest things – indicates that the sort of Socratic spirits 
whom Nietzsche sketches must retain a lingering uncertainty about their proper 
relationship to society, leaving a question-mark hanging over their whole self-
understanding. Nietzsche’s treatment of Epicurus is also significant because it shows 
what remains distinct about the philosophic life, even as the free spirits return to ordinary 
life (or, “the closest things”): namely, the exceptional self-discipline required to maintain 
it. 
 Epicurus might seem like an odd choice to turn to for advice on maintaining a 
rigorous self-discipline. It is easier to associate an Epicurean existence with the sort of 
self-indulgence to which the term “hedonism” tends to be colloquially applied. But 
Nietzsche reminds us that Epicurus’ philosophy of pleasure, his hedonism, properly 
means something quite different. For as Nietzsche suggests by placing his first discussion 
of Epicurus in an aphorism immediately following his first discussion of “the closest 
things”, Epicurus’ hedonism was not indiscriminately directed at potential sources of 
pleasure, but rather at those closest to him and, to the maximum extent possible, those 
things only. Epicurus’ great insight was therefore to appreciate that a consistent and thus 
truly satisfying hedonism must limit itself to those closest things, because only they 
provide a reliable and secure source of pleasure. To that end, Epicurus had to restrain 
himself from indulging many of the pleasures (or potential pleasures) that so ubiquitously 
attract human beings: for instance, pleasures which draw one out of one’s individual self 
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and thereby into a potential dependence on other people, or that rely on our capacity for 
hopefulness and thereby lead us into painful disappointments. Thus, Nietzsche stresses 
that even the attractions of a philosophic career (with its attendant pleasures of fame or 
influence) could appear as a distraction from Epicurus’ primary concern for the things 
closest to him; the Epicurean model of philosophy admits of no grand ambition, but only 
a retired, anonymous and simple existence (192, 227, 295; cf. 318).  
The illusory pleasures which Nietzsche’s Epicurean model warns against are not 
limited to the desire to stretch out one’s individual influence. They also include a warning 
against the desires associated with the quest for knowledge. To that end, Nietzsche’s first 
endorsement of Epicurus stresses that the Epicurean model demands that one “quiet the 
heart”, i.e., refrain from concerning oneself with matters that one cannot satisfactorily 
resolve, such as the existence of a supernatural realm, and its possible concern for the 
natural world (7). Now, to speak of “quieting the heart” in this context implies that the 
heart has a natural inclination to reach out beyond what it can naturally know, or that we 
have natural longings that we cannot naturally satisfy. And this, I would like to suggest, 
is how Nietzsche is encouraging us to understand traditional philosophic metaphysics: as 
a desire, which can be indulged or resisted just as a desire for sensuous pleasure might be.  
If this last suggestion seems fanciful, it is worth recalling that Nietzsche’s turn 
away from metaphysics in Human… is of a piece with his turn away from Wagnerian 
music. These two points are closely related, and throughout Nietzsche’s corpus he views 
music as providing the listener with the illusion of access to some sort of “primordial 
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oneness”, a transcendent realm of unity and harmony88. Indeed, in Chapter 2 we saw this 
pleasing illusion is central to Zarathustra’s self-conception as a prophet/legislator 
(“[H]ow could there be an outside-me? There is no outside me! But with all tones we 
forget that; how lovely it is that we forget!”). Against that tendency, in the period of 
Human… Nietzsche puts aside his musical enthusiasms89, and focuses on those “closest 
things” that are most personal and idiosyncratic, so that they cannot be held in common90. 
As these last observations suggest. Nietzsche’s turn away from metaphysics in his 
Book for Free Spirits brings along with it a program of rigorous self-discipline, because 
that turn amounts to a determined effort to invest oneself in satisfying only a certain, 
narrowly circumscribed set of desires, and conducting one’s whole life so as to dampen-
down or quarantine more expansive inclinations. Nietzsche formulates what is at issue 
with exceptional eloquence in the first volume of Human, All Too Human:  
“How strong the metaphysical need is, and how hard nature makes it to bid it a 
final farewell, can be seen from the fact that when the free spirit has divested 
                                                
88 For a helpful introduction to this aspect of Nietzsche’s though, see Gillespie, Nihilism Before 
Nietzsche, 203-214, 233-240 
89 He makes this explicit in the preface to the second volume of the 1888 edition, which I discuss 
in Chapter 4, below 
90 Nietzsche argues this human tendency to overestimate what can truly be held in common to be 
ultimately derived from our capacity for language, which necessarily exaggerates such 
commonalities, and serves as the root of metaphysics (GS 354-355). In this respect, Zarathustra 
seems to draw together the illusions fostered by language and by music, or all sounds in general: 
“[A]re words and tones [Worte und Töne] not rainbows and seeming bridges between what is 
eternally separated?” (cf. p. 50, above) 
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himself of everything metaphysical, the highest effects of art can easily set the 
metaphysical strings, which have long been silent or indeed snapped apart, 
vibrating in sympathy; so it can happen, for example, that a passage in 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony will make him feel he is hovering above the earth 
in a dome of stars with the dream of immortality in his heart: all the stars seem to 
glitter around him and the earth seems to sink farther and farther away. – If he 
becomes aware of being in this condition he feels a profound stab in the heart and 
sighs for the man who will lead him back to his lost love, whether she be called 
religion or metaphysics. It is in such moments that his intellectual probity is put to 
the test.” (HAH 153)91 
If we read this passage in light of the Epicurean exhortation to “quieten the heart”, we 
can conclude that the free spirited model of philosophy which Nietzsche here does not so 
much involve a straightforward return to blissful nature, as it requires a self-disciplined 
attempt to counteract naturally wayward human nature. A reflection which Nietzsche 
included in his return to the free spirit in 1886 is exceptionally suggestive on this point: 
“Tethered heart, free spirit. — If one tethers one’s heart severely and imprisons it, 
one can give one’s spirit many liberties: I have said that once before. But one does 
not believe me, unless one already knows it” (BGE 87) 
An aphorism towards the end of The Wanderer and His Shadow echoes the same 
sentiment: 
                                                
91 Consider Kant, Critique of Pure Reason B878: “[W]e will always return to metaphysics, as a 
beloved from whom we have been estranged” (cf. B353-354, Avii) 
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“The most needful gymnastic. – A lack of self-mastery in small things brings 
about a crumbling of the capacity for it in great ones. Every day is ill employed, 
and a danger for the next day, in which one has not denied oneself one small thing 
at least once: this gymnastic is indispensable if one wants to preserve in oneself 
the joy of being one’s own master.” (WS 305; cf. 318) 
In other words: the return to “the closest things” to which Nietzsche exhorts philosophy 
requires an intense self-discipline because Nietzsche sees the philosophic “metaphysics” 
which lead away from them as the product of natural human inclinations (we might think 
of this as the heart’s natural inclination to draw the mind outside of nature). Thus, when 
Nietzsche exhorts philosophy away from metaphysics and towards ordinary life, this 
cannot be a simple matter of clearing away old cobwebs of tradition and the machinations 
of social authority. It is also a matter of maintaining an appropriate internal disposition, 
placing a restraint on the heart that liberates the spirit and frees the mind.  
 
The Sources of The Wanderer’s Socratism 
 We are now in a position to summarize what is most distinct about Nietzsche’s 
understanding of philosophy in The Wanderer and His Shadow. The turn away from 
Wagner, and away from metaphysics, culminates in the attention given to “the closest 
things” of everyday life, but that awareness is sustained by a two-fold posture on the part 
of the free spirit, for which Nietzsche furnishes two classical models. In the first place, 
the Socrates’ example encourages the free spirit to engage in a critical contest with the 
larger communities in which he finds himself, in order to remain constantly on guard 
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against his individual interests and closest concerns being subsumed within any larger 
project. But, in addition, Nietzsche’s discussion of Epicurus suggests that the free spirit 
must guard not only against the predations of the outside world, but also against the 
wayward or self-forgetting aspect of his own heart, which will long to be part of some 
project that stretches beyond itself, and confuse the free spirit about his truest interests 
and his most individual task. Taken together, then, Nietzsche’s Socratic and Epicurean 
models suggest that The Wanderer’s outlook is likely to involve a constant balancing of 
competing imperatives, a continual testing of both the world around him and of himself. 
 At this point, however, a reader who endeavors to take Nietzsche’s commendation 
of Socrates and Epicurus in all seriousness would be entitled to object that neither of 
Nietzsche’s classical models conforms perfectly to the philosophic outlook that he is 
prescribing. In particular, the historical Epicurean philosophy that Nietzsche ostensibly 
endorses was in fact practically synonymous with a materialistic metaphysics that 
purported to answer precisely the sorts of questions which Nietzsche here counsels 
abandoning. Moreover, Socrates is no less closely associated with the spiritualist 
metaphysics of “Platonism”. How can Nietzsche direct us to these classical models while 
ignoring such prominent facts? 
 There is, I believe, a response to this objection discretely indicated in The 
Wanderer and His Shadow, and it is a response that sheds further light on Nietzsche’s 
whole understanding of philosophy during this period. The indication that I have in mind 
is a fact that we have already seen, namely, that in The Wanderer’s third and final 
reference to Socrates (in an aphorism for which the Athenian philosopher’s name serves 
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as the title), Nietzsche refers specifically to “the Memorabilia of Socrates” as a proper 
“guide to morals and reason”, which “the pathways of the most various philosophical 
modes of life lead back to”. In other words, Nietzsche is here commending us specifically 
to Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and thus to Xenophon’s portrait of Socrates more generally, 
rather than to the more famous dialogues of Plato (which have largely shaped Socrates’ 
posthumous reputation). The importance of this seemingly off-handed endorsement of the 
Xenophontic Socrates should not be under-estimated. Its significance is confirmed and 
clarified by several remarks found in Nietzsche’s notebooks and letters from the second 
half of the 1870s.  
When, as a young philology professor, Nietzsche had issued his first – and still 
most famous – assessment of Socrates in The Birth of Tragedy, he shared the common 
assessment of his profession according to which Xenophon’s portrait of Socrates 
amounted to prosaic history, not bearing on the heart of Socratic philosophy. Around 
1875, however, Nietzsche acquired an intense interest in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, as 
evidenced by a number of unpublished remarks92. These remarks all have the same gist: 
philologists have wrongly judged the work to be “boring”; to the contrary, Nietzsche 
judges it to be a more accurate and compelling representation of Socrates than that found 
in Plato; moreover, he takes the Xenophontic Socrates as a “model” to be imitated in the 
modern world. This last suggestion is given a special resonance by the fact that, in one 
instance, Nietzsche describes himself as “haunted” by the Xenophontic Socrates’ 
                                                
92 For what follows, see KGW IV.1: 170-171, IV.2: 423; IV.3: 363, 442; Letter to Carl von 
Gersdorff of May 26, 1876. 
 101 
judgment that those who teach for pay forfeit their independence in the process93. 
Nietzsche left the academic profession in 1879, and his autobiographical reflections 
direct us to consider his composition of The Wanderer and His Shadow in light of that 
change in his whole way of life. These facts give additional weight to the fact that in The 
Wanderer and His Shadow itself Nietzsche issued a public statement of his interest in the 
Xenophontic Socrates for the first time, by expressing his hope that the Socrates of the 
Memorabilia would replace the Bible as a guide to the proper conduct of life – along with 
The Wanderer’s numerous other exhortations to a simple way of life, unencumbered by 
external needs or personal dependencies. 
 The preceding facts enable us to conclude that Nietzsche took the Xenophontic 
Socrates very seriously indeed as a model of a philosophic life, which is to say, of the 
very best way of life. Moreover, realizing that Nietzsche’s endorsement of the Socrates 
found in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (rather than that of, say, Plato’s Phaedo) was not 
coincidental helps us to see its connection to the notion of philosophy that Nietzsche 
turned toward as he lived with, and absorbed, Xenophon’s portrait of Socrates. The 
Xenophontic Socrates is, after all, sharply distinguished from his Platonic counterpart 
partly because the former shows almost no traces of “Platonism” – or of “metaphysics” 
more generally. The Xenophontic Socrates’ concerns are far more “ethical” than 
“metaphysical”, and dwell especially on those “closest things” which The Wanderer and 
His Shadow recalls us to. In keeping with this interest, the Xenophontic Socrates places 
great emphasis on his freedom from material needs – and also stresses that that freedom 
                                                
93 See KGW IV.1: 170-171 with Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.6 
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is acquired less through his fixation on an incandescent super-sensible world or a perfect 
harmony of his soul’s desires (as Plato’s portrait of Socrates sometimes suggests), but 
instead through a rigorous self-discipline, imposed even in the teeth of his natural desires. 
Let me try to flesh out this last thought, along with some of its implications, by way of a 
few examples that should help us to grasp more completely the ideal of a free spirit that 
Nietzsche has in mind in The Wanderer. 
 Plato and Xenophon (and, for that matter, Aristophanes) both present Socrates’ 
exceptional self-mastery, or self-control, as one of his most prominent characteristics94. 
In Book Four of Plato’s Republic Socrates seems to take this quality in the most extreme 
direction, by suggesting that a true harmony can be achieved between the competing 
elements of an individual soul, analogous to the harmony of competing elements in a 
political community. Socrates’ analogy is perplexing, and it is difficult to see that he ever 
satisfactorily explains how such an authentically harmonious soul might come about. 
Indeed, in the Symposium Plato shows us that Alcibiades was no less impressed than 
perplexed by Socrates’ ostensible self-control, and he is apparently so frustrated by 
Socrates’ unique facility in this regard that he likens Socrates to a silenus, as if Socrates 
                                                
94 Aristophanes, Clouds 412-19, Birds 1280-83; Plato, Symposium 216c-221d; Xenophon, 
Apology, 16-18, Memorabilia 1.2.1, 1.5, 1.6. It is worth noting that Leo Strauss’ Socrates and 
Aristophanes shows that the comedian’s approach to this issue makes an essential contribution to 
our understanding of the problem of Socrates. An illuminating window on Strauss’s extremely 
oblique treatment is opened by Devin Stauffer, “Leo Strauss’s UnSocratic Aristophanes?”, esp. 
347-349. 
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possessed some sort of divine power – in other words, as if Socrates’ singularity required 
a supernatural explanation95. 
 Xenophon follows Plato in showing us that Socrates could have an intoxicating 
impact on those around him, but he also shows much more clearly some of the limitations 
of that impact. For instance, quite early in the Memorabilia Xenophon addresses the 
ephemeral and perhaps ultimately pernicious influence that Socrates had on some of his 
one-time students and future tyrants, including Alcibiades. And in asking why Socrates 
failed to win over such politically ambitious young men to moderation, Xenophon 
quickly admits that an individual’s inclinations might be so organized as to resist any 
                                                
95 In Nietzsche’s final treatment of “The Problem of Socrates” (in Twilight of the Idols) he 
alludes to this “theological” interpretation of Socrates’ appeal in a complex way. First, Nietzsche 
quotes a “famous physiognomic judgment” according to which Socrates was a “monster in the 
face, monster in the soul”, and then mentions that Socrates’ friends were offended by this 
judgment. The source for this anecdote is Cicero’s On Fate (V.10), where the physiognomic 
judgment is rebuked by Alcibiades. In Plato’s Symposium, when Alcibiades likens Socrates to a 
silenus, he emphasizes that those famously ugly creatures are reputed to have gods within them. 
For Alcibiades, then, Socrates’ ugly exterior was at least partially compensated for by his quasi-
divine interior. And of course, as Xenophon highlights (Memorabilia 1.1.2-5), Socrates attracted 
young friends partly with talk of his mysterious daimonion. Nietzsche also reminds us of this in 
“The Problem of Socrates”: “Let us also not forget those auditory hallucinations which, as ‘the 
daimonion of Socrates’, have taken on a religious interpretation”. I think that Nietzsche wants us 
to recognize that the daimonion “took on” a religious significance because of how Socrates’ was 
misunderstood by Alcibiades and others. (For a partial explanation of the misunderstanding, see 
n97, below.) 
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attempt to harmonize them96; “the drives want to play the tyrant”, as Nietzsche might 
have put it (TI “Problem” 9). Of course, this last dilemma is all the more reason to think 
that a proper Socratic training ought to emphasize to a relentless regimen of robust self-
discipline, of the sort that we have seen that Nietzsche himself associates with a 
Socratically-inspired free spirit. And Xenophon is quick to point out that Socrates did 
indeed employ very much such a program of moralistic exhortation with his young 
companions, who, “while they kept company with Socrates, were able to overpower their 
desires by using him as an ally”, but lost their away after they lost contact with him 
(Memorabilia, I.2.24). Perhaps, then, philosophy really is best deployed as a high-minded 
personal trainer after all, with Socrates’ example as an omnipresent Reginald Jeeves or 
Mary Poppins on whom we must all rely. And, someone might think, perhaps if 
Nietzsche had read Xenophon this way (as Benjamin Franklin seems to have done), he 
would never have followed Alcibiades in abandoning Socrates’ schoolmarmish 
moderating influence in favor of dangerous political ambitions. 
 There is, however, one obstacle to taxing Nietzsche for failing to remain under the 
sway of Socratic exhortations to self-discipline: namely, that Xenophon seems to have 
come up short on just this score as well. This is illustrated by the only two exchanges that 
Xenophon depicts between himself and Socrates. The first of these occurs shortly after 
                                                
96 “[T]he pleasures growing in the same body together with the soul persuade the soul not to be 
moderate but instead to gratify themselves and the body as quickly as possible” (Memorabilia, 
I.2.23), i.e., persuasion/mind, pleasure/body, and soul compete for control, rather than organizing 
themselves into a harmonious hierarchy. 
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the aforementioned discussion of Alcibiades, and involves Socrates upbraiding Xenophon 
for indulging his attraction to a beautiful young man. Socrates does not deny the 
delightful power of the young man’s beauty; to the contrary, he characterizes that power 
as so overwhelming, so threatening, as to overwhelm all other potential concerns. In that 
light, Socrates concludes: “I counsel you, Xenophon, whenever you see someone 
beautiful, to flee without looking back!” (Memorabilia, I.3.9-13). Now, Xenophon, it 
must be said, often heartily commends the effectiveness of Socrates’ exhortations; yet, 
“for some reason he refrained from doing so in this case”97. Moreover, if the second of 
his exchanges with Socrates is any indication, Xenophon cannot be presumed to have felt 
obligated by Socrates’ counsel in any case: for, as he shows us, he embarked on the major 
escapade of his adult life – joining military campaign through Persia, and eventually 
assuming control of it as the de facto ruler of a band of mercenaries – against the advice 
                                                
97 Christopher Bruell, “Introduction”, ix. In fact, in his Symposium, Xenophon shows us that – in 
contrast to the impression that Socrates sometimes tried to cultivate and that Plato helped to 
immortalize through his Symposium – Socrates was himself not perfectly stoic when faced with 
such pleasures (Xenophon, Symposium, 4.23-29). Indeed, if he had been, he could hardly have 
had the need to warn against them as passionately as he had to Xenophon. Later in the 
Memorabilia Xenophon lifts the veil from Socratic self-mastery a bit further when he shows us 
that Socrates may have had a special reason for wanting to maintain such a comportment around 
his students in particular: namely, because “playing hard to get” can be most attractive to those to 
whom one is attracted (although others to whom one is less attracted – a Theages rather than a 
Xenophon – might take a less-welcome interest for this same reason) (III.11.7-14). Socrates’ 
relationship to Alcibiades attests to this point, while also illustrating that Socrates’ self-control 
was not so much illusory as misunderstood by many of those around him. An uncommonly 
instructive discussion of some of the issues raised here can be found in Allan Bloom, Love and 
Friendship, 523-524. 
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of Socrates (Anabasis III.1.4-7). Xenophon gives us no indication that he ever regretted 
that decision, nor does he suggest that he admired Socrates any less for that reason (to the 
contrary: Memorabilia, IV.8.11).  
The difference between a successful student of Socrates’ (such as Xenophon) and 
a disreputable one (such as Alcibiades) cannot, then, consist primarily in the extent to 
which one or the other adhered to the Socratic self-help program, such as it was. It seems 
to have had to do, rather, with the extent to which a given student understood Socrates’ 
example to be transferable to a nature such as their own – and, to the extent that their 
natures differed, the students’ ability to continue to evaluate the different path that they 
were led to take in light of the insight and the standard supplied by Socrates. This seems 
to have been what Xenophon did, at any rate, and he thereby evinced an awareness of the 
diverse effects that a given philosophy can have on human beings’ with diverse natures – 
an awareness that Nietzsche surely would have appreciated (and which may have also 
inspired him to reflect critically on the encounter with Socrates that Xenophon had 
afforded him). 
 Exactly why, then, was Xenophon driven to differ with Socrates? And why would 
Socrates have been so much warier than Xenophon of an ambitious undertaking such as 
the Persian military expedition? It cannot be that Socrates was hostile to ambition as 
such; after all, his own way of life was in its own way uncommonly ambitious, and he 
impressed those around him with his ability to maintain it and even derive such great 
happiness from it. But Xenophon also shows us that when faced with the trial that would 
end his life, Socrates called attention to the fact that his whole life had been marked by an 
 107 
ever-present awareness that his happiness had always been limited by his mortal nature 
(Apology 6, 27; Memorabilia IV.8.8). Part of Socrates’ response to this predicament 
seems to have been to limit himself to pleasures, and to projects, that most reflected and 
kept in view the finite nature of the only happiness that he was truly capable of enjoying; 
consequently, he refrained from involving himself too directly with anything that could 
seem to be a distraction from such happiness (beauty) or stretch beyond it (politics). And 
surely Nietzsche, hovering around death as he wrote The Wanderer and His Shadow, 
would have appreciated that insight. Still, he might have shared with Xenophon a doubt 
about whether it was necessary, or even desirable, to allow that awareness to dictate the 
entire course of one’s life; at least Nietzsche clearly came to think that the restraints on 
the free spirit’s heart could be relaxed.  
 Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that Nietzsche would have noted approvingly 
the way in which the Xenophontic Socrates exhibits an appreciation for those things 
closest to our individual selves, and the seemingly-small, but in fact deeply-admirable, 
goods that they may procure for us. (An awareness which would certainly be abetted by 
the concentration on mortality which Nietzsche lived with during The Wanderer and His 
Shadow, and which Socrates never lived without.) This awareness is present in the 
Platonic Socrates as well, but it appears more clearly in Xenophon, as can be illustrated 
with a simple contrast. Both Plato and Xenophon show us Socrates engaged in a very 
similar refutation of a sophist (the two conversations are so similar that one must believe 
that Socrates did engage in just such exchanges more than once). In each case, the sophist 
initially espouses an amoral relativism, but is forced to back down from it when Socrates 
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applies a thorough-going standard of utility to measure the nobility of ordinary objects, 
finally registering the sophists’ outrage (and thus revealing the hollowness of his 
purported amoralism) when that standard is used to speak of the nobility of some sort of 
pot. But there is an important difference in the respective reports of Plato and Xenophon 
in this matter. In the Platonic case, the pot is a generic pot (Greater Hippias 288c-d, 
290d-e). In the Xenophontic case, the pot is a chamberpot (Memorabilia III.8.4-6). It 
seems that when the later Nietzsche accused Plato of “ennobling” the utilitarian Socrates 
(BGE 190), he could have even had this very contrast in mind. Of course, in later writings 
Nietzsche seems to be engaged in a competition with Plato for the fate of Western 
civilization, and thus to view Plato with a mixture of censure and admiration (BGE 
Preface; GS 372). But in The Wanderer and His Shadow, at least, Nietzsche exhibits less 
affinity for the poetic Plato than for the prosaic Xenophon.   
 As these last remarks allude to, in Nietzsche’s later writings his estimation of 
Socrates seems to change dramatically, and so the “Xenophontic” moment in his thought 
might be seen as only a passing interest. But I don’t believe this to be the case, because as 
we have also just seen, precisely in his later works Nietzsche stresses that the Platonic 
Socrates is a chimera, and Nietzsche claims to know the true Socrates better than anyone 
else – that is, the utilitarian, “ignoble”, Socrates that he had found in Xenophon. To put 
this point another way. In his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche analyzed 
Socrates critically, but still much more under the influence of Plato, so that he was able to 
conclude that treatment of Socrates by expressing the hope that there might still be found 
“a Socrates who plays music”. This image does not recur in Nietzsche’s later writings, 
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and with good reason: Xenophon had shown him that what was most challenging and 
most authentic about Socrates was precisely the ancient philosopher’s amusical or even 
anti-musical qualities, and it is for that reason that Nietzsche himself turned against music 
when he first came under the Xenophontic Socrates’ influence98. In later writings he 
turned back to music, and so back against Socrates, but to the extent that this represents a 
fundamental change, it is a change in Nietzsche’s evaluation of the worth of Socrates, not 
a change in his assessment of who Socrates was as a matter of fact. We might say that it 
represents not so much a change of mind on Nietzsche’s part, as a change of heart, 
entirely in keeping with the relaxation of the restraints placed on the free spirit’s heart 
(restraints which had themselves been partly inspired by the Socrates’ example). 
 We have seen, then, that Nietzsche’s turn away from the “tethered heart” of the 
free spirits and the Xenophontic Socrates, with their critical “no-saying” spirit, leads 
towards the creativity or indulgence of the “yes-saying” works. And the attempt to 
inoculate philosophy from the charms of social and political life now becomes an attempt 
to transform that life. But although we have gotten some sense of the way in which this 
turn represents Nietzsche’s concession to his heart, we need to understand that change of 
heart more fully: in the first place, why was it necessary (as opposed to merely being a 
pleasant indulgence), and then, how can this concession be justified, that is, justified to 
the mind as well as to the heart? 
 
                                                
98 As mentioned in n89, above, Nietzsche discusses this turn of events in the preface to the 





My aim in this chapter has been to show how The Wanderer and His Shadow represents a 
new and more thorough-going stage in Nietzsche’s turn towards the All Too Human, but 
also that the reflection on “the closest things” in which that turn culminates indicates the 
difficulty with maintaining that new orientation. What Nietzsche discovers here is not 
only a new manner of attacking an external enemy, but also a threat emerging from his 
own nature, a threat which leaves the free spirits’ project in a state of permanent 
instability. It would surely be possible to view that predicament as an unavoidable aspect 
of the human condition, which can be conscientiously counteracted, even if never wholly 
remedied. For the most part, The Wanderer and His Shadow points in that direction. 
Nevertheless, a remarkable aphorism towards The Wanderer’s conclusion suggests a 
different interpretation of this state of affairs: 
At Noon. – He who has been granted an active and storm-filled morning of life is 
overcome at the noontide of life by a strange longing for repose that can last for 
months or years.  It grows still around him, voices recede into the distance; the 
sun shines down upon him from high overhead. Upon a concealed woodland 
meadow he sees great Pan sleeping; all things of nature have fallen asleep with 
him, an expression of eternity on their face - that is how it seems to him.  He 
wants nothing, he is troubled by nothing, his heart stands still, only his eyes are 
alive - it is a death with open eyes. Then the man sees many things he never saw 
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before, and for as far as he can see everything is enmeshed in a net of light and as 
it were buried in it.  He feels happy as he gazes, but it is a heavy, heavy happiness 
– Then at length the wind rises in the trees, noon has gone by, life again draws 
him to it, life with unseeing eyes, its train of followers sweeping along behind it: 
desire, deception, forgetfulness, destruction, transience.  And thus evening rises 
up, more active and more storm-filled even than the morning. – To truly active 
men the more long enduring states of knowledge seem almost uncanny and 
morbid, but not unpleasant. (308) 
If the argument of this chapter has been sound, I believe that we can take Nietzsche’s 
Wagnerian beginnings as the “active and storm-filled morning of his life”, and the All 
Too Human trilogy as the noon in which voices recede into the distance for Nietzsche, 
leading to The Wanderer itself as the moment of isolated rediscovery, granting him a new 
clarity near death, with the “heavy happiness [schweres Glück]” that attends such a hard-
won awareness. At the same time, the aphorism suggests that this moment – The 
Wanderer and His Shadow itself – is only midday, i.e., it only represents one moment in 
time, and points to an existence beyond itself. Nietzsche would later make that allegory 
virtually literal by including a revised version of this aphorism as part of a speech in Part 
Four of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, also titled “At Noon” (which happens to follow a 
chapter where Zarathustra is addressed by his own shadow). We will return to those 
passages in Chapter 5. In the meantime, we should observe that The Wanderer’s glance 
away from his restful noontide towards the storm-filled evening to come does not only 
direct us towards Nietzsche’s Zarathustra; it points even more immediately to the “yes-
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saying” of his Daybreak. That movement of thought is what we will seek to follow 























“WHAT IS IT TO US THAT MR. NIETZSCHE HAS GOT WELL AGAIN?”: 
NIETZSCHE’S RETROSPECTIVE REEVALUATION OF HIS CAREER 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Human, All Too Human (especially The Wanderer 
and His Shadow) present the two major poles of Nietzsche’s thought, which issue in two 
distinct understandings of the proper posture towards one’s own soul: that of Zarathustra, 
who would allow it to sing while directing its song for their mutual benefit; and that of 
the free spirits, who would silence it in order to suppress the idols which it would 
otherwise generate. 
These alternatives are in competition in a unique way, however, because they are 
ultimately competing aspects of Nietzsche himself. As a consequence, Nietzsche does not 
immerse himself in one alternative without pointing towards the other: thus the free 
spirits appear as if in passing in Zarathustra, and The Wanderer suggests that the 
tranquility which the free spirited turn enabled Nietzsche to acquire may only amount to a 
noontide before a turbulent evening to come. But Nietzsche also presents these 
alternatives not only as aspects of himself, but also as more general character types, in 
order to encourage readers to reflect on a similar tension within themselves. I would even 
say that Nietzsche wants the reader to understand this tension as part and parcel of the 
human condition.  
At the same time, observing that Nietzsche was able to look reflexively from the 
perspective of Zarathustra onto the outlook of The Wanderer, and vice versa, forces one 
to wonder whether Nietzsche was ever moved to try to reconcile those two competing 
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perspectives, and how he brokered between them. This question turns out to be precisely 
what Nietzsche helps the reader to understand through the autobiographical writings of 
his last years: the prefaces that he added to the second editions of the books from the 
“middle period” in 1886, and Ecce Homo in 1888. In Chapter 3 we saw some of the ways 
in which these retrospective self-assessments help the reader to recognize the significance 
of the earlier works, and interpret their various aspects; in this chapter we will track 
Nietzsche’s statements about the development of his career more closely. This will serve 
to demonstrate that Human… and Zarathustra are indeed the decisive landmarks of his 
career, and it will also explain the series of discoveries that led Nietzsche to progress 
from that earlier to later outlook. Finally, Nietzsche’s retrospective assessments of that 
process will enable us to gauge how he understood the relationship between the 
alternatives that the free spirits and Zarathustra represent.  
The guidance that Nietzsche offers in this respect is both extensive and elliptical. 
It is elliptical because it is found especially in Nietzsche’s scattered remarks on the 
evolution of his health over the course of his career, a concern that permeated his whole 
adult life, but which could easily strike readers as a trivial or tangential question in the 
context of the existential and epochal questions raised by Zarathustra. To be sure, we 
have seen that The Wanderer learned from his Shadow not to underestimate the 
importance of such matters (“the closest things”), but one might think that Nietzsche 
turned away from that counsel precisely by turning towards the epic pursuits of 
Zarathustra. On the other hand, just such matters appear with renewed prominence in the 
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late autobiographical writings, and so grasping how Nietzsche finally came to understand 
them sheds an illuminating light on the whole evolution of his thought. 
Nietzsche introduces the theme of health as a prism through which to gauge his 
career most clearly at the very outset of the 1886 preface to The Gay Science. The book 
is, he says, a kind of convalescence or unexpected recovery, evincing a renewed strength 
and concomitant sense of hopefulness – in other words, a return to health. Nietzsche 
acknowledges that this might seem a trivial concern, conjuring up a hypothetical reader 
who objects: “What is it to us that Mr. Nietzsche has got well again?” Nietzsche 
provisionally concedes the objection (“let us leave Mr. Nietzsche”), but nevertheless 
offers a salient answer: a philosophy is related to the person of the philosopher (his 
sickness or health) insofar as it is an expression of strength or weakness. In the case of a 
sick philosopher, his philosophy will amount to a sort of escapism; in the case of a 
healthy philosopher, his philosophy will amount to an overflow or super-abundance. The 
second alternative calls to mind the disposition of Zarathustra, who began the journey 
down from his mounting from a desire to overflow like the sun99. Moreover, it calls to 
mind some of Nietzsche’s own characterizations of philosophy in Beyond Good and Evil 
(265, 285-287). Are Nietzsche’s remarks in the preface to The Gay Science therefore 
intended as an implicit denigration of the sickly philosophy of his earlier free spirited 
writings (especially Human, All Too Human, which was a wholly critical, “no-saying” 
                                                
99 Note that this description comes not only from the first section of the preface of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra; it is also the last words of the first edition of The Gay Science, which closed with an 
aphorism presenting the first section of that preface. 
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work composed during Nietzsche’s greatest infirmity, before the physical recovery which 
enabled him compose the “yes-saying” Daybreak, The Gay Science, and Zarathustra)? 
Nietzsche addresses that possibility more directly when he takes up the question of health 
in Ecce Homo, where it forms the book’s most dominant theme. 
 This is especially true of Ecce Homo’s account of the two works that we have just 
examined: Human, All Too Human and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche 
makes clearer than anywhere else that these two works represent landmark turning points 
in his thought, because they amount to decisive turning points in his life, specifically the 
changes in his health around the time that he composed each work, along with the way in 
which the resulting books reflected those changes.  
 Nietzsche call attention to this connection between his life and his thought with 
the short sentence that opens Ecce Homo’s sub-chapter on Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
“Now I shall relate the history [or, “story”: Geschichte] of Zarathustra”. Nietzsche’s 
commentary on this book stands alone with his reflections on Human…, in that both relay 
a “history” of the book at issue: a commentary on its composition, at least as much as a 
commentary on its content. In fact, the “history of Zarathustra” proves to be even more 
complex than this, since it is not only a commentary on the composition of the work, but 
also on Nietzsche’s response to its composition (what he will call his “recuperation” from 
it, highlighting the theme of health again). But in order to grasp the significance of the 






The History of Human, All Too Human 
We have already seen that in Ecce Homo Nietzsche characterized Human, All Too 
Human as “the monument to a crisis”, which he proceeds to identify as a process through 
which “I liberated myself from what in my nature did not belong to me” (EH HAH 1). 
This last remark is largely explained by what we have seen from Human, All Too Human 
itself: the “liberation” refers to the new, free spirit that Nietzsche took on with that work, 
a spirit which occupied itself with critically debunking the regnant ideals which had 
befogged Nietzsche’s vision heretofore. Ecce Homo, however, considerably expands on 
elements of this process that are left more implicit in Human…, because in his 
retrospective assessment Nietzsche stresses not only what he liberated himself from 
(Wagner, Schopenhauer, metaphysics, etc.), but also what that liberation led him to 
embrace. To that end, in Ecce Homo he speaks of this whole process as a “return to 
myself” (EH HAH 4). What that involves will not surprise the reader of Human, All Too 
Human: it means a renewed concern for “the closest things” that Nietzsche neglected 
previously, especially including his health. But what Nietzsche elaborates in Ecce Homo 
(which would not have been at all clear if Human, All Too Human were taken on its 
own), is that this whole “crisis” was not just a change in his philosophical orientation that 
enabled him to devote more attention to an issue such as his physiological constitution, 
along with other such “closest things”. Instead, Nietzsche now asserts, his philosophical 
development was compelled by his physiological evolution. Let us see how that works.  
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In his retrospective account, Nietzsche alludes to Human, All Too Human’s 
genesis in a life-altering episode when, as a young philologist and Wagnerian, the onset 
of an illness had driven him away from Wagner’s inaugural Bayreuth Festival and into 
isolation along the forests of the Bohemian border (EH HAH 2)100. He then describes in 
greater detail the prolonged sickness which kept him cut off from his former life: 
disrupting old habits, forcing him to lie in rest, his failing eyesight preventing him from 
continuing the philological studies which had dominated his entire adult life until that 
time. But it was precisely this debilitating condition which Nietzsche credits with 
fostering in him a self-reflection and self-discipline that made his “return to myself” 
possible (that is to say, his liberation from the dreams inspired by Schopenhauer and 
Wagner): a return to psychological clarity which he credits with having, in turn, made his 
return to physical health possible (EH HAH 3-4). 
What this inward-turn enabled Nietzsche to recognize was twofold. First, that his 
attraction to Wagner was not solely the result of qualities intrinsic to either man, but was 
actually a consequence of the sort of life that Nietzsche had chosen for himself at the time 
he encountered Wagner: a life of academic busywork that aggravated his natural 
infirmities (“crawling through ancient metricians which meticulous precision and bad 
eyes”). In this respect, his situation was not so different from that of many of the most 
                                                
100 For a more complete biographical account of this episode, see Curtis Paul Janz, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Volume 1, 715-716. Nietzsche was repeatedly forced to leave rehearsals for the first 
complete performance of Wagner’s Ring Cycle due to headaches, vomiting, and eye problems 
that prevented him from seeing the stage. 
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talented young German men of his day who, upon reaching adulthood, found themselves 
consumed by a life of busywork (the fruit of joining a “so-called profession”), and from 
which they therefore gratefully found escape for “five or six hours” through Wagner’s 
“narcotic art” (EH HAH 3)101. Wagner’s operas spoke to the needs created by this 
particular way of life: “art in the age of work”, as Nietzsche had put it in The Wanderer 
and His Shadow (170). Looking at this phenomenon from a newfound distance, 
Nietzsche came to see his own enchantment with Wagner as nothing other than a typical 
symptom of the age102. Perhaps Wagner was the best that one could hope for in such a 
life – but Nietzsche’s dislocating sickness had enabled him to question whether such a 
life was the best that he could hope for after all. 
In other words, Nietzsche had been driven to place his work (classical research) in 
the service of Wagner (with his quasi-neo-classicism), not so much as the result of 
                                                
101 This last point is one case where Nietzsche employs hardly any exaggeration: most of 
Wagner’s epic creations require over five hours to perform, and Nietzsche evidently saw this 
feature as essential to the intoxicating, “escapist” effect that Wagner had on his audience. In this 
connection, it is worth noting that the Bayreuth Festival represented the culmination of Wagner’s 
goal of creating a Gesamtkunstwerk (“total work of art”), and the operas which were specifically 
designed for Bayreuth (the Ring Cycle and Parsifal) most exemplify that goal.  
102 “When I looked around me more carefully I discovered that a large number of young men 
face the same crisis: one perversity positively compels a second” (EH HAH 3). It should be 
acknowledged that this whole passage provides a much more cut-and-dry explanation of 
Nietzsche’s attraction to Wagner than he gives elsewhere (compare especially CW Preface). 
Nevertheless, it is also consistent enough with what Nietzsche says in elsewhere about the appeal 
modern art that I am inclined to think that he wants readers to seriously reflect on this element of 
Wagner’s allure. 
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misapprehending Wagner, as because of Nietzsche’s own failure to properly judge what 
kind of work (what way of life) was most appropriate to him. When illness made it 
impossible for him to continue with that work, his attachment to Wagner dissipated along 
with it. And instead of seeking a narcotic escape from his natural infirmities, he was 
driven to overcome them, with Human, All Too Human as the product of that successful 
struggle. In this way, as Nietzsche puts it, “Illness slowly released me”, and thereby also 
helped him to see that his fullest health (the “return to myself”, or flourishing of his soul) 
was contingent on embracing the pain of his physical ailments (EH HAH 4).  
What all of this suggests is that Nietzsche came to see his “health” as meaningful 
only insofar as it was consistent throughout all aspects of his life, and that in order to 
achieve such consistency one might have to accept bodily illness as a temporary means to 
achieving psychological health, which alone could make physical improvements wholly 
worthwhile. Nietzsche had persisted through his Wagnerian/philological period in a 
confused mixture of quasi-health and quasi-illness, lacking any thorough care for and 
thus real knowledge of himself, all of which made him vulnerable to the sort of 
temporary escape from his condition promised by Wagnerian opera. When Nietzsche was 
finally forced to confront his illness in a more extreme form it led to a period of 
convulsion, but also the hope that he might begin to live a fully consistent life, in which 
full health (of both body and soul) might finally become possible.  
Nietzsche’s approach to health as reflecting something more consistent or 
thorough-going than one’s most immediate physical or psychological state is outlined a 
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bit more fully in the first chapter of Ecce Homo (“Why I Am So Wise”), where he also 
discusses his recovery from the sickness he fell into around the time of Bayreuth: 
“I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy again: the prerequisite for this – as 
every physiologist will concede – is that one is basically healthy. A typically 
morbid being cannot become healthy, still less make itself healthy; for a typical 
healthy person, conversely, being ill can be an energetic stimulant to living, to 
living more.” (EH Wise 2) 
A fully consistent life cannot, in other words, be one that is free of any illness, but instead 
must be a life that confronts illness in a manner that is productive of a more fundamental 
kind of health. To put this point another way: health is not the absence of illness to fight; 
it is the willingness and ability to fight one’s illnesses.  
 As this suggests, in order to grasp Nietzsche’s account we need to think of 
“health” in two different ways: in the most immediate sense, it means whether one 
happens to be vigorous or beset by illness at a particular time; but in a broader and more 
important sense, one’s health is defined by one’s ability to respond to such conditions103. 
According to this view, then, being healthy is less decisive for evaluating one’s character 
than being able to make oneself healthy. And it just such a process of becoming healthy 
that Nietzsche insists produced Human, All Too Human (EH Wise 1-2; HAH 4-5): an 
illness that provoked the break with Wagner, leading Nietzsche to adopt the regimen of 
the free spirit, which in turn set the stage for the works of his greatest health to come. 
                                                
103 “As summa summarum, I was healthy; as nook, as specialty, I was décadent” (EH Wise 2) 
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In this way, Nietzsche presents his philosophical and physiological states as 
engaged in a sort of dialectical development with one another, and thereby also provides 
readers with a model for the maintenance of their own mental and physical health – a 
model of “how to become what you are”. Nietzsche makes the exemplary and 
prescriptive aspect of his story more explicit when he tells another version of it in the 
autobiographical prefaces which he added to the second edition of Human… in 1886. At 
the same time, the prescriptive function of Nietzsche’s self-account is also one of its most 
puzzling, as we shall now see. 
In the preface to the first volume of Human, All Too Human Nietzsche explains 
that the work is dedicated to “free spirits” who do not yet exist, but whom could exist if 
appropriately-equipped-and-conditioned individuals follow the course of action that led 
Nietzsche himself to write the work. Nietzsche then narrates the evolution of a free spirit 
in terms that mirror his own odyssey as outlined above: the decisive experience in a free 
spirit’s existence will be a “great liberation” from the objects of one’s youthful reverence, 
followed by a long solitary project of critical examination and reevaluation of popular 
ideals, leading to a more mature state of self-mastery which enables the free spirit to 
work back towards a state of always-imperfect-but-ever-improving health from which 
perspective he is able to understand life and his place within it anew. Nietzsche concludes 
that this experience of “liberation” will inspire the following “generalization”: “What has 
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happened to me”, Nietzsche pictures the free spirit saying to himself, “must happen to 
everyone in whom a task wants to become incarnate and ‘come into the world’”104.  
In this manner, the first preface to Human… suggests that a free spirit’s mature 
self-awareness will culminate with this notion of a new “task” (Aufgabe) to set for 
himself105. This notion, to which Nietzsche only alludes in the present context, recurs 
more frequently in the preface to the second volume, and becomes even more thematic in 
Ecce Homo, where it is closely bound up with Nietzsche’s “return to myself”, and 
thereby also his return to health. Thus, Nietzsche opens the Foreword of Ecce Homo by 
observing “the mismatch between the greatness of my task and the smallness of my 
contemporaries”, and later in the book he explains that his break with Wagner and 
Schopenhauer was crucial for enabling him to distinguish between “the profound 
certainty about what in me can be my task” and “what merely my means, intermission, 
and incidental accomplishment” (EH Untimelies 3). Moreover, he distinguishes among 
the works of his maturity according to the distinct contributions that they make towards 
the fulfillment of “my task” (EH BGE 1). To that end, his history of Human… in 
particular is an account of his recognition of “my task” and an acceptance of the demands 
that it made on him (EH HAH 3, 6)106. 
                                                
104 The preceding paragraph is drawn from the second through seventh sections of the preface. 
105 Laurence Lampert points out that Aufgabe has a stronger resonance than the standard English 
translation captures: “Heard literally, Nietzsche’s Aufgabe is what is given him to do, almost his 
mission or, in religious settings, his calling” (Nietzsche’s Task, 6). 
106 Nietzsche elaborates his Aufgabe further in “Wise” 4; “Clever” 2, 9; “Daybreak” 1, 
“Zarathustra” 8 
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Taking the first preface of Human, All Too Human together with the remarks 
scattered throughout Ecce Homo, we can say the following: Nietzsche viewed the “free 
spirited” period of the former work as an essential preparation for the ultimate definition 
of his project in terms of the self-identified Aufgabe carried out through all of his mature 
works107. Moreover, the two texts together show that Nietzsche’s “return to myself” is 
coeval with the recovery of his Aufgabe, since it was only by disentangling himself from 
the hopes inspired by Wagner and Schopenhauer that Nietzsche was able to recover “my 
task”. Nietzsche’s battle with illness was not, then, simply the means for an inward-
looking return to himself; it also enabled him to recover the singular task which would 
distinguish his reengagement with the wider world. 
In several respects, then, the account of Human… that Nietzsche gives in the 1886 
preface supports and elaborates the apparent mission of Ecce Homo, which is to give the 
reader a manual for “how to become what you are”, in other words, a kind of self-help 
program: “Illness is the answer”, he even prescribes in the fourth section of the second 
preface, “every time we begin to doubt our right to our task”108.  
                                                
107 Adrian del Caro finds that Nietzsche applies the word Aufgabe “to several related facets of 
his late thought, and one wonders what this task or work could be” (Grounding the Nietzsche 
Rhetoric of the Earth, 22n61).  
108 In the third and fourth sections of the preface Nietzsche begins by discussing the process 
through which he recovered “my task” – typically italicizing either the first or the second of these 
words. However, as the narrative proceeds, he begins to speak of “our task” – frequently 
italicizing the first word. These devices highlight the ways in which Nietzsche’s is meant to 
appear as exemplary for the reader. 
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And yet this highly prescriptive and exhortative retrospective presentation of 
Human, All Too Human clashes with one of the suggestions that we made when 
examining the work itself. In particular, I argued that in The Wanderer and His Shadow 
Nietzsche is not very serious about presenting philosophy as a self-help program, and 
suggested that he might follow Xenophon in taking a greater interest in the variable 
natures of individuals attracted to philosophy, and scrutinizing how their distinct natures 
shape that encounter, rather than in how philosophy could be pre-packaged and 
distributed for widespread appropriation. Did Nietzsche then change his position on the 
utility of philosophy as self-help program a few years after having finished Human, All 
Too Human? 
In fact, however, in Ecce Homo Nietzsche acknowledges the difficulty involved 
in such self-help exhortations, even as he issues them, as the following complicated 
formulation illustrates: 
“Aside from being a décadent, then, I am also the opposite. My proof of this is, 
among other things, that I always instinctively chose the right means of dealing 
with unfavorable conditions [ich instinktiv gegen die schlimmen Zustände immer 
die rechten Mittel wählte]: while the décadent as such always chooses the means 
that are harmful to him.” (EH Wise 2) 
Now, an “instinctive choice” is not something chosen in a strong sense, i.e., it is not a 
free choice, and so a self-help program that depends on instinctually-determined choices 
will not be very helpful at all. In that scenario, the crucial issue could not involve 
following a regimen for “becoming what you are”, but, rather, being what one actually is 
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already: a “décadent”, or not. In fact, Nietzsche foregrounds very much such a 
“deterministic” interpretation of his life in the first sentence of this, the first chapter of the 
whole book: “The fortunate thing about my existence, perhaps its unique feature, is its 
fatefulness”. Nietzsche’s stress on the “fatefulness” of his existence recurs throughout the 
book (all the way through its final chapter, on “Why I Am A Destiny”), but it is 
especially prominent in the account of his break with Wagner, i.e., the point from which 
his entire philosophical career set forth. This observation accords with a difficulty that 
Nietzsche occasionally alludes to, namely, that his presentation of the free spirit in the 
plural may be rather ironically generous, since he did not know of one apart from 
himself109. Is Nietzsche, then, really prescribing a program for others to follow, or just 
giving a rhetorically attractive account of his own case, making an idiosyncratic and 
inexorable process seem more transferable to others than it really is? 
 This quandary has puzzled many readers. Indeed, the whole question of 
Nietzsche’s relationship to Wagner has been identified as the key to the larger question of 
whether Nietzsche is an advocate of “fatalism” or of “self-creation”110. Yet such a 
contrast is somewhat anachronistic. After all, the very notion of “self-creation” is 
somewhat problematic on Nietzsche’s terms, since he rejects our ordinary, 
commonsensical notion of “selfhood”, which he insists mistakenly supposes that there is 
                                                
109 “Thus when I needed to I once also invented for myself the ‘free spirits’… free spirits of this 
kind do not exist, did not exist” (HAH I. Preface 2; cf. TI Reason 5: “I say ‘we’ out of courtesy”) 
110 See Christa Davis Acampora, Contesting Nietzsche, 154, who assembles an array of 
statements from Nietzsche’s early and late assessments of Wagner attesting to this problem.  
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a unified, organic whole beneath the “I” that I suppose myself to be: in fact, the “I” does 
not oversee and direct my competing constituent components – it simply is one of them, 
having (temporarily) gained supremacy over the others (BGE 16, 17, 19; D 109; TI Errors 
3)111.  
 This last point is actually implied by the passage quoted above, which begins by 
affirming that Nietzsche is both a “décadent” and “also the opposite”. In light of this 
distinction, we have to conclude that the final sentence of the passage (“the décadent as 
such always chooses the means that are harmful to him”) is potentially somewhat 
misleading, since on the basis of an ordinary notion of selfhood one might take this to 
mean that the décadent reveals himself “as such” by virtue of the harmful means that he 
chooses: “I am a décadent, and therefore I choose Wagner”. It would be more accurate to 
say that it is only through the act of choosing Wagner that I become decadent (along with 
a thousand other little such actions, which taken together would make me into a 
consummate décadent).  
But this thought also must be qualified, since Nietzsche certainly does not believe 
that, so to speak, “the choice makes the man”. To the contrary: “at the bottom of us, way 
‘down there’, there is indeed something unteachable, a granite of spiritual fatum” (BGE 
231). What would seem to be decisive, then, would be an individual’s response to one’s 
                                                
111 Nietzsche would likely point out that the whole notion of “self-creation” actually attests to 
what is problematic about the ordinary notion of selfhood since, as Robert Pippin points out, “the 
character creating the unity of character in the story of one’s life is obviously also a character 
himself in the story he is narrating”, so that an infinite regress of character-creators would be 
required to establish a unified self (Nietzsche, Psychology and First Philosophy, 111). 
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granite of fate – a response which might in fact be demanded only after a long period of 
discovery, during which, indeed, “learning transforms us”, but also always (if we follow 
those lessons through doggedly) leads us back to “the great stupidity that we are, to our 
spiritual fatum, to what is unteachable ‘down there’” (BGE 231). In this scenario one 
could speak of “self-creation” in a constrained sense, where the “creator” was given 
certain raw materials, but the quality of his creation was contingent on understanding and 
accepting the nature of that raw material. This would make intelligible what Nietzsche 
means when he says that “illness is the answer”, i.e., that it will be the answer, if our 
nature is so fundamentally vigorous as to be capable of winning out in a temporary battle 
with various ailments. 
 At the same time, it needs to be stressed that when Nietzsche detached himself 
from Wagner’s “narcotic” in order to tend to his own, distinct raw material, he was not 
led into a straightforward embrace of his own nature either: rather, he was enabled to 
recognize that that he was both a “décadent” and “the opposite”, and this recognition 
compelled him to support and exploit certain aspects of his nature, while denying other 
aspects. In particular, Nietzsche precedes his exhortation to “illness” as “the answer”, and 
as the precondition to the recovery of “my task”, by laying out a precondition for 
engaging in that whole process of illness and recovery: namely, that when his break with 
Wagner began, “I began forbidding myself, totally and on principle, all Romantic music” 
(i.e., Wagner)112. In other words, Nietzsche recognized his decadent aspect, which was 
quite genuinely attracted to Wagner, and sought to subordinate it to alternate aspects of 
                                                
112 This remark is the third section of the second preface to the 1886 edition of HAH. 
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his nature. As he commented in another place, “I required a special self-discipline: to take 
sides against everything sick in me [Partei zu nehmen gegen alles Kranke an mir], 
including Wagner” (CW Forward). This act of self-denial on Nietzsche’s part thereby 
amounted to the ultimate precondition for embracing his illness and thus recovering his 
unique “task”: 
I…took sides against myself and for everything painful and difficult precisely for 
me: – thus I found again my way to that courageous pessimism that is the 
antithesis of all romantic mendacity, and also, as it seems to me today, the way to 
‘myself’, to my task.113 
Our discussion of the free spirit’s “tethered heart” in Chapter 3 serves to draw out what 
all that process of self-discipline involved. But what Nietzsche’s retrospective remarks on 
this whole process make clear is that suppressing one “decadent” aspect of himself 
ultimately proved to be transitional to the recovery of another, no less grand but more 
personally distinctive project. 
 Having thus acknowledged the process of self-denial or self-mastery that was 
indispensible to the recovery of his task, Nietzsche can proceed to issue to his readers 
(prospective free spirits) the broad imperative “cave musicam”: beware of music!  
Cave musicam is to this day my advice to all who are man enough to insist on 
cleanliness in things of the spirit; such music unnerves, softens, feminizes, its 
‘eternal womanly’ draws us – downwards! 
                                                
113 This statement is from the fourth section of the second preface to the 1886 edition of HAH. 
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But this advice seems a touch exaggerated, or at least overstated. For one thing, as we 
shall see below, by 1886 Nietzsche had already made an enthusiastic return to music, so 
it seems unlikely that he viewed it with quite such unqualified disdain114. Nietzsche’s 
buffo admonition to prospective free spirits about the allure of music might then put us in 
mind of Socrates’ extravagant dread at the prospect of his students’ attraction to youthful 
beauty, which we observed in Chapter 3. But there we also noted that one of those 
students, Xenophon, had freely adapted that advice in order to suit his own nature, which 
evidently allowed for somewhat different means than those Socrates employed, in the 
pursuit of a similar end (i.e., a less ascetic, less apolitical life, but still one centered by 
philosophy). And we also speculated that Nietzsche would have agreed that the regimen 
most appropriate to a philosopher will vary from one nature to the next. In accord with 
this last thought, we can now add that that while Nietzsche certainly possessed a knowing 
awareness of Socrates’ insight into the way that erotic attractions can lead us into 
intoxicating, other-worldly hopefulness115, in his own case this danger seems to have 
been far less acute in the face of physical beauty than it was in the grip of music. Both 
Nietzsche and Socrates thus seem to offer exhortations that are not entirely serious, but 
                                                
114 Not unrelatedly, he had also looked back to the eternally feminine that sometimes draws us 
higher (TSZ, “The Other Dancing Song” and “The Yes and Amen Song”; GS 363; BGE 295). The 
most trenchant commentary on this challenging aspect of Nietzsche’s thought is Lampert, 
Nietzsche and Modern Times, 377-383. 
115 Consider SE 5; TI “Skirmishes” 19-20 and 22-23; Plato, Phaedrus 249b-256d; Symposium 
202b-203a; Charmides 155c-e (cf. Xenophon, Symposium 1.8-10). Some insightful remarks on 
the resonances of Platonic eros to be found in Nietzsche are made by Pippin, Nietzsche, 
Psychology, and First Philosophy, 12-19. 
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still contain a serious kernel of truth: namely, that some sort of self-discipline or “self-
creation” is indispensible to the best life, even as the exact form which this takes will 
have to vary according to individual natures.  
 In view of the preceding, we can say that Nietzsche’s account of his break with 
Wagner, along with his subsequent recovery, is rhetorically complex due to its awareness 
of the variable natures likely to be found among his readers, and it is intrinsically 
complex because it takes into account the dual aspects of his own nature (“decadent” and 
“the opposite”). Thus, the exhortations which Nietzsche provides in his account of that 
break (Illness is the answer! Beware of music!) are emphatic enough to impress on the 
reader the paramount importance of attending to such questions, but the full details of 
Nietzsche’s account are also “idiosyncratic” enough to make precisely following his 
exhortations difficult, so that they can serve most effectively to prod inquisitive readers to 
reflect on their own condition and those things closest to them (such as their health, and 
sources of intoxication), and in that manner potentially devise an appropriate regimen for 
their own case. 
 By now it should be clear that when Nietzsche speaks of a “return to myself”, 
what he has in mind is neither simple nor straightforward. In returning to himself 
Nietzsche was not returning to some primordial “original” state, or arriving at a final 
“completed” state, or even resting in his most harmonious state. What the “return to 
myself” involves is, rather, his ability to recognize tendencies associated with certain 
predispositions woven into his nature – and then to counteract those tendencies through 
the deliberate arousal and fortification of contrary aspects of that same nature. There is, in 
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other words, no stable or definitive state to which Nietzsche can return, only more-and-
less self-conscious re-creations of his given nature. This means, in turn, that the state that 
Nietzsche strives to return to is not achieved by simply discovering and savoring his most 
natural self. It is, instead, a state that he imposes on his own nature, albeit in a manner 
which supports and serves certain aspects of that nature. 
 The picture that Nietzsche paints – of competing internal drives directed towards 
a common task by the most masterful among them – might well make us think of the 
organization of a soul by way of analogy to the organization of a polity, along the lines 
that Plato famously had his Socrates suggest116. But the political import of Nietzsche’s 
picture is not only metaphorical. After all, if Nietzsche’s experience with illness suggests 
that the catalyst for reorganizing the constituents of one’s soul comes from wrestling with 
demands that are placed on it, one might wonder whether an external stimulus could also 
compel an individual to discover and maintain their best-ordered self – and then train and 
condition themself further through successive stages of self-overcoming. Indeed, for 
Nietzsche, this tendency is exemplified by the intensely competitive agon of the Greek 
polis (BGE 262; cf. 257-259; TI Problem 8, Skirmishes 47, Ancients 3). Moreover, 
Nietzsche suggests that the greatest achievements of the Greek world were the product of 
a decaying (though not yet decadent) aristocracy, which in turn enables him to speculate 
that the decay of the modern world might present attractive possibilities for those who 
experience a war within themselves, a struggle amongst their own instincts, if they find a 
                                                
116 For a rich and wide-ranging comparison of Plato and Nietzsche on this point, see Graham 
Parkes, Composing The Soul, 346-362. 
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way to join that internal battle to the political conflicts of the wider world, in a new life-
affirming contest of self-overcoming (BGE 200). Elsewhere, Nietzsche commends the 
more outwardly peaceful but no less severe model of self-overcoming provided by the 
monastery, which can test and train human beings in a more private setting, while 
conveying a sense of spiritual severity and aspiration to the society at large (BGE 61-
62)117. 
 These prescriptive proposals are mainly found in Nietzsche’s later works, as the 
references just given indicate. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the insights on 
which they are based had their genesis during the period of Human, All Too Human. 
What I have in mind here is that the bout of illness which produced the early Nietzsche’s 
towards the free spirit helped him to grasp a particular view of human beings’ 
relationship to nature, beginning from his experience with his own nature. Nietzsche’s 
view of nature is well known: in Beyond Good and Evil he explicitly puts forward a 
conception of nature as an indifferent or hostile fact allowing human accomplishment 
only through a protracted process of struggling against it (BGE 9, 188). But I take it that 
what is implied by Ecce Homo is that it was the earlier battles with health which helped 
him to recognize that the human relationship to nature is fundamentally adversarial, and 
that the human response to that predicament is not to seek comfort in the face of it, but 
struggle to overcome it: “the instinct for self-recovery forbade me a philosophy of 
                                                
117 For a sympathetic account of this crucial component of Nietzsche’s understanding of 
religion, see Lampert, Nietzsche’s Task, 128-136. For a critical view, see Beiner, Civil Religion, 
377-389. 
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poverty and discouragement”, Nietzsche reflects on this period, adding, “I turned my will 
to health, to life, into my philosophy…” (EH Wise 2). 
 This last remark can be glossed by referring to Nietzsche’s famous assertion that 
“life itself is will to power”, by which Nietzsche means that life is a struggle to express 
and exert one’s strength (“self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent 
consequences of this”) (BGE 13). Thus, even and especially the austere self-discipline or 
self-restraint that Nietzsche imposed on himself during the period of Human, All Too 
Human was part and parcel of a self-overcoming (cf. CW Forward), and thus to the 
recovery of his greater task, as we have seen. The key point here is that although 
Nietzsche began his break from Wagner by retreating to isolation, by withdrawing 
himself from his formerly active life – although it “bestowed on me the gift of having to 
lie still, remain idle, wait, and be patient” (EH HAH 4) – he nevertheless came to 
understand that the ultimate goal of this process was not to remain peacefully and 
inwardly content, but was to move back outward. It was ultimately “expansionist”, like 
life itself: “The great and small struggle revolves everywhere around growth and 
expansion, around power and in accordance with the will to power, which is simply the 
will to life” (GS 349)118. 
 Thus, the works that resulted from Nietzsche’s greatest illness were also 
expressions of his will to power, of his life-affirming drive to overcome his condition: 
                                                
118 cf. A 6: “I consider life itself instinct for growth, for continuance, of accumulation of forces, 
for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline”. 
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I have never been so happy with myself as in my life’s periods of greatest illness 
and pain: you need only take a look at Daybreak or The Wanderer and His 
Shadow to understand what this ‘return to myself’ was: the highest kind of 
recuperation! (EH HAH 4) 
This was Nietzsche’s greatest happiness precisely because it was not any sort of mere 
contentment, but rather the sensation of life-affirming struggle, i.e., of will to power, life 
itself: “What is happiness? – The feeling that power increases – that a resistance is 
overcome” (A 2). Nietzsche was enabled to recognize this point by the crippling illness 
that made him look inward in order to scrutinize the tendency of his most basic drives, 
and then to recognize that their nature was to expand outward. 
 As this suggests, the inward-turn of Human, All Too Human may have been a 
necessary step for Nietzsche, insofar it caused him to reflect more thoroughly on his 
nature, and to attend more carefully to the various “physiological” drives that had been 
upset by the onset of illness, but that very process was necessarily impermanent, because 
the nature of those drives is not merely to survive, but to thrive and shine forth in new, 
more powerful configurations – as Nietzsche’s work of “yes-saying” (beginning with 
Daybreak) attested to. Indeed, Nietzsche sees the work of the all “great men” in this light: 
The genius – in his works, in his deeds – is necessarily a squanderer: his greatness 
lies in his expenditure… The instinct for self-preservation is, so to speak, 
unhinged; the overwhelming pressures of the energies streaming out forbids him 
any such care and caution. People call this ‘self-sacrifice’, they praise his 
 136 
‘heroism’, his indifference towards his own well-being, his devotion to an idea, a 
great cause, a fatherland: all of these are misunderstandings (TI Skirmishes 44)119 
Politics and philosophy then have at least this much in common, that they are both 
extensions of the same phenomenon of will to power – although, as Nietzsche here 
stresses, they have heretofore generally not been understood in these terms.  
 Viewed in this light, Nietzsche’s exhortations to “illness” as “the answer” serves a 
purpose similar to his promotion of a severe political culture. They are both attempts to 
bring others more consciously into contact with the situation that naturally defines human 
accomplishment: one in which human beings are confronted with conditions of such 
intense resistance to their inclinations that they are compelled to self-endangeringly re-
create those conditions for themselves, rather than simply seek comfort in them.  
 I have already indicated that the practical implications of this thought as 
elaborated in Nietzsche’s later thought are quite grim, and in some passages they are even 
starker: 
The magnitude of “progress” is indeed measured by the mass of whatever had to 
be sacrificed for it; humankind as a mass sacrificed for the flourishing of a single 
stronger species of human – that would be progress… (GM II.12) 
But even in a passage such as this it bears noting Nietzsche begins from a reflection, not 
on the mass of mankind, but from an observation about the “individual organism” from 
which he extrapolates to the whole of humanity: 
                                                
119 cf. TSZ Preface 4: “I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and does not 
give back again: for he always bestows and would not preserve himself” 
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“Even within an individual organism things are no different: with every 
substantial growth of the whole the ‘meaning’ of the individual organs also shifts 
– sometimes their partial destruction, their decline in number (for example 
through annihilation of the intermediary members) can be a sign of growing 
strength and perfection (GM III.12) 
This is not the only place where Nietzsche links his political and physiological 
observations: for instance, Zarathustra, in his major act of legislation, remarks: “Verily 
my brothers, the spirit is a stomach” (TSZ Tablets 16; cf. BGE 230: “the spirit most 
resembles a stomach”). Nietzsche intends this partly as a metaphor, but not wholly: in his 
most didactic statement on the will to power, he refers to it as belonging already to 
natural drives such as digestion, which he classifies as “pre-form[s] of life”, which reach 
a kind of self-consciousness (through which they “come to life”, so to speak) in our 
awareness of the relation of these drives to one another (BGE 36). It follows from this 
that the most self-conscious form of life would be one that was aware of its lineage in 
“pre-life”, which a person could become aware of by paying careful attention to their 
own drives, i.e., the way that one’s metabolism reacts to climate, or how to time one’s 
meals (EH Clever 1-2). 
 Let me try to state what is at issue here in somewhat more general terms. By 
instructing us to see all phenomenon as manifestations of will to power, Nietzsche also 
encourages us to reflect from the large-scale, political manifestations of the will to power 
back onto its small-scale physiological manifestations (as well as vice versa). The 
passages just cited show that he remained mindful of this connection even in the midst of 
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the overweening ambition of his later writings. Philosophy can then become the highest 
expression of will to power because it is most conscious of its nature as such. We might 
then think of the manifold expressions of will to power as the distinct-but-inseparable 
ripples on a teeming ocean, with the philosopher as its cresting wave – but fully aware, 
however, that his own will must be pulled back to the ocean, albeit all the better to surge 
forward once more, only to fall back again, and so on120. 
What all of this means is that for one who would follow Nietzsche’s path there 
must be a constant interplay between at least two “levels” of the will to power: the 
physiological level may spur one to the political level (say, by providing an impetus for 
self-overcoming at the level of health which forces me to transform myself, and in that 
process of struggle generates within me a reservoir of renewed strength which then 
expends itself in a project of world-transformation), but then also pull me back down 
from the political to the physiological level (consumed by new demands on my 
constitution), only to thereby repeat the whole process again. In other words, there is an 
inherently cyclical dynamic to the will to power, since the combination of resistance-and-
overcoming (sickness-and-health) is not just “part of life”: it is the very fabric of life. So 
when I look at my life in terms of will to power I would have to be grateful for the 
persistent source of resistance that I encounter in my “physiology”, because that 
                                                
120 In Waller Newell’s perceptive formulation, willing is “grounded in an interplay between man 
and Being in which Life solicits man to will her interpretation in order that Life can come to 
presence as the manifold values exhibited throughout history” (“Zarathustra’s Dancing 
Dialectic”, 416; cf. Pangle “The ‘Warrior Spirit’ as an Inlet to the Political Philosophy of 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra”, 174). 
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resistance provides the spur to even greater acts of overcoming than I could have 
conceived of it without it. And so there is nothing that I can will without also willing this 
constant source of struggle within myself: indeed, I must will again and again that illness 
is the answer, “insatiably shouting da capo [from the beginning, i.e., “play it again”], not 
only to myself but to the whole play and performance”, i.e., joining an affirmation of the 
will to power in the vehicle that I experience as my self to the world of will to power in 
which I exert my aspect of it (BGE 56). In this way, I will tentatively suggest, 
Nietzsche’s understanding of himself in terms of will to power leads to the thought of 
eternal recurrence which he sometimes posits as a sort of cosmological doctrine, but 
which also has a much more naturalistic root in his reflection on the inner nature and 
necessity of his own drives (as an unconditional affirmation of the conditions to which 
my will is subject). 
There is a difficulty with this suggestion that must be considered, however. If 
Nietzsche’s most famous “doctrinal” teaching (the eternal recurrence) arises out of 
reflection on what he identifies as the fundamental fact of existence (the will to power) as 
it is manifested in its highest form (the life of the philosopher), then does the fact that 
Nietzsche is the first to proclaim the doctrine suggest that he is the first to truly 
understand existence and his own place within it – in other words, the first to be a true 
knower, a true philosopher? In fact, Nietzsche himself suggests that previous 
philosophers have failed to understand the will to power that motivated their own activity 
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(e.g., BGE 9)121. And wouldn’t this also be suggested by the simple fact that most 
philosophers have not promulgated the eternal recurrence, suggesting that they 
understood their own nature and activity rather differently from the way that Nietzsche 
insists that it must be understood? On the other hand, as we shall see, Nietzsche actually 
does suggest that the thought of eternal recurrence is not wholly original to him, and has 
an older philosophic pedigree, suggesting that he shares something crucial with 
seemingly disparate predecessors. And this, I would like to suggest, is what is most 
significant about both the eternal recurrence and the will to power (the former being 
derived from the latter, as I have just indicated, as Zarathustra’s example demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, and as I will elaborate below). After all, if only an interpretation of existence 
is possible, then the material being interpreted is more fundamental than the 
interpretation (the will to power) and its products (the eternal recurrence). As will 
become even clearer in his history of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s account of his 
own doctrines is not really doctrinal at all, but experiential.  
  
The Path to Zarathustra 
 Before continuing along Nietzsche’s road from The Wanderer and His Shadow to 
Zarathustra it is worth pausing to reflect on the model of philosophy that we have seen 
laid out so far. I have already suggested that Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy can 
                                                
121 In Zarathustra’s speech “On Self-Overcoming” he admonishes “the wisest”: “You still want 
to create the world before which you can kneel: that is your ultimate hope and intoxication”, i.e., 
that they will not have to recognize as the world as will to power and nothing besides 
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lead towards a forbidding and extreme political project. But Nietzsche also outlines 
possibilities that are quite different, and even quite likely to appeal to some contemporary 
readers. For instance, crucial features of Human, All Too Human, along with Nietzsche’s 
retrospective assessment of it, provide a compelling account of the way that close 
attention to and care for “the closest things” of everyday life can lead to a kind of 
spiritual liberation, and awareness of this fact could furnish a standard enabling readers to 
critically assess the way in which different forms of political organization influence or 
nurture diverse human capacities and aspirations. Thus, we have seen how in the period 
of Human… Nietzsche came to be deeply critical of the practical and intellectual effects 
of basing a society around “work”, along with a wealth accumulation more generally (cf. 
HAH 282, 284; AOM 310, 317; WS 220, 288) and, accordingly, in later writings he 
therefore tried to reinvigorate something of the classical ideal of leisure in contemporary 
culture (e.g., GS 31, 42, 188, 329; BGE 58, 189)122.  
 The surprisingly friendly posture that Nietzsche adopts vis-a-vis many older 
philosophers during the period of Human… is connected to this last point. His primary 
concern here is the set of particular experiences and conditions that have made a 
                                                
122 Leslie Paul Thiele aptly notes that Nietzsche’s “attitude toward leisure, its meaning and its 
purpose, is very much at odds with modernity’s equation of it with relaxation. Aristotle’s view of 
leisure as neither work nor play but a time for relaxation is Nietzsche’s own” (Friedrich 
Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul, 179n8). There are some striking parallels between 
Nietzsche’s attempt to revive this notion of leisure and Josef Pieper’s very helpful introduction of 
the subject for an unappreciative modern world in his Leisure: The Basis of Culture. Of course, 
what exactly contemplation involves varies somewhat between Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Pieper, 
and those differences could be the subject of a study of its own. 
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contemplative life possible, and thus also with reflecting on how a range of 
philosophically-inclined individuals have negotiated their complex relationship to the 
broader society in which they lived. In this way, Nietzsche also helps us to see that 
philosophers confront politics not just to construct abstract “theories” of it, but even more 
to help gauge its impact on the quotidian concerns everyday life, and assess how it 
influences the needs or desires of different sorts of individuals. And I think that Nietzsche 
makes clear enough that, in his judgment, these sorts of matters should in fact be the 
primary concern of political philosophy – and that they had, in fact, been the main 
concern of a great many philosophers in the past. 
  As this suggests, the outlook of Human… enables Nietzsche to focus his attention 
on what older philosophers may have held in common beyond their traditional 
pretensions (say, as “metaphysicians” or “social contract theorists”) – and, thus, also, to 
consider what they may have held in common apart from what are traditionally judged to 
be their primary disagreements (e.g., concerning “spiritualist” versus “materialist” 
metaphysics). To state this point in more familiar terms: the sage of Human, All Too 
Human shows us philosophy as a “way of life”, rather than as a source of doctrine.  
 Indeed, Nietzsche himself foregrounded the question of “philosophy as a way of 
life” in the first edition of Human…, which had as its epigraph a quotation from the third 
part of Descartes’ Discourse on Method, beginning with this sentence: “I was drawn to 
make a review of the diverse occupations of men in this life in order to try to choose the 
best of them”. This is notable in part because it captures something crucial about where 
Nietzsche stood when he wrote the book, but also because the whole notion of 
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philosophy as a way of life that it evokes is attractive to many contemporary readers123. 
Thus, one sometimes finds the suggestion made that one could be committed to living a 
philosophic life without taking a position on the various doctrinal disputes that have 
dominated the history of philosophy124. Such an approach possesses an undeniable appeal 
for our metaphysically skeptical age, since it suggests that one might be able to claim an 
allegiance with the philosophers of the past without subscribing to their outmoded 
ontological commitments (and thereby also avoid altogether having to arbitrate between, 
say, Platonic and Cartesian metaphysics). But although Nietzsche helped to inspire the 
prevailing metaphysical skepticism, his own approach to philosophy as a way of life 
allowed for no agnosticism about the basic questions of philosophy, and it is worth 
emphasizing why that is the case. 
                                                
123 In recent times it has been most closely associated with Pierre Hadot’s researches recovering 
this aspect of classical philosophy, and Hadot himself saw Nietzsche’s thought as an attempt to 
revive something of the ancient model in this respect (Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 272). 
And I think that work along the lines of Hadot’s can quite legitimately help us to understand more 
fully the approach to philosophy as a mode of self-care that Nietzsche recommends to us; Horst 
Hutter’s Shaping the Future is an interesting application of Hadot’s framework to Nietzsche in 
this vein. Still, it is worth noting Hadot may not have fully recognized the extent to which 
Nietzsche anticipated him in this respect. For instance, Hadot acutely observes that what has been 
most forgotten about the Socratic model of philosophy as a way of life is Socrates’ “irony and 
humor”, which can be seen especially in the Xenophontic Socrates; Hadot then notes Nietzsche’s 
awareness of this aspect of Socrates, but does not comment on Nietzsche’s interest in the 
Xenophontic Socrates (What is Ancient Philosophy?, 50). 
124 For instance, Catherine and Michael Zuckert argue that Leo Strauss revived such an approach 
(Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy, 125-26, 297). 
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 There are two stages in Nietzsche’s development on this question. First, during 
the period of Human, All Too Human, when he first began to emphasize the notion of 
philosophy as a way of life (and live in accordance with it), his critical approach to 
metaphysics began from careful attention to his own nature and his own needs. This 
careful attention forced Nietzsche to confront his earlier metaphysical longings more 
critically, asking what aspects of his nature they served, and questioning whether their 
influence on him was salutary or not. To that end, during this period Nietzsche 
recommends deploying historical philosophy as a critical instrument to debunk all 
metaphysics, and confirm the free spirit’s skeptical outlook on social and political life. 
Here, then, Nietzsche has no doctrinal teaching of his own, but he is actively antagonistic 
towards the doctrines of others. 
 However, as we have already begun to see, in the period subsequent to Human…, 
Nietzsche’s reflection on his activity during that earlier activity led him to interpret it, 
along all human activity, in terms of the will to power, which leads in turn to the doctrine 
of the eternal recurrence. To be sure, as I have already stressed, the will to power (along 
with the eternal recurrence) is only an interpretation of the world, which means that 
Nietzsche must leave open the possibility that a superior interpretation will yet emerge 
(cf. BGE 22, 43). To that extent, the experiential grounds of the interpretation are more 
important to understanding Nietzsche’s thought (and all thought) than the doctrines 
themselves. And yet Nietzsche was still ultimately led to develop those teachings, and 
give them a most prominent place in his thought. In particular, as we shall see, in Ecce 
Homo he would emphasize that the eternal recurrence is the “basic conception” of Thus 
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Spoke Zarathustra, and also accord Zarathustra a preeminent place amongst his writings. 
In this way, Nietzsche impresses on us the crucial importance of this doctrinal teaching to 
his whole project. We cannot then fully understand Nietzsche’s posture as a philosopher 
until we have understood why he was led in that direction, billing himself (in what are 
almost the final words of Twilight of the Idols) as “the teacher of the eternal recurrence” 
(TI Ancients 5).  In order to explain Nietzsche’s development in this regard I will trace 
out how his doctrinal teachings emerge over the course of his career by looking briefly at 
his first two “yes-saying” works, Daybreak and The Gay Science, and then examine 
carefully the retrospective account provided in Ecce Homo of the third and final 
installment in the “yes-saying” series, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
 Daybreak constitutes a landmark in Nietzsche’s thought, and I cannot pretend to 
do justice to it here. However, its significance is attested to by a signal fact: namely, that 
in its fifth and final book Nietzsche provides his first full treatment of the philosophic 
life, both canvassing its historic exemplars and providing his own, distinct account of it. 
For present purposes, I will have to limit myself to one, synoptic remark about the picture 
of philosophy that Nietzsche outlines here. Nietzsche opens book five with a glance at 
philosophy as solitary, a tranquil joy acquired in its separation from society, exemplified 
by the austere Aristotle, and the ancient Greek world more generally (424). This seems 
largely consistent with the picture of philosophy that we get in The Wanderer and His 
Shadow, and as the fifth book continues, the theme of philosophy’s solitude apart from 
society is elaborated (482, 485, 491). Towards the end of the book, however, Nietzsche 
begins to reflect on the broad cultural influence that philosophy can have, spreading out 
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even from its solitude (496, 544, 550, 552, 575). This emphasis reflects a turn away from 
the whole posture of Human, All Too Human, or at least amounts to a significant addition 
to it. This addition proves to be increasingly the leading concern and characteristic of 
Nietzsche’s next two works: Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the document of a former 
solitary’s attempt to change through the world through the promulgation of theoretical 
insight; and The Gay Science helps to explain why that project was of such interest to 
Nietzsche. A few words therefore need to be said on The Gay Science, to see how it 
explains the transition from the new concern with philosophy’s cultural influence in 
Daybreak, to an experiment with exercising it in Zarathustra. 
 The Gay Science is a step beyond Daybreak in several ways. First, it introduces 
Nietzsche’s most famous teachings or “doctrines”, the will to power and the eternal 
recurrence – though it does not name either as directly as its successor, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, which announces and explicates both. But then Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
itself is actually introduced in The Gay Science: its final aphorism presents the first 
sections of Zarathustra’s preface (where Zarathustra descends from his mountain) under 
the heading “Incipit Trageoedia”. This is preceded by an aphorism that gives Nietzsche’s 
first major statement of the eternal recurrence (through he does not here name it as such, 
presenting it instead through the image of “an eternal hourglass of existence”) under the 
title “The Greatest Heavy Weight”, and which he presents as a challenge for the reader to 
affirm. The Gay Science thereby clearly leads up to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (both the 
book and its central doctrine), and is meant to help prepare the reader for it. This point 
can be expanded by observing that the fourth and final book of the first edition is also the 
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only part of the original work to carry a title: St Januarius, Saint January, the 
representative of a new birth, a new beginning. Indeed, the desire to lead the way or be 
led into a new future is the most pervasive theme of the fourth book (276, 278, 283, 285, 
289, 300, 335, 337, 339). All of these indications suggest that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is 
the consummation hoped for or pointed towards by the fourth book of The Gay Science – 
especially because Zarathustra becomes the vehicle for the teaching on the eternal 
recurrence, which is introduced in The Gay Science without becoming thematic in it.   
 With that being said, it should be noted that the presentation of the eternal 
recurrence in the penultimate aphorism of The Gay Science is probably Nietzsche’s most-
quoted statement of the teaching, and cited more often than anything in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. This fact is somewhat curious, since, for the reasons just noted, that 
aphorism is clearly presented as an ingress to Zarathutra, where the doctrine becomes 
thematic. So it is worth pausing to consider why GS 341 has been a more popular 
statement of the eternal recurrence than anything drawn from the work that it was 
designed to set the stage for. The simplest answer would be that the aphorism has a neatly 
self-contained, lyrical quality which makes for memorable reading. This lyrical quality is 
connected to a more substantive fact about the aphorism: namely, that it is presented in a 
way which enables the reader to interpret the eternal recurrence as “an entirely 
hypothetical question, a thought experiment”, a kind of ethical test meant to shape one’s 
comportment towards life and choice of actions, not a “cosmological” theory about the 
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actual nature of the universe125. In other words, for many readers GS 341 is Nietzsche’s 
most attractive presentation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence precisely because it 
is his least “doctrinal” (indeed, as noted, Nietzsche does not even refer to it as the 
“eternal recurrence” here). On this view, then, The Gay Science is less of a preparation to 
Zarathustra than a welcome alternative to it.   
 But I do not find this approach to GS 341 persuasive. In the first place, it neglects 
the extent to which the aphorism is used as a prelude to Zarathustra, which is just as 
clearly intended as an advance beyond The Gay Science. So I don’t think that the 
aphorism can be easily divorced from its relation to Zarathustra. Moreover, GS 341 is 
actually not Nietzsche’s only allusion to the eternal recurrence in The Gay Science, and 
so it needs to be understood as part of a broader argument: one which forms an ingress to 
Zarathustra, but also a continuation of Daybreak. I have already suggested the nature of 
this connection: Daybreak shows Nietzsche becoming interested in philosophy’s 
potential for cultural influence, and Zarathustra shows him experimenting with it 
directly, an experiment which very much includes the promulgation of his own major 
doctrines. The presentation of the eternal recurrence at the end of The Gay Science is a 
key part of that picture, because it is the culmination of an argument showing why the 
                                                
125 Bernard Williams, The Sense of the Past, 318-319. Williams is of course aware that in 
unpublished notes Nietzsche writes of the eternal recurrence as more of a cosmological theory, 
but stresses that these notes were unpublished. For a fuller statement of this view of the doctrine, 
see Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Chapter 8. 
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doctrine is an essential part of that project of philosophy’s becoming more involved and 
invested in the world. Nietzsche’s argument on this point can be outlined as follows. 
 The best way to see the role that The Gay Science plays in Nietzsche’s ongoing 
project is in the fourth book’s middle two aphorisms, which contain a clear anticipation 
of the will to power (though Nietzsche does not yet use the term126). The first of this pair 
of aphorisms is titled “From the Seventh Solitude”, and presents a short speech that 
Nietzsche ascribes to “the wanderer”, who exclaims in frustration from deep in the barrel 
of his solitude:  
This penchant and passion for what is true, real, non-apparent, certain – how it 
exasperates me! Why does this gloomy and earnest oppressor follow me of all 
people? I want to rest, but he won’t allow it. (309) 
An answer to the wanderer’s plaintive question is suggested by the very next aphorism: 
Will and Wave. – How greedily this wave is approaching, as if it were trying to 
reach something! How it crawls with terrifying haste into the inmost crevices of 
the craggy gorge! It seems to be trying to arrive before something else; something 
of value, of great value seems to be hidden there. – And now it is returning, a bit 
more slowly but still quite white with excitement – is it disappointed? Has it 
found what it was seeking? Is it simulating disappointment? – But already another 
wave is nearing, still more greedily and wildly than the first, and its soul, too, 
                                                
126 For other instances of Nietzsche’s prefiguration of the will to power, see Franco, Nietzsche’s 
Enlightenment, 170 
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seems full of secrets and the hunger for treasure-digging. This is how the waves 
live – that is how we live, we who will – I will say no more. (310) 
“We who live”, that is, “we who will”, live in this way like the waves, prompting 
Nietzsche to conclude the aphorism by confiding to the waves: “I know you and your 
secret; I know your kind! After all, you and I are of one kind! After all you and I have 
one secret!” Their shared secret is, of course, the secret of all life – that we who live are 
nothing other than will. This is the same “secret” that Nietzsche will later have a 
personified Life reveal more directly to Zarathustra, but here it is more obliquely offered 
to his own earlier iteration, the Wanderer, as an explanation of their shared existence. 
 In this way Nietzsche seems to suggest that he has uncovered a frustrating or 
nagging aspect of his own earlier existence, and responded by explaining it in terms of a 
new interpretation of life as something which does not allow “the wanderer” to rest in his 
solitude, but also spurs him on even in his solitude. In other words, Nietzsche seems to 
suggest that the interpretation of the world in terms of will to power prevents philosophy 
from being remaining wholly solitary, driving it to embrace and seek to comprehend the 
whole of life.  
In keeping with this observation, one of the most important aspects of the future 
that Nietzsche looks toward throughout the fourth book is a recast notion of the meaning 
and the conduct of a “contemplative life”. It is not that Nietzsche simply collapses the 
“contemplative” and “active” lives here: to the contrary, he insists that these two 
alternatives will continue to “differ greatly”. But the new notion of contemplation differs 
even more strongly from the old notion, which understood the contemplative as 
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“spectators” on life; to the contrary, Nietzsche insists, it is contemplative thought which 
above all changes and shapes the world (gives it “value”), and so contemplative 
individuals are not passive bystanders to life, but rather “the actual poets and ongoing 
authors of life” – they are creative (301). This thought– that the contemplative ones are 
not spectators to life, but are in fact its authors – follows from the very notion of the will 
to power, claiming as it does that there is no perspective outside of life, only 
interpretations from within it, so that philosophy (contemplation) becomes the supreme 
form of interpretation, or “world-creation”.  
 The whole fourth book of The Gay Science can, then, be understood as searching 
for a way to maintain the primacy of contemplation once life has been recognized as will 
to power, i.e., once it has been recognized that there is no perspective outside of life from 
which to contemplate it, but only creative reinterpretations from within it. Nietzsche is 
quite clear on this point: contemplation needs to have the same revered status in a future 
civilization that the Church was able to give it in an earlier epoch, but having stamped out 
all of the Church’s inducements to other-worldly speculations, and redirecting 
contemplative activity towards this this-life alone (280). Nietzsche restates the point 
while briefly alluding to what the object of reflection in such a new, higher culture would 
be: 
Excelsior. – “You will never pray again, never adore again, never again rest in 
endless trust; you refuse to let yourself stop to unharness your thoughts before any 
ultimate wisdom, goodness, or power; you have no perpetual guard and friend for 
your seven solitudes; you live without the view of a mountain-range with snow-
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capped peaks and fire in its heart; there is no avenger for you anymore, no final 
corrector of the text of your life; there is no more reason in what happens, no love 
in what will happen to you; no more resting place stands open for your heart in 
which to find and no longer seek; you arm yourself against any ultimate peace; 
you will the eternal recurrence of war and peace; – Man of renunciation, all this 
you wish to renounce? Who will give you the strength to do so? No one has yet 
had strength!” There is a lake that one day refused to let itself flow off and formed 
a dam where it used to flow off: ever since, this lake rises higher and higher. 
Perhaps this very renunciation will lend us the strength to bear renunciation; 
perhaps man will rise ever higher until he no longer flows off into a god (285) 
This is Nietzsche’s first direct, published reference to the “eternal recurrence”) (and his 
only use of the phrase in The Gay Science). Although brief, it is revealing in at least two 
respects: first, because Nietzsche here emphasizes that the eternal recurrence is to be 
willed, and, moreover, that it is to be willed in order to create a higher culture where 
human longing no longer directed towards another world. Rather than contemplating the 
next life, philosophy will contemplate the eternal recurrence of this life.  
 The context of this remark also suggests, I think, that the eternal recurrence is 
here meant to serve both a political and philosophic purpose: one the one hand, it centers 
contemplation definitively on the given world, without any longing to reach beyond it; on 
the other hand, this affirmation itself becomes a new object of aspiration, a kind of 
civilizational or cultural center, which places a reenvisioned understanding of the 
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contemplative life at the apex of human society once it has been transformed by the 
understanding of life as will to power127.   
 The cultural or political significance of this first reference to the eternal 
recurrence can be seen most clearly by reading it in conjunction with aphorism 280, as I 
have just suggested. At the same time, its theoretical importance is also highlighted by 
the way in which Nietzsche associates his first reference to the eternal recurrence with the 
thought of Heraclitus (“the eternal recurrence of war and peace”), who Nietzsche would 
reaffirm as a forbear of the eternal recurrence in Ecce Homo, along with the Stoics (who 
were acolytes of Heraclitus) (EH BT 3; cf. TI Reason 2).  
 To this should be added that there is an allusion to the eternal recurrence even 
earlier in The Gay Science, in aphorism 109, immediately following Nietzsche’s first 
pronouncement (later put into the mouth of Zarathustra) that “God is Dead”. In this 
freighted context, Nietzsche engages in a straightforwardly cosmological speculation on 
the nature of the universe as “for all eternity chaos”, and then glossing this thought by 
asserting that “the whole music box eternally repeats its tune, which must never be called 
                                                
127 Leo Strauss seems to have this dual function of the eternal recurrence in mind (as a means of 
recentering human civilization, and of regrounding contemplation) when he suggests that it was 
in response to the “artificial protection against the elementary problems” – viz., the “cave” of 
opinions erected by the pre-modern faith in providence and the modern faith in history – 
Nietzsche “reasserted hypothetically the doctrine of eternal return: to drive home that the 
elementary, the natural subject of philosophy still is, and always will be, as it had been for the 
Greeks: the kosmos, the world” (“Living Issues of German Postwar Philosophy”, 137-138; cf. 
Letters to Karl Lowith of June 23 and July 17, 1935, and “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s 
Beyond Good and Evil”, paragraph 35). 
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a melody” (i.e., it must not be supposed to operate in accord with human purposes or 
even human understanding). This formulation also carries a special weight since, as Paul 
Loeb has noted, in the Pythagorean tradition music was often used to explain the nature 
of the universe, and in one of Nietzsche’s early essays he mentions Pythagorean theories 
which anticipate the eternal recurrence (On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life, 2)128.  
 (Parenthetically – but related to the question of the doctrine’s cosmological status 
– it is also worth noting that Loeb presents some significant evidence that contemporary 
physics supports the hypothesis of eternal recurrence129. This might seem to make the 
doctrine more empirically plausible in our age than it had been in the past, but then it 
must be added that Nietzsche’s published remarks emphasize the findings of modern 
science far less than the fact that the insight into the eternal recurrence was also gleaned 
by ancient philosophers. Consequently, it would seem that in Nietzsche’s judgment one 
of the most essential aspects of the doctrine cannot depend the findings of modern 
science – even if he nevertheless presents the eternal recurrence as a cosmological 
hypothesis.)  
 Let me then suggest that the significance of the eternal recurrence is manifold. On 
the one hand, it may have some value as an empirical statement about the nature of the 
universe. But in the context of Nietzsche’s broad philosophic project as it comes to sight 
in The Gay Science, it serves even more as a possibility around which the contemplative 
life, and thus all life, can be reoriented in light of the will to power. This is indeed the 
                                                
128 Loeb, “Eternal Recurrence”, 656-657 
129 Loeb, “Eternal Recurrence”, 661-662 
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eternal recurrence’s “political” purpose. At the same time, however, we have seen that 
Nietzsche intends the will to power as an interpretation of the philosophic life itself, from 
its roots in everyday concerns to its project to transform the world. Nietzsche’s suggests 
that his teaching on the will to power thereby speaks to, and captures most convincingly, 
the experiences of a broad range of philosophers. And this is reflected in the fact that the 
logical consequence of an interpretation of the world in terms of will to power – an 
affirmation of its eternal recurrence – was in fact foreshadowed by philosopher as old as 
Heraclitus and Pythagoras. If this is correct, then one of Nietzsche’s primary concerns 
would be less to encourage new philosophers to test the empirical status of the eternal 
recurrence, or even promulgate it for political purposes, than to encourage them to reflect 
on the set of experiences that naturally suggest such a doctrine, and which render it 
plausible. Nietzsche directs us, in other words, once again to the “experiential” core of 
his doctrinal teaching. 
 But there is a difficulty with this suggestion also: it is one thing to suggest that 
Nietzsche was using his doctrines of the will to power and the eternal recurrence to 
induce greater reflectiveness or self-awareness on the part of the philosophically-inclined. 
But the project of Zarathustra is in fact something more than that: it is an attempt to 
reshape human existence around those doctrines. And although in Chapter 2 we found 
good reason to doubt that Nietzsche truly shares Zarathustra’s political project, we have 
also just seen that the argument of The Gay Science suggests that Nietzsche at least 
seriously entertained the idea of basing a new, higher culture around the affirmation of 
the eternal recurrence. But then there would seem to be a gap between how a society of 
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the future would understand the teaching (as deadly serious) and how Nietzsche’s more 
philosophic audience might understand it (as an experimental interpretation of their 
innermost experience). In order to fully embrace the former, political project, then, 
wouldn’t Nietzsche to some extent have to overstep the bounds of a more modest 
philosophic judgment – viewing or presenting the eternal recurrence as something more 
definitive than it truly is? And how could that be appropriate for a truly reflective, 
critical, philosophic spirit? Both of these questions, I would now like to suggest, are what 
Nietzsche effectively answers through his retrospective account of the primary vehicle 
for the eternal recurrence, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
   
The History of Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Ecce Homo’s sub-chapter on Thus Spoke Zarathustra is, as we have already 
noted, the lengthiest discussion by Nietzsche of any of his writings, and the reason is 
partly indicated by its opening sentence, “Now I shall relate the history of Zarathustra”, 
i.e., give an account of how to the work came to be in addition to giving an account of the 
book itself. Accordingly, of this sub-chapter’s eight sections, the first five tell the book’s 
“history”; the last three give an account of the concept of the Dionysian in Zarathustra 
(including long quotations from Zarathustra’s speeches). My own discussion will 
therefore treat the first five sections, i.e., the “history” of Zarathustra.  
In the two previous sub-chapters, on Daybreak and The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
had mentioned that each was a “yes-saying” work, which we suggested in Chapter 3 can 
broadly be understood to mean “affirmative” (creative or constructive). But he had not 
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explained exactly what was being affirmed there. Now, Thus Spoke Zarathustra is also a 
“yes-saying” work130, but here Nietzsche makes clear exactly what this yes-saying 
consists of from the very second sentence of the sub-chapter: “The basic conception 
[Grundconception] of the work – the thought of eternal recurrence, the highest possible 
formula of affirmation – belongs to the August of 1881”. 
When Nietzsche refers to the eternal recurrence as the “basic conception” of 
Zarathustra, he seems to mean this in two ways: in the first place, it means that eternal 
recurrence is the cardinal notion of the work itself. But Nietzsche is also using the word 
“conception” to refer to the way in which the doctrine occurred to him (i.e., how he 
“conceived” it). Thus he adds that when “this thought came to me” in a hike through the 
woods, he “dashed it off” on only a single sheet of paper with the caption: “6000 feet 
beyond man and time”. Taken literally, this “beyond man and time” would imply that 
Nietzsche conceived of the eternal recurrence not through a rational deductive process, 
but instead through some kind of super-natural revelation. In fact, later in the chapter he 
will imply precisely that even more strongly, and he begins to do so even at the end of 
this first section when he states that “the whole first part of Zarathustra…ambushed me”. 
These intimations that Zarathustra and its “basic conception” of the eternal 
recurrence hold some sort of inspired, revelatory status for Nietzsche are made more 
explicit by the context which he suggests for them throughout the first section of this sub-
chapter. That context is neither cosmological nor political (as the allusions to the eternal 
                                                
130 Zarathustra is “the most affirmative of all spirits” (EH TSZ 6), “he is yes-saying to the point 
of justifying, redeeming even all that is past” (EH TSZ 8). 
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recurrence in The Gay Science might have led one to expect), but…musical. Indeed, 
Nietzsche here seems to echo a related point which he had made privately to his publisher 
when he wrote the book five years earlier: the book which he had then described as 
“something else for which there is no name yet”, he now ventures “may perhaps be 
counted as music”. But to describe Zarathustra as “music” also expands on the earlier 
statement by suggesting that the book articulates something that might not easily be 
“named” not merely because it is new, but because its content is non-discursive or sub-
rational131. 
Nietzsche’s elaboration of Zarathustra’s musical qualities illustrates this last 
suggestion in three ways: first, when he notes that an “omen” of the eternal recurrence 
occurred to him through “a sudden and profoundly decisive alteration in my taste, in 
music above all”. Second, when he remarks that in the period between 1881 and 1883 
(i.e., in the period after the eternal recurrence first occurred to him on the mountain “6000 
feet beyond man and time”) he composed a piece of actual music which he speaks more 
highly of than the book which he wrote at the same time (The Gay Science). Third, 
because he claims that the completion of Zarathustra occurred “at precisely the sacred 
hour when Richard Wagner died in Venice”132. At all events, then, Nietzsche’s “history 
of Zarathustra” points us towards the non-discursive, sub-rational, inspired or simply 
                                                
131 Note that in 1886, after having completed Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche referred back 
to that work primarily in songs: in the “Aftersong” concluding Beyond Good and Evil, and in the 
appendix of songs that he added to the second edition of The Gay Science. 
132 Apparently this is only a slight exaggeration: Nietzsche received word of Wagner’s death 
immediately after mailing the manuscript to his publisher. 
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uncanny foundations for the work – especially as these bear on its “basic conception” of 
the eternal recurrence. 
Nietzsche provides what seems like an implicit commentary on this whole set of 
experiences in the first section of a book that was written a few months before Ecce 
Homo. In The Case of Wagner Nietzsche gives his most sustained reflections of music, 
and in the first section of the book he describes his enchantment with the opera of Bizet, 
leading him to comment on the intermingling of music and philosophy thusly: 
The gray sky of abstraction illuminated in a flash as if by lighting, the light 
strong enough for the whole filigree of things; the great problems close enough to 
grasp; the world surveyed as if from a mountain… 
This “world surveyed as if from a mountain” might well put us in mind of the perspective 
that Nietzsche acquired on his hike “6000 feet beyond time and man” where he first 
conceived of the eternal recurrence. Indeed, if this statement is put together with the 
musical context that Nietzsche suggests for Zarathustra, we can infer that one may not 
even need trek to a mountaintop to reach the state of mind at issue. Music itself may take 
us there, just as Nietzsche had already observed a decade earlier in the first installment of 
Human, All Too Human, an experience which even then he noted could lead one into 
religion or metaphysics. To recall:  
A passage in Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony will make him feel he is hovering 
above the earth in a dome of stars with the dream of immortality in his heart: all 
the stars seem to glitter around him and the earth seems to sink farther and farther 
away. If he becomes aware of being in this condition he feels a profound stab in 
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the heart and sighs for the man who will lead him back to his lost love, whether 
she be called religion or metaphysics (HAH 153) 
Now, that reflection should serve to remind us of a key point: namely, that Nietzsche 
would surely deny that the eternal recurrence amounts to metaphysics in any traditional 
sense. Indeed, we saw that in The Gay Science he presents the doctrine specifically as a 
consequence of the death of metaphysics. Nevertheless, we have also seen that he at least 
plays with the notion that Zarathustra amounts to a kind of religion – for which the 
eternal recurrence would presumably serve as the primary tenet of faith (a new sort of 
religion, one without metaphysics). In sum: I take it that Nietzsche’s allusions to the 
“musical” context of Zarathustra suggest that as the book and its central notion (the 
eternal recurrence) took shape, his life and his thought somewhat gingerly returned to the 
quasi-religious or incipiently metaphysical types of experiences that he had warned 
against in the passage from Human, All Too Human.  
 What begins in the first section of this sub-chapter as the hint or implication that 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a revelatory rather than a strictly rational text expands 
dramatically in the arresting third section. The third section takes up the thrust of the first 
section that we have just identified, but in a way that immediately strikes the reader as 
discontinuous because, whereas the surrounding sections are placed within a detailed 
chronology, this one points radically outside of that whole chronology by beginning with 
this question: “Does anyone, at the end of the nineteenth century, have any idea of what 
poets in strong ages called inspiration?” (Note that in the next section Nietzsche will 
refer to himself as “the poet of Zarathustra”.) By “inspiration” Nietzsche means: “the 
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sense of being just an incarnation, just a mouthpiece, just a medium for overpowering 
forces”. “The notion of revelation”, he comments, “provides a simple description of the 
facts of the matter”.  
Nietzsche then proceeds to a more detailed phenomenological description of the 
facts of the matter, which he encapsulates by introducing a striking neologism: “a perfect 
being-outside-yourself [ein vollkommnes Ausser-sich-sein]”133. As the translator Duncan 
Large observes in an editorial note, this phrase is especially striking because it “recalls 
the portrayal of Dionysian ‘ecstasy’ in BT 1”. In fact, in a fragment from 1869 that reads 
as a draft of the discussion in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche characterizes the 
Dionysian revelries with exactly this expression, and later he explicitly connects this 
experience of the dissolution of individual identity to a process whereby poets come to 
believe in their own creations (KGW III.3: 6). Was this then what Nietzsche allowed to 
happen with himself and his Zarathustra?  
In fact, towards the end of the third section of Ecce Homo’s sub-chapter on 
Zarathustra Nietzsche turns from describing the universal and immemorial “revelatory” 
phenomenon to venture an observation on his own description, i.e., a comment on it 
drawn at a distance from the experience itself: “it really seems - to recall a phrase of 
Zarathustra’s - as though the things themselves were stepping forward and offering 
themselves for allegorical purposes”. Then, as if recalling the experience of Zarathustra’s 
homecoming for himself, Nietzsche provides a direct quotation of the most 
‘metaphysical’ passage from the relevant speech in parentheses (“Here the words and 
                                                
133 Walter Kaufmann neuters this passage by translating Ausser-sich-sein as “beside oneself”. 
 162 
word-shrines of all Being spring open for you…”). But then, immediately outside of the 
parentheses, he emphatically asserts: “This is my experience of inspiration”. Nietzsche’s 
account of his experience of “revelation” thus seems to shade into the experience of his 
character Zarathustra while still retaining some separation from it, and it is not entirely 
clear where Nietzsche ends and Zarathustra begins. 
Implicitly, then, Nietzsche seems to be suggesting – consistent with the 
statements in the first section about how Thus Spoke Zarathustra “ambushed” him – that 
the whole work was the product of an immersion in the kinds of experiences just outlined 
- and, insofar as those are timeless experiences (at least, in “strong ages”), he would seem 
to be recommending them to the reader also. A passage from Daybreak – Nietzsche’s 
first “yes-saying” work, and thus the first to look to the shape of a potential future – 
seems to confirm this by offering a related discussion of some of the phenomena just 
mentioned: 
“Tragedy and Music. – Men whose disposition is fundamentally warlike, as for 
example the Greeks of the age of Aeschylus, are hard to move, and when pity 
does for once overbear their severity it seizes them like a frenzy and as through a 
‘demonic force’ – they then feel themselves under constraint and are excited by a 
shudder of religious awe. Afterwards they have doubts about their condition; but 
for as long as they are in it they enjoy the delight of the miraculous and of being-
outside-themselves…”  
Nietzsche goes on to suggest that such cathartic music ought to experience a resurgence 
in a stronger age of the future. It is worth noting that throughout the aphorism Nietzsche 
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refers variously to “tragedy”, “music”, “tragic poets”, “artists”, i.e., he has in mind the 
broad sense of the Greek mousikê. Given that all of these art forms have the potential to 
produce some sort of “being-outside-yourself”, we can conclude that Nietzsche sees them 
all as offering an inlet to the experience of revelation that he describes in Ecce Homo, and 
which he evidently experienced directly as “the poet of Zarathustra” (EH TSZ 4).  
 What this whole range of art forms and the experiences which they induce hold in 
common then, is “being-outside-yourself”, i.e., the sense of being part of something 
beyond or greater than oneself. It is therefore the very opposite of the “return to myself” 
that characterized Human, All Too Human. To that extent, it serve to underline the 
fundamental gulf that separates these two landmarks of Nietzsche’s career: Human… 
marked his return to, and focus on, his most individual self; Zarathustra represents a sort 
of turn away from himself, a receptivity to and immersion in what lies beyond him. 
Nietzsche’s account of himself in Ecce Homo thereby forces on us the same conundrum 
that both Human… and Zarathustra present the reader with (both considered by 
themselves and vis-à-vis each other): how to negotiate between the competing 
perspectives that they represent. From what standpoint can we judge the validity of a 
choice for either way of life (that of the free spirits, or that of Zarathustra)? Fortunately, 
Ecce Homo also shows us – albeit in a complex way – what such a standpoint might look 
like. 
 The standpoint in question is suggested in the second section of Ecce Homo’s 
sub-chapter on Zarathustra. This section of the sub-chapter is apparently incongruous, 
because it amounts to an “aphorism-within-an-aphorism”: that is, an unedited quotation 
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of a lengthy aphorism from The Gay Science, placed in the midst of Ecce Homo’s sub-
chapter on Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Still, Nietzsche introduces this aphorism-within-an-
aphorism in a way that helps to elucidate its purpose. At the end of the first section of the 
sub-chapter, Nietzsche gives a description of the circumstances under which Zarathustra 
“ambushed” him during a period of ill-health, referring to Zarathustra in this context as a 
“type”: “the whole first part of Zarathustra came to me, especially Zarathustra himself, 
as a type”. This notion of Zarathustra as a “type” appears here for the first time, and it is 
picked up at the very outset of the next section, which begins: “To understand this type 
[i.e., Zarathustra] you first need to be clear about its physiological precondition, which is 
what I call great health”. The fact that Nietzsche begins this section of his discussion by 
referring to Zarathustra as a “type” to be understood immediately suggests that a critical 
distance from Zarathustra’s perspective is being introduced. In other words: whereas in 
the first section of the chapter Nietzsche characterized his enterprise in Zarathustra as 
one of non-discursive or sub-rational inspiration, in this second section he points towards 
a vantage point from which that entire enterprise can be analyzed and evaluated. 
This impression is reinforced when we find that the remainder of the second 
section consists of an aphorism reproduced from the fifth book of The Gay Science, 
where it appeared as the penultimate aphorism (#382) under the heading “The Great 
Health”. Now, the fifth book of The Gay Science was composed several years after 
Nietzsche had completed Zarathustra; this fact must be kept in mind in order to 
understand why Nietzsche reproduced GS 382 in his retrospective assessment of 
Zarathustra in Ecce Homo.  
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To help clarify the significance of the chronological distance between Zarathustra 
and the fifth book of The Gay Science, the following timeline of Nietzsche’s writings 
may be of assistance: three books of Zarathustra were published separately between 1883 
and 1884, with a fourth book circulated privately in 1885. The fifth book of The Gay 
Science was written in 1886. This was the year when, with Zarathustra finally behind 
him, Nietzsche revisited his free-spirited beginnings: first, with the composition and 
publication of Beyond Good and Evil, in which the second of nine chapters would be 
entirely devoted to “The Free Spirit”; second, by reissuing the works of the free-spirited 
“middle-period” with new prefaces explaining the process of their composition – and, in 
the case of The Gay Science, also adding an entirely new, fifth, book.  
In view of the preceding chronology (as well as what we have seen of the 
competing alternatives of the free spirit and Zarathustra), we must expect that insofar as 
Nietzsche’s work in 1886 amounted to a shift back towards the free spirit, it should also 
constitute a movement away from the perspective which characterized the composition of 
Zarathustra. And, in fact, if we turn to the end of the chapter of Ecce Homo dealing with 
Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche’s first major project in 1886) our expectation is borne 
out: 
“…[Beyond Good and Evil] is a recuperation: after all, who could guess just what 
a recuperation is called for by such a squandering of goodness as is Zarathustra… 
Theologically speaking – and listen well, for I rarely speak as a theologian – it 
was God himself who lay down in the form of a serpent under the Tree of 
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Knowledge when his days’ work was done: that was his way of recuperating from 
being God…” 
Here Nietzsche confirms that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is to be understood as a sort of 
inspired product of quasi-divine creativity, while also admitting that a recovery from this 
miracle-work was needed. Let me add a few words on the creative half of that equation, 
before remarking on the recovery. 
 Nietzsche’s “theological” framing here obviously has an outrageous rhetorical 
aspect, but it also points to a more serious dimension of Zarathustra. We have already 
observed that the inspired process that produced the work can be seen in terms of 
timeless, universal “artistic” experiences which were well known among the ancient 
Greeks, and which we can still gain an inkling of today insofar as we can approach the 
state of “being-outside-oneself” that Nietzsche refers to. Moreover, the limit of such an 
experience, Nietzsche suggests, is the feeling of being divinely inspired – also a timeless 
and universal experience on Nietzsche’s account, albeit one that is less commonly 
recognized today134. But there is also a more specific variant of this phenomenon, 
namely, the “creativity” of the Biblical God, with which Nietzsche here so pointedly 
associates himself135. What this suggests is that Thus Spoke Zarathustra was not merely 
the product of an inspired intoxication on Nietzsche’s part, in the manner of, say, a Greek 
                                                
134 In addition to his own experience to which he appeals in his last book, in his first book 
Nietzsche had tried to help readers recognize it in the ancient poet Archilochus (BT 5-6).  
135 Laurence Cooper emphasizes Nietzsche’s imitation of the Biblical God (Eros in Plato, 
Rousseau, and Nietzsche, 248, 326).  
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rhapsode (cf. Plato, Ion). Thus Spoke Zarathustra is also something beyond that, because 
it is a creative project in the sense of self-consciously “divine” creation, i.e., an attempt to 
impact the world by reshaping it, giving it new laws or “values”, showing humanity how 
it can best live in that new world – with the crucial qualification that this is to be 
accomplished (in stark contrast to the example of Biblical divinity) entirely from within 
the human world, by human will, thereby showing the full sufficiency of the immanent 
world for the satisfaction of human concerns (cf. BGE 37, 150). In this way, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra amounts to a document of the philosophy of the future called for by The Gay 
Science. 
 But I have already suggested that Nietzsche also indicates that there was a certain 
limitation on his Zarathustrian project of world-creation: a need for repose or recovery 
that came along with it. At least this is hinted at by the description of Beyond Good and 
Evil as a “recuperation [erholte]” from Zarathustra. This thought is given a slight 
elaboration in the sub-chapter on Zarathustra, where the third section begins from an 
undated, timeless description of revelation and then gradually shades more directly into a 
specific description of Zarathustra, followed by a fourth section which opens with the 
sentence: “Afterwards I lay ill for a few weeks in Genoa”. After what Nietzsche does not 
pin down precisely, but if we take the statement at face value (i.e., as referring back to the 
third section which it immediately follows upon), it would mean that after the quasi-
divine flight of Zarathustra Nietzsche was brought back down to earth by his ever-
fractious health (that is, forced again to return-to-himself after being-outside-himself). 
This would also help to explain why Nietzsche required the “recuperation” of Beyond 
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Good and Evil after Zarathustra. Moreover, it sheds light on why Nietzsche included 
within Ecce Homo’s discussion of Zarathustra the aphorism on “great health” drawn 
from the fifth book of The Gay Science – i.e., an aphorism which was composed 
contemporaneous to his “recuperation” from the inspired work of Zarathustra, and which 
Nietzsche introduces in Ecce Homo as presenting the “physiological precondition” 
necessary to understanding Zarathustra, whom he has also just characterized as a “type”. 
In other words, in the very midst of presenting the “being-outside-oneself” characteristic 
of Zarathustra in its most extreme form, Nietzsche also introduces a perspective external 
to that experience, which makes possible a reflexive commentary on it. 
 In sum: the chronological and physiological distance which Nietzsche places 
between Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the perspective which he says is necessary for 
understanding it implies that the work of his greatest creativity was not, however, the 
work of his greatest clarity136.  
                                                
136 There is an important piece of evidence for this claim internal to the text of TSZ: the word 
“nature” only occurs once in the entire work (in the speech “On the Poets”), where it is placed in 
a very skeptical light. (Note that all translators of Zarathustra other than Parkes have the word 
appearing in several additional places where it might seem sensible for to Nietzsche to employ – 
but where, in fact, he does not invoke nature at all.) Nietzsche’s use of this word is typically quite 
self-conscious (see especially BGE 188); so far as I have been able to determine, the greatest 
density of its usage anywhere in his writings occurs in Ecce Homo, where he refers repeatedly to 
his own, individual (idiosyncratic) nature (e.g., “Wise” 8, “Clever” 3). This observation is 
complemented by the fact noted above (n131), to the effect that in the writings of his 
“recuperation” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche refers to Zarathustra mainly in song. 
(Also note that in these writings nature becomes a prominent theme in the main body of the texts: 
e.g., BGE 188, GS 363.) 
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 This last point is cast in an even more revealing light when the aphorism on “great 
health” is considered in its original context in the second edition of The Gay Science. 
There, the aphorism’s concluding words (“the tragedy begins…”) clearly echo the final 
aphorism to the first edition of the work, which had presented the opening section of the 
preface to Thus Spoke Zarathustra under the title “Incipit Tragoedia”. However: in the 
preface to the second edition of The Gay Science (i.e., contemporaneous to the 
“recuperation” from Zarathustra and related reflection on “great health”) Nietzsche also 
writes: “Incipit tragoedia, we read at the end of this suspiciously innocent book. Beware! 
Something utterly wicked and mischievous is being announced here: incipit parodia, no 
doubt”. So: having “recuperated” from writing Zarathustra Nietzsche can refer back to it 
from the perspective of 1886 in order to suggest that what had originally seemed a 
tragedy now may also appear as a parody – or, differently stated, that what had seemed 
deadly serious may also be viewed as not-so-serious. How could that be possible?  
 An answer is suggested by the aphorism on “great health” itself. If we begin from 
the end of the aphorism – that is, with the train of thought which directly precedes the 
conclusion “the tragedy begins” – we find that Nietzsche points towards not only the 
opening of TSZ (to which the “tragedy begins”/Incipit Trageoedia formulation had 
originally served as a heading), but also (as the introduction to the aphorism in EH 
indicated) to the way in which the “type” Zarathustra first came to sight for him. First, 
Nietzsche observes how the discovery of a new ideal will render one entirely dissatisfied 
with “present-day man”: “One must now look at his most worthy objectives and hopes 
with a seriousness that is difficult to maintain, and perhaps not even look”. This 
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repugnance is compensated for, however, by the alternative promised, by the rich 
“overflow” of the spirit which has seen through the old idols, so that their transcendence 
is accompanied by their replacement with a new “human-superhuman [menschlich-
übermenschlichen]” ideal which sets itself up against “all previous earthly seriousness”, 
making it appear ridiculous – a “parody”. But this is itself no laughing matter, for with 
the new ideal, Nietzsche stresses “the great seriousness at last begins” – or, as the 
aphorism concludes, “the tragedy begins”: Thus Spoke Zarathustra begins. 
 If we turn to the beginning of the aphorism, however, we see that the process 
which Nietzsche describes at its culmination is qualified in an essential respect. For at the 
aphorism’s outset Nietzsche stresses that “great health” involves not only the 
transcendence, but also the ability to immerse oneself in – and thus comprehend the 
innermost experience of – the reigning idols, especially in their religious aspect. Thus, 
Nietzsche notes that the “great health” requires one to feel oneself not only as “the 
discoverer and conqueror of the ideal”, but also as “an artist, a saint, a legislator, a sage, a 
scholar, a pious man, an old-style religious hermit”. To this, “Argonauts of the ideal” 
might say: well and good – this shows precisely that we have comprehended most 
thoroughly, and thus transcended decisively, the old idols. Against such a presumption, 
Nietzsche ventures: this process – not only the transcendence of old ideals, but the 
immersion in them – is to be repeated again and again, because the “great health” which 
makes it possible is “of the kind that you not only have but also still constantly acquire 
and have to acquire because time and again you give it up, have to give it up”. In other 
words, the new “seriousness” which Nietzsche’s “great health” makes possible is 
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necessarily temporary, a transcendence waiting to be transcended – and is in this sense 
both tragedy and parody, serious and unserious.  
 There is one crucial point to add here. If Nietzsche accepts the task of teaching the 
eternal recurrence, even in a qualified manner (e.g., as divorced from any strict 
cosmology, or as articulated through characters of his own creation), there remains a 
question as to why he would have done so even while acknowledging the transience of 
his and any teaching. And here I think that the aphorism on “great health” is especially 
instructive because it makes clear that such health emerges from an ever-renewed return 
to a certain core of archetypal human experiences – especially to different types of 
religious experience (“a saint”, “a pious man”, “an old-style religious hermit”), and 
others that are closely related to these types for Nietzsche (“an artist”, “a legislator”). 
This suggests that the recurring experiences in which the “great health” immerses itself in 
a way have a more primary status its products (e.g., the eternal recurrence). Reflection on 
Nietzsche’s doctrines thereby naturally leads to reflection on the experiences from which 
those doctrines are derived.  
 
The Path from Zarathustra 
 In Chapter 3 I suggested that understanding the place which Human, All Too 
Human occupies in Nietzsche’s thought could help us to tease out the question of the 
status of Nietzsche’s planned-but-never-completed magnum opus (Hauptwerk): The Will 
to Power. Was Nietzsche’s lifework left decisively incomplete by his inability to 
complete this Hauptwerk? Or do the works that he left behind (including The Antichrist, 
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which was at one point planned as the first of four volumes in The Will to Power) leave 
us with a sufficiently complete picture of his thought, so that we can analyze it without 
forever attaching an asterisk beside every interpretive claim? What I would like to 
suggest now is that the argument put forward in this study shows that we do indeed 
possess a sufficiently complete picture of Nietzsche’s thought to be able to grasp it as an 
integral whole, and that this is the case even if he would have gone on to write a further 
magnum opus meant to supersede all of his earlier writings.  
 I do not think that the historical record allows us to say with confidence whether 
or not Nietzsche finally intended to write his planned Hauptwerk, or exactly what form it 
would have taken. However, we do have sufficient evidence to identify a certain rhythm 
amongst Nietzsche’s writings, and thus to recognize how the Hauptwerk would have fit 
into that pattern. As we have seen, Nietzsche’s whole career is characterized by a 
transition from affirmative “yes-saying” works, to critical “no-saying” works, and back 
again (if the Hauptwerk had arrived). This can be observed in the first place by following 
the transition from Human, All Too Human to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and then to the 
works of 1886-1888, along with the indications in them that new positive project was still 
to come. But Ecce Homo also adds an essential insight into this trajectory, because its 
account of that process, and especially its account of the “great health” that produced it, 
suggest that this movement of thought was not accidental, but essential to Nietzsche’s 
life, and to human life more generally. Any planned Hauptwerk must therefore be 
understood as part of this broader movement, and the writings that Nietzsche left behind 
show us how the Hauptwerk would fit within the rhythm of his thought: it would have 
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amounted to Nietzsche’s attempt to test and expend his creative energies once more, to 
present his interpretation of the world more powerfully than he had before, though not 
with any greater finality, since the nature of the exercise does not admit of any finality.  
Since there can be no definitive interpretation, to exert oneself in the world will be to 
some extent to lose oneself within it, to abandon oneself in its enduring mystery. But one 
cannot get caught up in the mystery of the universe unless it somehow corresponds or 
responds to a mysterious aspect of oneself, a part of one’s self that remains mysterious to 
oneself. 
 This last thought touches on what is one of the most essential, perhaps even the 
essential, question of philosophy: the possibility and the nature of self-knowledge. If the 
argument just sketched out is sound, then I think we can conclude that, on Nietzsche’s 
account, the extent to which one could grasp oneself only in particular manner, where 
even and especially the most intense self-reflection would always provoke one to still 
further self-discovery, including a reengagement with the wider world that would reveal 
new depths to explore, for the mystery of the universe and the mystery of the soul run 
parallel: 
Parable. – Those thinkers in whom all stars move in cyclical orbits are not the 
deepest; he who looks into himself as into a vast space and bears galaxies within 
also knows how irregular galaxies are; they lead into the chaos and labyrinth of 
existence (GS 322) 
“Know thyself”, Socrates famously learned from the Delphic temple. Yes, but never 
altogether, Nietzsche adds: 
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An issue that is clarified ceases to concern us. – What did that god mean who 
counseled “Know Thyself!” Was it perhaps: “stop being of concern to yourself! 
Become objective!” – And Socrates? – And the “scientific human being?” – (BGE 
80) 
In order to recognize the full significance of this elliptical statement (which constitutes 
the entirety of an aphorism), it is helpful to read its clauses in reverse order.  
Nietzsche ends the aphorism from what is closest to us today, the ideal of a 
“scientific human being”. But the scientific ideal was already present in the ancient 
world, in Socratic rationality, which commanded its hearers to “become objective!” One 
this view, to “know thyself” is to know those aspects of oneself that are generalizable, 
subject to rational manipulation, and that enable one to take a critical distance on oneself, 
as if it were possible to be impartial with respect to oneself. In the ancient world this 
aspiration frequently seemed ridiculous: ancient scientists could hardly even walk straight 
(cf. Plato, Theaetetus 173c-174b), and the Socratic exhortation to self-knowledge was 
partly meant to correct their patently absurd follies. In the modern world, by contrast, 
science is monumentally successful, and a physicist who lacked all self-knowledge might 
nevertheless possess tremendous power. In that context, an exhortation to self-knowledge 
is required once more, only not an exhortation to “objectivity”, but instead a recognition 
of what remains permanently mysterious about ourselves. As Nietzsche remarks in the 
next aphorism: 
It is terrible to die of thirst in the ocean. So do you have to go and salt your truth 
so much that it no longer even – quenches a thirst? (BGE 81) 
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If this aphorism is read in light of its predecessor, it can be taken to mean: do not seek to 
know yourself so thoroughly that there is nothing left of significance for you to know. 
“An issue that is clarified ceases to concern us”: you can never be fully objective, you 
can never cease to be of concern to yourself, because you can never fully know 
yourself137. 
 And this rejoinder to modern science and ancient philosophy alike, written during 
Nietzsche’s “recuperation” from the admittedly intoxicated ambitions of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, I believe implicitly constitutes his most reflective and balanced assessment 
of that whole project. Nietzsche may have been able to look back on Zarathustra’s project 
of world-transformation with a more sober or skeptical eye (as The Gay Science’s 
reflection on “great health” suggests), but he would have been unwilling to concede that 
the possibility of some such project, and the attractiveness of such a project, should be 
abandoned. For he would have been unwilling to concede that even and especially the 
very wisest human beings can know themselves so perfectly well as to be fail to be 
tempted by some such project.  
 Let me elaborate this point slightly. Zarathustra’s project is not only one of 
demolishing the idols of the modern world; it is also one of establishing new ideals which 
comprehend and make use of the genuine enrichment of the soul effected by everything 
                                                
137 And maybe this is why Nietzsche ended Beyond Good and Evil by remarking that his claim 
“even gods philosophize” would “arouse suspicion precisely among philosophers” (295) – 
because it suggests that the object of philosophy may never be perfectly knowable, even for an 
omnipotent being. 
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that came before it. Indeed, a pervasive question for Nietzsche himself is not simply how 
to overthrow the old, Christian, God – but how to do so in a way that does justice to it as 
well (cf. BGE 60; GM I.6; HAH 251). This is the challenge or temptation that drives 
Zarathustra’s revolutionary activity, and which the free sprits remain at a critical distance 
from. The great practical question confronting the reader, then, is how or whether these 
two perspectives can be squared – is Zarathustra’s revolution necessary and desirable? Or 
to what extent can one remain merely a free spirit – critical of the modern world, without 





























Nietzsche’s thought, like that of any great political philosopher, enables  readers 
ensconced in any number of times or places to separate themselves to some extent from 
the spirit of their age, and view it from a more reflective distance. In the last chapter I 
tried to outline the sort of program which Nietzsche recommends for acquiring that 
perspective. 
At the same time, however, Nietzsche’s writings also lay out a much more 
specific sort of program: a particular response to the contemporary world, a political 
project that he holds to be necessary if the possibility of philosophy is to be carried on at 
all in any future world. The thrust of that project is, in a word, revolutionary: only it is 
not a revolution intended to “radicalize” any existing tendencies in liberal democracy (as, 
e.g., the communist revolutionaries of the 19th-and-20th centuries aimed at). Just the 
opposite: Nietzsche means to foreclose the possibility of ever returning to the late-
Christian, pseudo-Platonic, liberal democratic world once and for all. Fomenting such a 
revolution is the task taken up by his Zarathustra, but also to some extent by Nietzsche 
himself, as is clearest from one of his last books, the explicitly revolutionary Antichrist.  
Nietzsche’s political posture can make him appear as a discreditably reckless or 
irrelevant political thinker, for reasons that do not require much explanation. After all, for 
any reader who does not long to dispense with all that the modern world offers – or who 
is not enthused about the future that Nietzsche promises – his political posture will 
amount to a non-starter. Thus, Nietzsche’s most famous writings, beginning with Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, are often taken as offering outstanding intellectual provocation, but as 
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practical proposals they are either ignored or whittled-down into components that focus 
on the conduct of individual lives, rather than the structuring (and restructuring) of 
political society.  
To be sure, as noted in Chapter 3, Nietzsche’s pre-Zarathustrian writings offer 
somewhat more attractive practical options for the contemporary reader. In particular, 
Human, All Too Human outlines a program for adopting a roughly libertarian outlook that 
serves to foster a critical distance from contemporary society, without seeking to 
transform it in any revolutionary manner. That being said, having looked over 
Nietzsche’s entire corpus synoptically, we are now in a position to note that there is in 
fact a critical connection between the quietist outlook of Human, All Too Human and the 
revolutionary program of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Grasping that connection can help us 
to understand the nature of Nietzsche’s whole practical program – but it can also help us 
to discern a possible middle-ground which a sympathetic-but-skeptical reader could adopt 
in the modern world which remained true to the spirit of Nietzsche’s thought, without 
rushing immediately into its most extreme conclusions.  
 In order to show the relationship between the project of the free spirits and that of 
Zarathustra, we can begin from an issue raised at the very outset of this entire study: the 
“last man”. In the preface to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, its protagonist gives his famous 
description of the last man, the prospect of which is meant to incite his listeners to a 
revolutionary struggle to reverse the trajectory of the modern world – only to find his 
audience responding with laughter, eager to become last men, rather than seeking to 
avoid that fate. Zarathustra’s great speech about the last men – which amounts to 
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Nietzsche’s most famous description and indictment of the modern world – thereby 
proves to be entirely ineffectual. We are thereby confronted with the curious fact that 
Nietzsche’s most famous description and indictment of the modern world is entrusted to a 
mouthpiece, Zarathustra, while Nietzsche himself makes clear through the dramatic 
context that this speech will not suffice for rallying opposition to the modern world. In 
order to avoid the last men, then, one would require not only a vivid and detailed 
description of their horrors – but also an audience who was prepared to accept them as 
horrifying, rather than as appealing. In fact, Nietzsche has Zarathustra allude to the 
source of the difficulty only a few lines after beginning his peroration on the last man: “I 
say to you: one must have chaos within to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say to 
you: you still have chaos within you.” This supposition – initially taken for granted by 
Zarathustra, regarded with incredulity by the modern crowd, and therefore recognized as 
at least in need of clearer demonstration by Nietzsche – is the necessary fuel for the fire 
of the revolutionary project outlined later in the book (especially in the speech “On Old 
and New Tablets”), and Nietzsche’s own later writings (especially The Antichrist). But 
where is the basis for this crucial presupposition to be found? 
 Zarathustra’s own answer to this question is unfolded over the course of his 
singular journey through the margins of society, speaking to a few other characters here 
and there, and, even more, reflecting intensively on what he sees and what he hears, until 
he is finally able to promulgate a distinctly post-Christian, post-liberal democratic new 
world order near the end of Book Three (based on his insight into the will to power, and 
culminating in his affirmation of the eternal recurrence). In Chapter 2 of this study I 
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suggested that even at that point of Zarathustra’s journey, his mission remains somewhat 
problematic – and I also suggested that an alternative to Zarathustra is presented by the 
free spirits, who also engage in a critical analysis of modern society conducted from its 
margins, but whose activity remains wholly negative, rather than a prelude to affirmative 
transformation.  
 Nevertheless, it ought to noted that the whole dilemma which spurs Zarathustra to 
his journey of critical examination – namely, the failure of the great majority to recognize 
that they are still filled with “chaos”, and thus capable of overcoming themselves, rather 
than degenerating – is also a dilemma that Nietzsche confronted in his own way in the 
works that preceded Zarathustra: the works of the free spirit, or the “middle period”. And 
these writings in their way thereby give an answer to the dilemma that Zarathustra spends 
much of his journey puzzling over: namely, where sources of “chaos” can be located in 
the modern world, and how it can therefore be known that our world does not represent 
an endpoint for humankind, but a point of transition instead. In order to illustrate this 
point, we can begin by looking at the extent to which Zarathustra’s concerns about the 
last man are already present in Nietzsche’s earlier writings. 
 In Human, All Too Human the problem first emerges in the chapter on “Tokens of 
Higher and Lower Culture”, which includes a sequence of aphorisms on how the free 
spirits gradually become aware of the nature of human genius, and the exceptional social 
conditions required to bring it about. Nietzsche elaborates the problem most fully as 
follows: 
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Value of the middle way. – Perhaps the production of genius is reserved only to a 
very limited period in the life of mankind. For one cannot expect of the future of 
mankind that it will produce all at the same time things which required for their 
production quite definite conditions belonging to some period or other of the past; 
we cannot, for example, expect to see the astonishing effects of the religious 
feeling. This itself has had its time and many very good things can never thrive 
again because it was only out of it they could grow. Thus there will never again 
be a life and culture bounded by a religiously determined horizon. Perhaps even 
the type of the saint is possible only within a certain narrowness of the intellect 
which, as it seems, is now done with for all future time. And thus the high point of 
intelligence has perhaps been reserved for a single age of mankind: it appeared – 
and continues to appear, for we are still living in this age – when an extraordinary, 
long accumulated energy of will transferred itself through inheritance to spiritual 
goals. This high point will be past when that energy and wildness have ceased to 
be cultivated. Perhaps mankind will approach closer to its actual goals at the 
middle of its way, in the mid-period of its existence, than at its end. Forces such 
as condition the production of art, for example, could simply die out; delight in 
lying, in the vague, in the symbolic, in intoxication, in ecstasy, could fall into 
disrepute. Indeed, if life were ever to be ordered within the perfect state, there 
would no longer exist in the present any motive whatever for poetry and fiction, 
and it would only be the retarded who still had a desire for poetical unreality. 
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These would in any case look back in longing to the time of the imperfect state, of 
society still half barbaric, to our times (HAH 234)138 
The stark alternatives posed here by the “genius” and those who no longer possess “any 
motive whatever for poetry and fiction” unavoidably put one in mind of Zarathustra’s 
contrast between “supermen” and “last men”. And yet Nietzsche’s formulations here are 
also consistently tentative or speculative: perhaps, he says again and again. In other 
words, throughout this aphorism Nietzsche is extrapolating from certain facts about the 
modern world to help envision a future world that could come to exist, but does not in 
fact yet exist. Thus, at the end of the aphorism he gives a ringing affirmation of “our 
times” as “still half barbaric”, i.e., as still possessed of the potential for conflict, struggle, 
and for thus spirituality and overcoming – not a world of last men, but of human beings 
who still have chaos within them.  
 So how, then, does Nietzsche justify that last assertion? What entitled him to 
advance that claim with greater certainty than Zarathustra (whose initial confident 
assertions were shaken by the laughter of the modern crowd)? The answer is suggested 
by the fact that Nietzsche places this last reflection in a political context: it is due to the 
fact that we live with an “imperfect state” that inner chaos persists.  
 This last, political, thrust of Nietzsche’s reflection is elaborated in the next 
aphorism (which concludes this whole sequence of aphorisms treating the problem of 
genius): 
                                                
138 “Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever feels differently goes voluntarily into 
the madhouse” (TSZ Preface 5) 
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Genius incompatible with the ideal state. – The socialists desire to create a 
comfortable life for as many as possible. If the enduring homeland of this 
comfortable life, the perfect state, were really to be attained, then this comfortable 
life would destroy the soil out of which great intellect and the powerful individual 
in general grows: by which I mean great energy. If this state is achieved mankind 
would have become too feeble still to produce the genius. Ought one not desire 
therefore that life should retain its violent character and savage forces and 
energies continue to be called up again and again? (HAH 235) 
Nietzsche’s answer to this question in the remainder of the aphorism is resoundingly 
affirmative: “the highest intelligence and the warmest heart cannot coexist in the same 
person.” 
 At the risk of turning Nietzsche’s point here into a semantic game, the prospect of 
a “perfect state” (or “ideal state”) is, by his lights, itself imperfect or less-than-ideal. For 
it is only a state where people do not universally feel that their desires are fully satisfied 
that a spur to struggle and self-overcoming can be found. And Nietzsche therefore gives 
his qualified approval to the modern state in Human, All Too Human not because it is an 
ideal state, but precisely because it is imperfect, because it fails to satisfy or pacify all 
within its ambit. The free spirits take to the margins of society partly, then, to avoid 
efforts such as those of the socialists to “fix” the modern state’s problems – to make it 
more just, more equitable, more peaceful. In The Wanderer and His Shadow Nietzsche 
makes clear that the free spirits will take the greatest interest in modern politics when it 
can be seen as bridge to something beyond itself: this does not mean that they reject it, 
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but that they look for ways in which its institutions can act to store up and cultivate the 
energies that persist in the democratic world (WS 275). This includes a principled 
opposition to political forces which may evince an apparently admirable restless energy, 
but are in fact directed towards an unworthy goal (here Nietzsche alludes to the 
Bismarckian mélange of nationalism, militarism, and anti-Semitism that was popular 
during his lifetime: e.g., HAH 475, 480, 481). The free spirits therefore look to modern 
political institutions as transitional – but cautiously so, as the character of the transition 
remains a delicate and uncertain question, with as much to potentially be lost as to be 
gained in attempting to effect it (WS 350). 
 In sum: Zarathustra’s wanderings on the margins of society differ from the free 
spirits’ first of all in that Zarathustra becomes convinced that he has found a worthy and 
necessary replacement for the modern world. But the free spirits’ project is not entirely 
incompatible with Zarathustra’s, because it is an attempt to locate and cultivate sources of 
“chaos” within the modern world, so that it still may be overcome. Yet whether or not our 
world can and should be transformed is a question separate from whether it contains the 
potential for such transformation. The project of Nietzsche’s free spirits (that is, 
examining the extent to which modern politics has managed to satisfy the people that it 
governs, and gauging the depth and significance of any remaining opposition to it) 
therefore remains at least a viable project in the contemporary liberal world. Moreover, if, 
as I argued in Chapter 1, that world was also built and sustained on the basis of specific 
claims about what is most naturally and deeply satisfying to us (individually and 
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collectively), then such a project could not help but contribute to our understanding more 
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